The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
CEO Contractual Protection and Managerial Short-Termism
Open accessAbstract
How to address managerial short-termism is an important issue for companies, regulators, and researchers. We examine the effect of CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment agreements and severance pay agreements, on managerial short-termism. We find that firms with CEO contractual protection are less likely to cut R&D expenditures to avoid earnings decreases and are less likely to engage in real earnings management. The effect of CEO contractual protection is both statistically and economically significant. We further find that this effect increases with the duration and monetary strength of CEO contractual protection. The cross-sectional analyses indicate that the effect is stronger for firms in more homogeneous industries and for firms with higher transient institutional ownership, as protection is particularly important for CEOs in these firms, and is stronger when there are weaker alternative monitoring mechanisms. JEL Classifications: G32; M40
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Citations
Cites
Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/376950 · Cited by 3,777
Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia
Stein, J. C. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261524 · Cited by 1,673
Is there Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (1999) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556062 · Cited by 221 · cited 3×
“, Bertrand and Mullainathan 1999, 2003) and, thus, CEO protection becomes less important. Garmaise (2011) finds that in states where non-competition agreements are better enforced, executive stability increases.”
BackgroundInfluential
Cited by
The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review
Roychowdhury, S., Shroff, N., & Verdi, R. S. (2019) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.101246 · Cited by 749
“Chen et al. (2015) investigate a second manifestation of this phenomenon: they distinguish between CEOs with long-term employment contracts and/or severance contracts and those without, reasoning that the former have a longer-term perspective on firm value.”
BackgroundIncorrect Inferences When Using Residuals as Dependent Variables
CHEN, W., HRIBAR, P., & MELESSA, S. (2018) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12195 · Cited by 701
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management
Cheng, Q., Lee, J., & Shevlin, T. (2016) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-51275 · Cited by 412
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Chen, X., Cheng, Q., Lo, A. K., & Wang, X.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2015-01-01
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1871-1906
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W3121153177
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 36.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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