The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Voluntary Audits versus Mandatory Audits
Open accessAbstract
Exploiting a natural experiment in which voluntary audits replace mandatory audits for U.K. private companies, we analyze whether imposing audits suppresses valuable information about the types of companies that would voluntarily choose to be audited. We control for the assurance benefits of auditing to isolate the role signaling plays by focusing on companies that are audited under both regimes. These companies experience no change in audit assurance, although they can now reveal for the first time their desire to be audited. We find that these companies attract upgrades to their credit ratings because they send a positive signal by submitting to an audit when this is no longer legally required. In contrast, companies that dispense with being audited suffer downgrades to their ratings because avoiding an audit sends a negative signal and removes its assurance value. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.
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Cites
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476 · cited 1×
“…loans to private companies that supply audited financial statements (e.g., Allee and Yohn 2009), banks also rely heavily on their debt monitoring and customer relationship activities to collect information on borrowers (e.g., Diamond 1984; Fama 1985; Petersen and Rajan 1994; Berger and Udell 1995).”
BackgroundAccounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital
LAMBERT, R., LEUZ, C., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (2007) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2007.00238.x · Cited by 2,586
The relevance of the value-relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting
Holthausen, R. W., & Watts, R. L. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00029-5 · Cited by 1,742 · cited 1×
“Prior research implies that debt contracting is partly responsible for the demand for conservative financial reporting (e.g., Leftwich 1983; Holthausen and Watts 2001).”
BackgroundThe Value of Auditor Assurance: Evidence from Loan Pricing
Blackwell, D. W., Noland, T. R., & Winters, D. B. (1998) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491320 · Cited by 417
Cited by
A review of archival auditing research
DeFond, M., & Zhang, J. (2014) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.09.002 · Cited by 3,188
The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review
Roychowdhury, S., Shroff, N., & Verdi, R. S. (2019) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.101246 · Cited by 749
Connecting the Dots: Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle
Aguilera, R. V., Desender, K. A., Bednar, M. K., & Lee, J. H. (2015) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2015.1024503 · Cited by 502
DeFond, M., Erkens, D. H., & Zhang, J. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2528 · Cited by 405
Reid, L. C., Carcello, J. V., Li, C., Neal, T. L., & Francis, J. R. (2019) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12486 · Cited by 371
Metadata
- Authors
- Lennox, C. S., & Pittman, J. A.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2011-05-01
- Volume
- 86
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1655-1678
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W2162453114
- Cited by
- 291
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 42.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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