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Cited by 163Influenza Virus Research StudiesVaccine Coverage and HesitancyGlobal Security and Public Health

Reflections on the 1976 swine flu vaccination program

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Sencer, David J., Millar, J. Donald·2006·Emerging Infectious Diseases
DOI 10.3201/eid1201.051007PMC PMC3291400
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Abstract

In 1976, 2 recruits at Fort Dix, New Jersey, had an influenzalike illness.Isolates of virus taken from them included A/New Jersey/76 (Hsw1n1), a strain similar to the virus believed at the time to be the cause of the 1918 pandemic, commonly known as swine flu.Serologic studies at Fort Dix suggested that >200 soldiers had been infected and that person-to-person transmission had occurred.We review the process by which these events led to the public health decision to mass-vaccinate the American public against the virus and the subsequent events that led to the program's cancellation.Observations of policy and implementation success and failures are presented that could help guide decisions regarding avian influenza."Flu to the Starboard!Man the Harpoons!Fill with Vaccine!Get the Captain!Hurry!" Edwin D. Kilbourne, New York Times, February 13, 1976 (1) "Grounding a Pandemic" Barack Obama and Richard Lugar, New York Times, June 6, 2005 (2) Swine Flu at Fort DixOn February 3, 1976, the New Jersey State Health Department sent the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta isolates of virus from recruits at Fort Dix, New Jersey, who had influenzalike illnesses.Most of the isolates were identified as A/Victoria/75 (H3N2), the contemporary epidemic strain.Two of the isolates, however, were not typeable in that laboratory.On February 10, additional isolates were sent and identified in CDC laboratories as A/New Jersey/76 (Hsw1N1), similar to the virus of the 1918 pandemic and better known as "swine flu."A meeting of representatives of the military, the National Institute of Health, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the State of New Jersey Department of Health was quickly convened on Saturday, February 14, 1976.Plans of action included heightened surveillance in and around Fort Dix, investigation of the ill recruits to determine if contact with pigs had occurred, and serologic testing of recruits to determine if spread had occurred at Fort Dix.Surveillance activities at Fort Dix gave no indication that recruits had contact with pigs.Surveillance in the surrounding communities found influenza caused by the current strain of influenza, A/Victoria, but no additional cases of swine flu.Serologic testing at Fort Dix indicated that person-to-person transmission had occurred in >200 recruits (4).In 1974 and 1975, 2 instances of humans infected with swine influenza viruses had been documented in the United States.Both persons involved had close contact with pigs, and no evidence for spread of the virus beyond family members with pig contact could be found (5). The National Influenza Immunization ProgramOn March 10, 1976, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the United States Public Health Service (ACIP) reviewed the findings.The committee concluded that with a new strain (the H1N1 New Jersey strain) Reflections on the 1976 Swine Flu Vaccination Program

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  • False alarms about emerging infectious diseases can be politically costly, as seen in the 1976 H1N1 influenza scare and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, which had a relatively low mortality rate of 0.1-0.7%.

    “There is no doubt that false alarms about emerging infectious diseases can be politically costly, as was seen during the H1N1 influenza scare in 1976—an epidemic that never occurred91, 92—and the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, which ultimately had a relatively low mortality rate of 0·1–0·7%.93”

    From The Lancet Commission on lessons for the future from the COVID-19 pandemic (2022) · cites this paper as [91]

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Authors
Sencer, D. J., & Millar, J. D.
Affiliations
  • Atlanta, Georgia, USA;
  • Murraysville, Georgia, USA
Corresponding author
Sencer, David J.
Venue
Emerging Infectious Diseases
Publisher
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Published
2006-01
Volume
12
Issue
1
Pages
23-28
ISSN
  • 1080-6040 (ISSN-L)
  • 1080-6059
DOI
10.3201/eid1201.051007
PMC
PMC3291400
OpenAlex
W2101877224
Cited by
163
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 12
FWCI
9.07
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Emerging infectious diseases (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Epidemiology › Influenza Virus Research Studies
  • Social Sciences › Health › Vaccine Coverage and Hesitancy
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Global Security and Public Health
Keywords
influenza vaccination program, influenza surveillance, human-to-human transmission, vaccine adverse events, vaccine hesitancy, public health decision-making, pandemic influenza preparedness
MeSH terms
Animals, Decision Making, Humans, Influenza, Human, Influenza Vaccines, Male, National Health Programs, New Jersey, Influenza A virus, United States, Guillain-Barre Syndrome, Mass Vaccination, History, 20th Century

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