Is Voluntary Profiling Welfare Enhancing?1
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Although consumer profiling advocates tout benefits from personalization, consumer advocacy groups oppose profiling in online markets because of concerns about privacy and price discrimination. Policies such as opt-out or opt-in that provide consumers the option to voluntarily participate in profiling are the favored compromise. We compare voluntary profiling to no profiling and show that voluntary profiling leads to some counterintuitive results. Consumers that do not participate in profiling and some that participate are worse off under voluntary profiling. Neither social welfare nor aggregate consumer surplus is necessarily higher under voluntary profiling; even when voluntary profiling leads to an increase in social welfare, it may come at the expense of consumer surplus. If the seller cannot price discriminate and charge only a uniform price for everyone or the seller can only charge different prices based on the consumer’s participation status, then aggregate consumer surplus under voluntary profiling is higher and a reduction in privacy cost has a positive impact on all consumers as well as the seller. However, when personalized pricing is possible, reducing privacy cost alone may reduce aggregate consumer surplus. The primary reason for these results is that voluntary profiling allows the seller to identify high valuation consumers that have no incentive to participate and set a higher price for them (compared to no profiling) while simultaneously benefitting from the profile information of low valuation consumers that participate. However, a positive privacy cost mitigates the participation incentives of even low valuation consumers and hence sellers’ ability to engage in price discrimination.
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Citations
Cites
Reducing buyer search costs: Implications for electronic marketplaces
Bakos, J. Y. (1997) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.43.12.1676 · Cited by 2,259
Building consumer trust online
Hoffman, D. L., Novak, T. P., & Peralta, M. (1999) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/299157.299175 · Cited by 2,132 · cited 1×
“Many studies attribute the negative consumer attitude towards profiling to privacy and price discrimination concerns (Hoffman et al. 1999; Volokh 2000; Earp and Baumer 2003; Acquisti and Grossklags 2005).”
Privacy and rationality in individual decision making
Acquisti, A., & Grossklags, J. (2005) · IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine · doi:10.1109/msp.2005.22 · Cited by 1,123 · cited 1×
“Many studies attribute the negative consumer attitude towards profiling to privacy and price discrimination concerns (Hoffman et al. 1999; Volokh 2000; Earp and Baumer 2003; Acquisti and Grossklags 2005).”
Conditioning prices on purchase history
Acquisti, A., & Varian, H. R. (2005) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1040.0103 · Cited by 689
Price dispersion and differentiation in online travel: An empirical investigation
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Dynamic targeted pricing with strategic consumers
Chen, Y., & Zhang, Z. J. (2009) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.03.002 · Cited by 144
Cited by
The Value of Personal Information in Online Markets with Endogenous Privacy
Montes, R., Sand-Zantman, W., & Valletti, T. (2019) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2989 · Cited by 280
Mapping the Ethicality of Algorithmic Pricing: A Review of Dynamic and Personalized Pricing
Seele, P., Dierksmeier, C., Hofstetter, R., & Schultz, M. D. (2021) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-019-04371-w · Cited by 196
Agag, G. M., Khashan, M. A., Colmekcioglu, N., Almamy, A., Alharbi, N. S., Eid, R., Shabbir, H., & Abdelmoety, Z. H. S. (2019) · Information Technology & People · doi:10.1108/itp-12-2017-0446 · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- Koh, B., Raghunathan, S., & Nault, B. R.
- Venue
- MIS Quarterly
- Publisher
- MIS Quarterly
- Published
- 2017-03-01
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23-41
- ISSN
- 0276-7783 (ISSN-L)
- 2162-9730
- OpenAlex
- W2525073621
- Cited by
- 54
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 4.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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