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Cited by 232Religion, Spirituality, and PsychologyReligion and Society InteractionsStudy and Philosophy of Religion

Atheists and agnostics are more reflective than religious believers: Four empirical studies and a meta-analysis

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Pennycook, Gordon, Ross, Robert M., Koehler, Derek J., Fugelsang, Jonathan A.·2016·PLoS ONE
DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0153039PMC PMC4824409
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Abstract

Individual differences in the mere willingness to think analytically has been shown to predict religious disbelief. Recently, however, it has been argued that analytic thinkers are not actually less religious; rather, the putative association may be a result of religiosity typically being measured after analytic thinking (an order effect). In light of this possibility, we report four studies in which a negative correlation between religious belief and performance on analytic thinking measures is found when religious belief is measured in a separate session. We also performed a meta-analysis on all previously published studies on the topic along with our four new studies (N = 15,078, k = 31), focusing specifically on the association between performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test (the most widely used individual difference measure of analytic thinking) and religious belief. This meta-analysis revealed an overall negative correlation (r) of -.18, 95% CI [-.21, -.16]. Although this correlation is modest, self-identified atheists (N = 133) scored 18.7% higher than religiously affiliated individuals (N = 597) on a composite measure of analytic thinking administered across our four new studies (d = .72). Our results indicate that the association between analytic thinking and religious disbelief is not caused by a simple order effect. There is good evidence that atheists and agnostics are more reflective than religious believers.

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  • A reliance on an analytic (vs. intuitive) cognitive style increases the likelihood of becoming a disbeliever.

    “In summary, there appear to be at least three plausible contributors to religious disbelief: a lack of exposure to CREDs in the community while growing up, living under conditions of low existential threat, and a reliance on an analytic (vs. intuitive) cognitive style should all increase the likelihood of becoming a disbeliever.”

    From The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality (2021) · cites this paper as [41]

    The Conclusion reports that atheists and agnostics scored higher on analytic-thinking measures than religious believers, and the Introduction cites experimental evidence that analytic thinking can decrease religious belief. But the paper’s own studies establish an association, not that a reliance on analytic thinking increases the likelihood of becoming a disbeliever over time. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • The use of more effortful and controlled System 2 processes varies between individuals.

    “The use of more effortful and controlled System 2 processes (i.e., the propensity to engage in analytic thinking rather than relying on intuition) varies between individuals (e.g., Stanovich, 2012;Pennycook et al., 2016).”

    From The detection of political deepfakes (2022) · cites this paper as Pennycook et al., 2016

  • Individuals have a general tendency to suspend effortful cognitive processes and to rely on associative processes and intuitions.

    “Individuals have a general tendency to suspend effortful cognitive processes and to rely on associative processes and intuitions (e.g., Pennycook et al., 2016, reported that 65% gave an incorrect answer to the 'bat and ball' problem).”

    From The detection of political deepfakes (2022) · cites this paper as Pennycook et al., 2016

  • Recent research has linked individual differences in analytic thinking with skepticism about various epistemically suspect information, such as fake news, religious and paranormal beliefs, conspiracy theories, and pseudo-profound bullshit.

    “Recent research has linked individual differences in analytic thinking with skepticism about various epistemically suspect information, such as fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019;2020), religious and paranormal beliefs (Pennycook et al., 2016;Shenhav et al., 2012), conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014), and pseudo-profound bullshit (Pennycook et al., 2015;Pennycook & Rand, 2020).”

    From The detection of political deepfakes (2022) · cites this paper as Pennycook et al., 2016

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Authors
Pennycook, G., Ross, R. M., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A.
Affiliations
  • University of Waterloo (CA)
  • University of London (GB)
Corresponding author
Pennycook, Gordon
ORCID
Venue
PLoS ONE
Publisher
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
Published
2016-04-07
Volume
11
Issue
4
Pages
e0153039
ISSN
1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1371/journal.pone.0153039
PMC
PMC4824409
OpenAlex
W2317198474
Cited by
232
References
47
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 27 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 58 · 2018: 27 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 1
FWCI
7.05
Type
journal article
Language
en
Update notices
correction (2017-04-21)
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Health › Religion, Spirituality, and Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Religion and Society Interactions
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Study and Philosophy of Religion
Keywords
analytical thinking, religious beliefs, atheism, agnosticism, cognitive reflection, Cognitive Reflection Test, individual differences, order effects, reflective thinking, religiosity
MeSH terms
Cognition, Female, Humans, Male, Religion, Thinking

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