The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols
Abstract
Electronic voting promises the possibility of a convenient, efficient and secure facility for recording and tallying votes in an election. Recently highlighted inadequacies of implemented systems have demonstrated the importance of formally verifying the underlying voting protocols. We study three privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols: in increasing order of strength, they are vote-privacy, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. We use the applied pi calculus, a formalism well adapted to modelling such protocols, which has the advantages of being based on well-understood concepts. The privacy-type properties are expressed using observational equivalence and we show in accordance with intuition that coercion-resistance implies receipt-freeness, which implies vote-privacy. We illustrate our definitions on three electronic voting protocols from the literature. Ideally, these three properties should hold even if the election officials are corrupt. However, protocols that were designed to satisfy receipt-freeness or coercion-resistance may not do so in the presence of corrupt officials. Our model and definitions allow us to specify and easily change which authorities are supposed to be trustworthy.
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- Delaune, S., Kremer, S., & Ryan, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Computer Security
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2009-07-02
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 435-487
- ISSN
- 0926-227X (ISSN-L)
- 1875-8924
- OpenAlex
- W1571378841
- Cited by
- 285
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 35.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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