The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Price versus Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts
Abstract
We empirically examine standard agency predictions about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives. Consistent with prior empirical research, we document that the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO cash pay is a decreasing function of the relative variances. Agency theory speaks to the weights in total compensation (annual total pay and changes in the CEO's equity portfolio value), however, and we document that very little of CEOs' total incentives come from cash pay. We also document that variation in the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO total compensation is an increasing function of the relative variances. The conflicting results using total compensation indicate that existing findings on cash pay cannot be interpreted as evidence supporting standard agency predictions. Based on our results, we suggest approaches for future research on performance measure use in CEO total compensation.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260062 · Cited by 29,074
A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
White, H. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912934 · Cited by 25,861
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261354 · Cited by 6,236
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,903
The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies
Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. L. (1992) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(92)90029-w · Cited by 3,589
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913238 · Cited by 2,859
Regression standard errors in clustered samples
Rogers, W. H. (1993) · Stata technical bulletin · Cited by 2,694
Financial accounting information and corporate governance
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00027-1 · Cited by 2,283
Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance
Mehran, H. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00809-f · Cited by 2,086
Corporate performance and managerial remuneration
Murphy, K. J. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90026-6 · Cited by 1,755
Core, J., & Guay, W. (2002) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.00064 · Cited by 1,696
Self-citationThe use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels
Core, J., & Guay, W. (1999) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00019-1 · Cited by 1,456
Self-citationAre CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
Hall, B. J., & Liebman, J. B. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555702 · Cited by 1,308
Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
Hall, B., & Liebman, J. (1997) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w6213 · Cited by 1,291
Gaver, J. J., & Gaver, K. M. (1993) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(93)90007-3 · Cited by 1,257
Stock options for undiversified executives
Hall, B. J., & Murphy, K. J. (2002) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00050-7 · Cited by 1,159
Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems
Bushman, R., Chen, Q., Engel, E., & Smith, A. (2004) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.09.005 · Cited by 1,059
Contracting theory and accounting
Lambert, R. A. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00037-4 · Cited by 1,050
Lambert, R. A., & Larcker, D. F. (1987) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491081 · Cited by 1,046
The Other Side of the Trade‐Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation
Aggarwal, R. K., & Samwick, A. A. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250051 · Cited by 1,037
The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives
Prendergast, C. (2002) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/341874 · Cited by 995
Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation
Banker, R. D., & Datar, S. M. (1989) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491205 · Cited by 875
Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation
Lamber, R. A., Larcker, D. F., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1991) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491032 · Cited by 843
Self-citationAccounting earnings and top executive compensation
Sloan, R. G. (1993) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(93)90005-z · Cited by 817
An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives
Antle, R., & Smith, A. (1986) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2490802 · Cited by 677
CEO reputation and stock-based compensation
Milbourn, T. T. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00066-7 · Cited by 639
Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory
Garen, J. E. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261967 · Cited by 610
Performance standards in incentive contracts
Murphy, K. J. (2000) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00013-1 · Cited by 549
Baker, G. P., & Hall, B. J. (2004) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/423154 · Cited by 487
Employee stock option exercises an empirical analysis
Huddart, S., & Lang, M. (1996) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(95)00409-2 · Cited by 484
CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation
Bushman, R. M., Indjejikian, R. J., & Smith, A. (1996) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(95)00416-5 · Cited by 482
Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation
Baber, W. R., Janakiraman, S. N., & Kang, S.-H. (1996) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(96)00421-1 · Cited by 430
CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives
Jin, L. (2002) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00150-2 · Cited by 384
An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation Hypothesis
Janakiraman, S. N., Lambert, R. A., & Larcker, D. F. (1992) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491091 · Cited by 305
Accounting income, stock price, and managerial compensation
Bushman, R. M., & Indjejikian, R. J. (1993) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(93)90003-x · Cited by 266
On the Efficiency of Stock-based Compensation
Paul, J. M. (1992) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/5.3.471 · Cited by 266
Executive Compensation: Six Questions that Need Answering
Abowd, J., & Kaplan, D. (1999) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7124 · Cited by 230
Accounting earnings and executive compensation:
Baber, W. R., Kang, S.-H., & Kumar, K. R. (1998) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(98)00021-4 · Cited by 209
Bettis, J. C., Bizjak, J. M., & Lemmon, M. L. (2001) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2676287 · Cited by 202
Executive Compensation: Six Questions That Need Answering
Abowd, J. M., & Kaplan, D. S. (1999) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.13.4.145 · Cited by 192
The self-serving management hypothesis
Benston, G. J. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90028-x · Cited by 174
Accounting and Stock Price Performance in Dynamic CEO Compensation Arrangements
Boschen, J. F., Duru, A. I., Gordon, L. A., & Smith, K. J. (2003) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2003.78.1.143 · Cited by 96
Core, J. E., & Guay, W. R. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.271123 · Cited by 24
Self-citation
Cited by
The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 · Cited by 1,494
Self-citationAccounting Conservatism and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm‐level Evidence
Kim, J., & Zhang, L. (2016) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12112 · Cited by 1,039
A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium
Edmans, A., Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn117 · Cited by 559
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958 · Cited by 542
Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?
MORSE, A., NANDA, V., & SERU, A. (2011) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01687.x · Cited by 432
Metadata
- Authors
- Core, J. E., Guay, W. R., & Verrecchia, R. E.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2003-10-01
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 957-981
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W3121591358
- Cited by
- 310
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 39.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.