Analytic atheism: A cross-culturally weak and fickle phenomenon?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Religious belief is a topic of longstanding interest to psychological science, but the psychology of religious disbelief is a relative newcomer. One prominently discussed model is analytic atheism, wherein analytic thinking overrides religious intuitions and instruction. Consistent with this model, performance-based measures of reliance on analytic thinking predict religious disbelief in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic) samples. However, the generality of analytic atheism remains unknown. Drawing on a large global sample (N = 3461) from 13 religiously, demographically, and culturally diverse societies, we find that analytic atheism is in fact quite fickle cross-culturally, only appearing robustly in aggregate analyses and in three individual countries. Such complexity implies a need to revise simplistic theories of religious disbelief as primarily grounded in cognitive style. The results provide additional evidence for culture’s effects on core beliefs, highlighting the power of comparative cultural evidence to clarify core mechanisms of human psychological variation.
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Cites
Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Seli, P., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2012) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.03.003 · Cited by 544
Moralistic gods, supernatural punishment and the expansion of human sociality
Purzycki, B. G., Apicella, C., Atkinson, Q. D., Cohen, E., McNamara, R. A., Willard, A. K., Xygalatas, D., Norenzayan, A., & Henrich, J. (2016) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature16980 · Cited by 494 · cited 2×
“Certain features of religious beliefs vary strongly by culture (Purzycki et al., 2016), while others appear to be relatively stable (Gervais et al., 2017).”
Self-citationBayesian Benefits for the Pragmatic Researcher
Wagenmakers, E.-J., Morey, R. D., & Lee, M. D. (2016) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721416643289 · Cited by 334
Global evidence of extreme intuitive moral prejudice against atheists
Gervais, W. M., Xygalatas, D., McKay, R. T., van Elk, M., Buchtel, E. E., Aveyard, M., Schiavone, S. R., Dar-Nimrod, I., Svedholm-Häkkinen, A. M., Riekki, T., et al. (2017) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-017-0151 · Cited by 292 · cited 2×
“, 2016), while others appear to be relatively stable (Gervais et al., 2017).”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationPennycook, G., Ross, R. M., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2016) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153039 · Cited by 232
The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Barr, N., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2014) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.865000 · Cited by 170
Cited by
White, C. J. M., & Norenzayan, A. (2019) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/bs.aesp.2019.03.001 · Cited by 54
Ståhl, T. (2021) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0246593 · Cited by 35
“However, the relationship between ACS and religious disbelief appears to primarily hold up in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) countries [42].”
BackgroundReynolds, C. J., Makhanova, A., Ng, B. K. L., & Conway, P. (2020) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2019.109632 · Cited by 22
Metadata
- Authors
- Gervais, W. M., van Elk, M., Xygalatas, D., McKay, R., Aveyard, M., BUCHTEL, E. E., Dar-Nimrod, I., Kundtová Klocová, E., Ramsay, J., Riekki, T., Svedholm-Häkkinen, A. M., & Bulbulia, J.
- Publisher
- Center for Open Science
- Published
- 2017-12-06
- OpenAlex
- W2808121403
- Cited by
- 60
- References
- 6
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Gervais, W. M., van Elk, M., Xygalatas, D., McKay, R., Aveyard, M., BUCHTEL, E. E., Dar-Nimrod, I., Kundtová Klocová, E., Ramsay, J., Riekki, T., Svedholm-Häkkinen, A. M., & Bulbulia, J. (2017). Analytic atheism: A cross-culturally weak and fickle phenomenon? https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/92r8x
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