Corporate Accountability Reporting and High-Profile Misconduct
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I investigate whether corporate accountability reporting helps protect firm value. Specifically, I examine (1) whether corporate accountability reporting helps firms prevent the occurrence of high-profile misconduct (e.g., bribery, kickbacks, discrimination), and (2) whether prior corporate accountability reporting reduces the negative stock price reaction when high-profile misconduct does occur. Using multiple methods to address self-selection, I find that, on average, firms that report on their corporate accountability activities are less likely to engage in high-profile misconduct, consistent with the reporting process helping firms to manage their operations better. Additionally, I find that when high-profile misconduct does occur, firms that have previously issued corporate accountability reports experience a less negative stock price reaction, consistent with corporate accountability reports influencing perceptions of managerial intent, which, in turn, influences expected punishments.
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Cited by
Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review
Christensen, H. B., Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2021) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-021-09609-5 · Cited by 1,923
“…or society at large (Godfrey et al. 2009; Hoepner et al. 2019); around corporate scandals and high-profile misconduct (Janney and Gove 2011; Christensen 2016); after inadvertent (non-fraudulent) financial restatements (Bartov et al. 2020); following negative press coverage (Shiu and Yang…”
BackgroundWhy is Corporate Virtue in the Eye of The Beholder? The Case of ESG Ratings
Christensen, D. M., Serafeim, G., & Sikochi, A. (2022) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-2019-0506 · Cited by 1,537
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Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure: A literature review
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Larcker, D. F., & Watts, E. M. (2020) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101312 · Cited by 562
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Perspectives on Corporate Tax Planning: Observations from the Past Decade
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CEO overconfidence and CSR decoupling
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“We respond to call by Christensen (2016) who suggests that future research should examine the interaction between corporate governance and voluntary disclosures in impact on firm performance.”
BackgroundEconomic Analysis of Widespread Adoption of CSR and Sustainability Reporting Standards
Christensen, H. B., Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3315673 · Cited by 67
Metadata
- Authors
- Christensen, D. M.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2015-07-01
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 377-399
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W2162011391
- Cited by
- 383
- References
- 56
- FWCI
- 43.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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