Cited by 33Embodied and Extended CognitionPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceFree Will and Agency

Attenuating oneself: An active inference perspective on “selfless” experiences

Open access
Limanowski, Jakub, Friston, Karl·2020·Philosophy and the Mind Sciences

Abstract

In this paper, we address reports of “selfless” experiences from the perspective of active inference and predictive processing. Our argument builds upon grounding self-modelling in active inference as action planning and precision control within deep generative models – thus establishing a link between computational mechanisms and phenomenal selfhood. We propose that “selfless” experiences can be interpreted as (rare) cases in which normally congruent processes of computational and phenomenal self-modelling diverge in an otherwise conscious system. We discuss two potential mechanisms – within the Bayesian mechanics of active inference – that could lead to such a divergence by attenuating the experience of selfhood: “self-flattening” via reduction in the depth of active inference and “self-attenuation” via reduction of the expected precision of self-evidence.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.35

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Cites

  • Bayesian Learning Models of Pain: A Call to Action

    Tabor, A., & Burr, C. (2019) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2018.10.006 · Cited by 57 · cited 1× · see citing works

    “…lack of central coherence in psychiatric syndromes in particular, such as organic psychosyndromes (Collerton, Perry, & McKeith, 2005), chronic pain (Tabor & Burr, 2019), functional motor symptoms (Edwards et al., 2012), autism (Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014; Pellicano & Burr, 2012; Van de Cruys et…”
    Background

Flagged first, then by citations

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Limanowski, J., & Friston, K.
Affiliations
University College London (GB)
Venue
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
Published
2020-03-24
Volume
1
Issue
I
Pages
1-16
ISSN
2699-0369 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3025322213
Cited by
33
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 2
FWCI
1.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
selfhood, active inference, predictive processing, self-modeling, action planning, precision control, deep generative models, Bayesian inference, self-attenuation, phenomenal self

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review