Do Career Concerns Affect the Delay of Bad News Disclosure?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Theory argues that career concerns (i.e., concerns about the impact of current performance on contemporaneous and future compensation) encourage managers to withhold bad news disclosure. However, empirical evidence regarding the extent to which a manager's career concerns are associated with a delay in bad news disclosure is limited. Across multiple proxies for career concerns, we find that the extent to which managers delay bad news is positively associated with their level of career concerns. Then, we hand-collect data on a compensation contract that firms use to reduce CEOs' career concerns (i.e., ex ante severance pay agreements). We find that if managers receive a sufficiently large payment in the event of dismissal, they no longer delay the disclosure of bad news. Overall, our findings support prior theoretical evidence that managers delay bad news disclosure due to career concerns and suggest a mechanism through which firms can mitigate the delay. JEL Classifications: M12; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
White, H. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912934 · Cited by 25,861 · cited 2×
“The definitions of each variable are presented in Appendix A. Presented t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 1980).”
BackgroundHealy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00018-0 · Cited by 8,097 · cited 7×
“In a theoretical paper, Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) link managers’ career concerns to disclosure choice, and assume that owners assess the CEO’s ability using all available information and replace the CEO if their assessment is too low. They conclude that optimal disclosure lacks transparency, and that this issue is…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe economic implications of corporate financial reporting
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002 · Cited by 6,316
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies
Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. L. (1992) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(92)90029-w · Cited by 3,589 · cited 2×
“On the other hand, severance pay could be a form of efficient contracting that reduces managerial risk-aversion (i.e., career concerns) and increases firm value (i.e., Lambert and Larcker 1985, 1987; Knoeber 1986; Smith and Watts 1992; Ju, Leland, and Senbet 2014).”
BackgroundMethodological Issues Related to the Estimation of Financial Distress Prediction Models
Zmijewski, M. E. (1984) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2490859 · Cited by 2,888 · cited 2×
“DistressRisk Coded 1, if the firm’s Z-score (Zmijewski 1984) financial distress rank is in the top quartile of the sample; otherwise coded 0 HiInsideOwn Coded 1, if the share-ownership of the firm’s insiders is above the median value of the sample in the fiscal year; otherwise coded 0 OutsideCEO Coded 1, if the CEO wa…”
BackgroundThe financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature
Beyer, A., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., & Walther, B. R. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.003 · Cited by 2,609
Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News
Skinner, D. J. (1994) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491386 · Cited by 2,427 · cited 4×
“Specifically, we control for the firm’s litigation risk (Kasznik and Lev 1995; Skinner 1994, 1997; Baginski et al. 2002), information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors (Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson 1995; Lang and Lundholm 2000; Aboody and Kasznik 2000), distress risk (Weisbach…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialVerrecchia, R. E. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00025-8 · Cited by 2,303
Executive compensation as an agency problem
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2009) · The Economic Nature of the Firm · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511817410.026 · Cited by 2,282
Do Managers Withhold Bad News?
KOTHARI, S. P., SHU, S., & WYSOCKI, P. D. (2009) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2008.00318.x · Cited by 2,155 · cited 59×
“Additionally, we exclude observations with analyst consensus forecast less than five cents, management forecast news less than one percent of the analyst consensus forecast, and the top and bottom one percent of management forecast news (as in Kothari et al. 2009).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialPay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-4735 · Cited by 1,936
Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information
Dye, R. A. (1985) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2490910 · Cited by 1,905
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261826 · Cited by 1,873
Management's Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises
Matsumoto, D. A. (2002) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2002.77.3.483 · Cited by 1,613
Skinner, D. J., & Sloan, R. G. (2002) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1023/a:1020294523516 · Cited by 1,471
CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures
Aboody, D., & Kasznik, R. (2000) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(00)00014-8 · Cited by 1,053 · cited 7×
“2002), information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors (Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson 1995; Lang and Lundholm 2000; Aboody and Kasznik 2000), distress risk (Weisbach 1988; Gilson 1989; DeAngelo 1998; Kothari et al. 2009), and insider and managerial ownership levels (Kothari et al. 2009). Each of these co…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialLambert, R. A., & Larcker, D. F. (1987) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491081 · Cited by 1,046 · cited 1×
“On the other hand, severance pay could be a form of efficient contracting that reduces managerial risk-aversion (i.e., career concerns) and increases firm value (i.e., Lambert and Larcker 1985, 1987; Knoeber 1986; Smith and Watts 1992; Ju, Leland, and Senbet 2014).”
