The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rating Agency Adjustments to GAAP Financial Statements and Their Effect on Ratings and Credit Spreads
Abstract
I examine a dataset of both quantitative (hard) adjustments to firms' reported U.S. GAAP financial statement numbers and qualitative (soft) adjustments to firms' credit ratings that Moody's develops and uses in its credit rating process. I first document differences between firms' reported and Moody's adjusted numbers that are both large and frequent across firms. For example, primarily because of upward adjustments to interest expense and debt attributable to firms' off-balance sheet debt, on average, adjusted coverage (cash flow-to-debt) ratios are 27 percent (8 percent) lower and adjusted leverage ratios are 70 percent higher than the corresponding U.S. GAAP ratios. I then find that Moody's hard and soft rating adjustments are associated with significantly higher credit spreads and flatter credit spread term structures. Overall, the results indicate that Moody's quantitative adjustments to financial statement numbers and qualitative adjustments to credit ratings enable it to better capture default risk, consistent with it effectively processing both hard and soft information.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653 · cited 1×
“Under the view that rating agencies are efficient information intermediaries, bond investors rely on the rating agencies’ reputation, and rating manuals sufficiently explain the types of adjustments rating analysts undertake under their optimal effort choice (Wakeman (1984), White (2002), Partnoy (1999), SEC (2003), K…”
BackgroundPremiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
Shapiro, C. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881782 · Cited by 2,327
The relevance of the value-relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting
Holthausen, R. W., & Watts, R. L. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00029-5 · Cited by 1,742 · cited 2×
“Furthermore, the threat of litigation provides bond investors with limited recourse because, until 2010, courts have imposed a lower standard of care on rating agencies than on accountants and auditors (Husisian (1990), Partnoy (2006)).”
BackgroundMethod
Cited by
The impact of narrative disclosure readability on bond ratings and the cost of debt
Bonsall, S. B., & Miller, B. P. (2017) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-017-9388-0 · Cited by 500
Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective
CHRISTENSEN, H. B., NIKOLAEV, V. V., & WITTENBERG‐MOERMAN, R. (2016) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12108 · Cited by 301
Metadata
- Authors
- Kraft, P.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2014-07-01
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 641-674
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W3125299499
- Cited by
- 195
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 26.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.