Do Career Concerns Affect the Delay of Bad News Disclosure?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Theory argues that career concerns (i.e., concerns about the impact of current performance on contemporaneous and future compensation) encourage managers to withhold bad news disclosure. However, empirical evidence regarding the extent to which a manager's career concerns are associated with a delay in bad news disclosure is limited. Across multiple proxies for career concerns, we find that the extent to which managers delay bad news is positively associated with their level of career concerns. Then, we hand-collect data on a compensation contract that firms use to reduce CEOs' career concerns (i.e., ex ante severance pay agreements). We find that if managers receive a sufficiently large payment in the event of dismissal, they no longer delay the disclosure of bad news. Overall, our findings support prior theoretical evidence that managers delay bad news disclosure due to career concerns and suggest a mechanism through which firms can mitigate the delay. JEL Classifications: M12; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
White, H. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912934 · Cited by 25,861 · cited 2×
“The definitions of each variable are presented in Appendix A. Presented t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 1980).”
BackgroundHealy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00018-0 · Cited by 8,097 · cited 7×
“In a theoretical paper, Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) link managers’ career concerns to disclosure choice, and assume that owners assess the CEO’s ability using all available information and replace the CEO if their assessment is too low. They conclude that optimal disclosure lacks transparency, and that this issue is…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe economic implications of corporate financial reporting
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002 · Cited by 6,316
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies
Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. L. (1992) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(92)90029-w · Cited by 3,589 · cited 2×
“On the other hand, severance pay could be a form of efficient contracting that reduces managerial risk-aversion (i.e., career concerns) and increases firm value (i.e., Lambert and Larcker 1985, 1987; Knoeber 1986; Smith and Watts 1992; Ju, Leland, and Senbet 2014).”
BackgroundMethodological Issues Related to the Estimation of Financial Distress Prediction Models
Zmijewski, M. E. (1984) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2490859 · Cited by 2,888 · cited 2×
“DistressRisk Coded 1, if the firm’s Z-score (Zmijewski 1984) financial distress rank is in the top quartile of the sample; otherwise coded 0 HiInsideOwn Coded 1, if the share-ownership of the firm’s insiders is above the median value of the sample in the fiscal year; otherwise coded 0 OutsideCEO Coded 1, if the CEO wa…”
BackgroundThe financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature
Beyer, A., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., & Walther, B. R. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.003 · Cited by 2,609
Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News
Skinner, D. J. (1994) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491386 · Cited by 2,427 · cited 4×
“Specifically, we control for the firm’s litigation risk (Kasznik and Lev 1995; Skinner 1994, 1997; Baginski et al. 2002), information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors (Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson 1995; Lang and Lundholm 2000; Aboody and Kasznik 2000), distress risk (Weisbach…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialVerrecchia, R. E. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00025-8 · Cited by 2,303
Cited by
Do firms underreport information on cyber-attacks? Evidence from capital markets
Amir, E., Levi, S., & Livne, T. (2018) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-018-9452-4 · Cited by 295
Powerful CEOs and stock price crash risk
Al Mamun, M., Balachandran, B., & Duong, H. N. (2020) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101582 · Cited by 257
Beyond earnings quality: evaluating the quality of corporate disclosure practices
Dechow, P. M., Ge, W., Loh, W. T., & McVay, S. (2026) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-026-09971-2 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Baginski, S. P., Campbell, J. L., Hinson, L. A., & Koo, D. S.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2017-07-01
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 61-95
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W3122790099
- Cited by
- 231
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 40.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Do Career Concerns Affect the Delay of Bad News Disclosure? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2308/accr-51848
- The paper
- Baginski, S. P., Campbell, J. L., Hinson, L. A., & Koo, D. S. (2018). Do Career Concerns Affect the Delay of Bad News Disclosure? The Accounting Review. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51848
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.