BackgroundGood Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements
YERMACK, D. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04809.x · Cited by 973 · cited 2×
“On the one hand, managers may accelerate the disclosure of bad news (or delay the disclosure of good news) to mitigate personal liability over litigation (Skinner 1994; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough 2002) or to lower the exercise price on their option grants (Yermack 1997; Aboody and Kasznik 2…”
BackgroundEarnings disclosures and stockholder lawsuits
Skinner, D. J. (1997) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(97)00010-4 · Cited by 925 · cited 3×
“Specifically, we control for the firm’s litigation risk (Kasznik and Lev 1995; Skinner 1994, 1997; Baginski et al. 2002), information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors (Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson 1995; Lang and Lundholm 2000; Aboody and Kasznik 2000), distress risk (Weisbach…”
BackgroundCredibility of Management Forecasts
Rogers, J. L., & Stocken, P. C. (2005) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2005.80.4.1233 · Cited by 909
CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies
Serfling, M. A. (2014) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.12.013 · Cited by 904
To Warn or Not to Warn: Management Disclosures in the Face of an Earnings Surprise.
Kasznik, R., & Lev, B. I. (1995) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-9502082508 · Cited by 888 · cited 4×
“On the one hand, managers may accelerate the disclosure of bad news (or delay the disclosure of good news) to mitigate personal liability over litigation (Skinner 1994; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough 2002) or to lower the exercise price on their option grants (Yermack 1997; Aboody and Kasznik 2…”
BackgroundInfluentialMeasuring securities litigation risk
Kim, I., & Skinner, D. J. (2012) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.09.005 · Cited by 842
CEO tenure and earnings management
Ali, A., & Zhang, W. (2015) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.11.004 · Cited by 735
Disclosure When the Market Is Unsure of Information Endowment of Managers
Jung, W.-O., & Kwon, Y. K. (1988) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491118 · Cited by 701
The Role of Supplementary Statements with Management Earnings Forecasts
Hutton, A. P., Miller, G. S., & Skinner, D. J. (2003) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1046/j.1475-679x.2003.00126.x · Cited by 682
Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment
Garmaise, M. J. (2011) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewp033 · Cited by 542 · cited 3×
“Garmaise (2011) notes that labor laws vary by state and non-compete agreements are enforced in a relatively small number of states.”
BackgroundInfluentialEntrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures
Almazán, A., & Suárez, J. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00536 · Cited by 452
Bundled forecasts in empirical accounting research
Rogers, J. L., & Van Buskirk, A. (2013) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2012.06.001 · Cited by 302
Jennings, R. (1987) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491260 · Cited by 291 · cited 3×
“We rigorously consider the strength of these proxies in Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4. strongly to the more credible bad news (Jennings 1987; Hutton et al. 2003; Ng et al. 2013).”
BackgroundInfluentialGolden parachutes, executive decision-making, and shareholder wealth
Lambert, R. A., & Larcker, D. F. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90036-9 · Cited by 277 · cited 1×
“On the other hand, severance pay could be a form of efficient contracting that reduces managerial risk-aversion (i.e., career concerns) and increases firm value (i.e., Lambert and Larcker 1985, 1987; Knoeber 1986; Smith and Watts 1992; Ju, Leland, and Senbet 2014).”
