Expecting some action: predictive processing and the construction of conscious experience
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Abstract Predictive processing has begun to offer new insights into the nature of conscious experience—but the link is not straightforward. A wide variety of systems may be described as predictive machines, raising the question: what differentiates those for which it makes sense to talk about conscious experience? One possible answer lies in the involvement of a higher-order form of prediction error, termed expected free energy. In this paper we explore under what conditions the minimization of this new quantity might underpin conscious experience. Our suggestion is that the minimisation of Expected Free Energy is not in itself sufficient for the occurrence of conscious experience. Instead, it is relevant only insofar as it helps deliver what Ward et al. (2011) have previously described as a sense of our own poise over an action space . Perceptual experience, we will argue, is nothing other than the process that puts current actions in contact with goals and intentions, enabling some creatures to know the space of options that their current situation makes available. This proposal fits with recent work suggesting a deep link between conscious contents and contents computed at an ‘intermediate’ level of processing, apt for controlling action.
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Arguably, AI-C benefits from a formalised approach that grounds the 'everyday-language' explanations afforded by sensorimotor theory in a computationally tractable account that speaks to underlying neural dynamics.
“Arguably, AI -C benefits from a formalised approach that grounds the 'everyday -language' explanations afforded by sensorimotor theory (O'Regan, 2023, p. 2) e.g., the notion of being 'poised' to act in a particular way (O'Regan, 2022, p. 3) in a computationally tractable account that speaks to underlying neural dynamics (Nave et al., 2022).”
From Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review (2026) · cites this paper as Nave et al., 2022
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- Authors
- Nave, K., Deane, G., Miller, M., & Clark, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Edinburgh (GB)
- Hokkaido University (JP)
- University of Sussex (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Nave, Kathryn
- Venue
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Published
- 2022-06-10
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1019-1037
- ISSN
- 1878-5158 (ISSN-L)
- 1878-5166
- OpenAlex
- W4281786305
- Cited by
- 50
- References
- 88
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 2
- FWCI
- 5.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Edinburgh Research Explorer (University of Edinburgh) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- H2020 European Research Council (692739)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- predictive processing, subjective experience, expected free energy, prediction error, perceptual experience, action space, goal-directed action, philosophy of mind, free energy principle
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