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Cited by 291

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Voluntary Audits versus Mandatory Audits

Open access
Lennox, Clive S, Pittman, Jeffrey A·2011·The Accounting Review

Abstract

Exploiting a natural experiment in which voluntary audits replace mandatory audits for U.K. private companies, we analyze whether imposing audits suppresses valuable information about the types of companies that would voluntarily choose to be audited. We control for the assurance benefits of auditing to isolate the role signaling plays by focusing on companies that are audited under both regimes. These companies experience no change in audit assurance, although they can now reveal for the first time their desire to be audited. We find that these companies attract upgrades to their credit ratings because they send a positive signal by submitting to an audit when this is no longer legally required. In contrast, companies that dispense with being audited suffer downgrades to their ratings because avoiding an audit sends a negative signal and removes its assurance value. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.

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Crossref · 10.2308/accr-10098

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Metadata

Authors
Lennox, C. S., & Pittman, J. A.
Venue
The Accounting Review
Published
2011-05-01
Volume
86
Issue
5
Pages
1655-1678
ISSN
  • 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
  • 1558-7967
OpenAlex
W2162453114
Cited by
291
References
4
FWCI
42.33
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Voluntary Audits versus Mandatory Audits. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2308/accr-10098
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Lennox, C. S., & Pittman, J. A. (2011). Voluntary Audits versus Mandatory Audits. The Accounting Review. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10098

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.