BackgroundGolden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers
Knoeber, C. R. (1986) · American Economic Review · Cited by 259
Specific Capital and Labor Turnover
Mortensen, D. T. (1978) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003599 · Cited by 254
Explicit versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO Employment Agreements
GILLAN, S. L., HARTZELL, J. C., & PARRINO, R. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01475.x · Cited by 200
Golden handshakes: Separation pay for retired and dismissed CEOs
Yermack, D. (2006) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.01.001 · Cited by 184
Management Forecast Credibility and Underreaction to News
Ng, J., Tuna, İ., & Verdi, R. S. (2011) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-012-9217-4 · Cited by 173 · cited 4×
“We rigorously consider the strength of these proxies in Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4. strongly to the more credible bad news (Jennings 1987; Hutton et al. 2003; Ng et al. 2013).”
InfluentialThe Effect of Litigation Risk on Management Earnings Forecasts*
Cao, Z., & Narayanamoorthy, G. S. (2010) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01045.x · Cited by 163 · cited 3×
“…of litigation induces managers to voluntarily disclose bad news prior to the mandatory earnings announcement (Skinner 1994; Baginski et al. 2002; Cao and Narayanamoorthy 2011) because timely disclosure (1) makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to successfully argue that management withheld…”
BackgroundResultCEO Contractual Protection and Managerial Short-Termism
Chen, X., Cheng, Q., Lo, A. K., & Wang, X. (2015) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-51033 · Cited by 162
Transparency and Corporate Governance
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w12875 · Cited by 156
Ali, A., Li, N., & Zhang, W. (2018) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-52314 · Cited by 144
Does the midpoint of range earnings forecasts represent managers’ expectations?
Ciconte, W., Kirk, M., & Tucker, J. W. (2013) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-013-9259-2 · Cited by 127 · cited 22×
“By examining earnings announcements and by measuring news based on the sign of market returns, they are not exposed to the measurement issue identified by Ciconte et al. (2014).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialDas, S., Kim, K., & Patro, S. (2011) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-10128 · Cited by 120
Detailed management earnings forecasts: do analysts listen?
Merkley, K. J., Bamber, L. S., & Christensen, T. E. (2012) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-012-9214-7 · Cited by 67 · cited 1×
“Furthermore, recent research warns against proliferating the “stylized inference” that bad news is inherently more credible than good news (Merkley, Bamber, and Christensen 2013).”
BackgroundAre Ex Ante CEO Severance Pay Contracts Consistent with Efficient Contracting?
Cadman, B. D., Campbell, J. L., & Klasa, S. (2016) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109016000375 · Cited by 48 · cited 11×
“B of Cadman et al. (2014) fully describes this hand-collection process.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationEx Ante Severance Agreements and Earnings Management
Brown, K. (2015) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12103 · Cited by 25 · cited 5×
“Cadman et al. (2014) find that the contracted severance payment amount is positively associated with CEO risk-taking and the extent to which a CEO invests in projects that have a positive net-present-value.”
BackgroundInfluentialRedundancy Payments and Firm-Specific Training
Booth, A., & Chatterji, M. (1989) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554326 · Cited by 19
The Effects of Employer-Provided Severance Benefits on Reemployment Outcomes
Kodrzycki, Y. K. (1998) · New England economic review · Cited by 18
Managerss Pay Duration and Voluntary DisclosuresPreprint
Cheng, Q., Cho, Y. J., & Kim, J. B. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2372814 · Cited by 4
Cited by
Do firms underreport information on cyber-attacks? Evidence from capital markets
Amir, E., Levi, S., & Livne, T. (2018) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-018-9452-4 · Cited by 295
Powerful CEOs and stock price crash risk
Al Mamun, M., Balachandran, B., & Duong, H. N. (2020) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101582 · Cited by 257
Beyond earnings quality: evaluating the quality of corporate disclosure practices
Dechow, P. M., Ge, W., Loh, W. T., & McVay, S. (2026) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-026-09971-2 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Baginski, S. P., Campbell, J. L., Hinson, L. A., & Koo, D. S.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2017-07-01
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 61-95
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W3122790099
- Cited by
- 231
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 40.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.