Towards a Positive Theory of the Determination of Accounting Standards.
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article provides the beginnings of a positive theory of accounting by exploring those factors influencing management's attitudes on accounting standards which are likely to affect corporate lobbying on accounting standards. Certain factors are expected to affect a firm's cashflows and in turn are affected by accounting standards. These factors are taxes, regulation, management compensation plans, bookkeeping costs, and political costs, and they are combined into a model which predicts that large firms which experience reduced earnings due to changed accounting standards favor the change. All other firms oppose the change if the additional bookkeeping costs justify the cost of lobbying. This prediction was tested using the corporate submissions to the FASB's Discussion Memorandum on General Price Level Adjustments. The empirical results are consistent with the theory.
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“For instance, larger, more highly visible firms are often well-suited targets for activist campaigns and also subject to more media scrutiny subsequent to poor CSR performance, compared to smaller, lesser known firms (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1978).”
From Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review (2021) · cites this paper as Watts and Zimmerman 1978
In the citing paper
“Contrary to the literature that states that external stakeholder pressure has significant impacts on corporate social responsibility implementation [138], and that companies may invest in philanthropic activities to improve external perceptions and influence external decision-makers that affect the company [139], Benefit Corporations had an internally driven proactive behavior.”
From Sustainability Reporting and Performance Measurement Systems: How do Small- and Medium-Sized Benefit Corporations Manage Integration? (2018) · cites this paper as [139]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L.
- Affiliations
- University of Rochester (US)
- ORCID
- Zimmerman, Jerold L.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 1978-01-01
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 112-134
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W40198218
- Cited by
- 2,667
- References
- 23
- Citations by year
- 2026: 72 · 2025: 71 · 2024: 118 · 2023: 119 · 2022: 118 · 2021: 128 · 2020: 147 · 2019: 134 · 2018: 140 · 2017: 117 · 2016: 138 · 2015: 121 · 2014: 175 · 2013: 123 · 2012: 115
- FWCI
- 97.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Locations
- The Accounting Review (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Accounting Theory and Financial Reporting
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Accounting and Organizational Management
- Keywords
- accounting standards, corporate lobbying, managerial attitudes, price level adjustment, executive compensation, corporate taxation, political costs, firm size
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.