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Cited by 310

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Price versus Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts

Core, John E., Guay, Wayne R., Verrecchia, Robert E. · 2003 · The Accounting Review

Abstract

We empirically examine standard agency predictions about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives. Consistent with prior empirical research, we document that the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO cash pay is a decreasing function of the relative variances. Agency theory speaks to the weights in total compensation (annual total pay and changes in the CEO's equity portfolio value), however, and we document that very little of CEOs' total incentives come from cash pay. We also document that variation in the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO total compensation is an increasing function of the relative variances. The conflicting results using total compensation indicate that existing findings on cash pay cannot be interpreted as evidence supporting standard agency predictions. Based on our results, we suggest approaches for future research on performance measure use in CEO total compensation.

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Metadata

Authors
Core, J. E., Guay, W. R., & Verrecchia, R. E.
Venue
The Accounting Review
Published
2003-10-01
Volume
78
Issue
4
Pages
957-981
ISSN
  • 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
  • 1558-7967
OpenAlex
W3121591358
Cited by
310
References
45
FWCI
39.79
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Price versus Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2308/accr.2003.78.4.957
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Core, J. E., Guay, W. R., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2003). Price versus Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts. The Accounting Review. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2003.78.4.957

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