The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
R&D Expenditures and CEO Compensation
Abstract
This study investigates whether compensation committees seek to prevent opportunistic reductions in R&D expenditures. I hypothesize that changes in R&D spending are more strongly positively associated with changes in CEO compensation in two situations: (1) when the CEO approaches retirement, and (2) when the firm faces a small earnings decline or a small loss. Consistent with these hypotheses, the results indicate that the association between changes in R&D spending and changes in the value of CEO annual option grants is significantly positive in the above two situations, and insignificant otherwise. Similar results hold for changes in CEO annual total compensation. The results also show that neither situation is associated with reduced R&D spending. Overall, these findings suggest that compensation committees respond to, and effectively mitigate, potential opportunistic reductions in R&D spending.
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Cites
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Evidence on the Trade-Off between Real Activities Manipulation and Accrual-Based Earnings Management
Zang, A. Y. (2012) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-10196 · Cited by 2,291
GUNNY, K. A. (2010) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01029.x · Cited by 1,416
CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies
Serfling, M. A. (2014) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.12.013 · Cited by 904
CEO tenure and earnings management
Ali, A., & Zhang, W. (2015) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.11.004 · Cited by 735
Does a long‐term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity
Flammer, C., & Bansal, P. (2017) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2629 · Cited by 670
Metadata
- Authors
- Cheng, S.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2004-04-01
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 305-328
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W2118949969
- Cited by
- 479
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 33.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.