The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
Open accessAbstract
In a discretionary regime the monetary authority can print more money and create more inflation than people expect.But, although these inflation surprises can have some benefits, they cannot arise systematically in equilibrium when people understand the policymakor's incentives and form their expectations accordingly.Because the policymaker has the power to create inflation shocks ex post, the equilibrium growth rates of money and prices turn out to be higher than otherwise.Therefore, enforced commitments (rules) for monetary behavior can improve matters.Given the repeated interaction between the policymaker and the private agents, it is possible that reputational forces can substitute for formal rules.Here, we develop an example of a reputational equilibrium where the out- comes turn out to be weighted averages of those from discretion and those from the ideal rule.In particular, the rates of inflation and monetary growth look more like those under discretion when the discount rate is high.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information
Cukierman, A., & Meltzer, A. H. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912324 · Cited by 1,286
RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES
ALESINA, A., & TABELLINI, G. (1987) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1987.tb00764.x · Cited by 401
'New' Views on the Optimum Currency Area Theory: What is Emu Telling Us?
Mongelli, F. P. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.357400 · Cited by 354
Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence
Posen, A. S. (1995) · NBER Macroeconomics Annual · doi:10.1086/654279 · Cited by 336
Independent Agencies, Distribution, and Legitimacy: The Case of Central Banks
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Metadata
- Authors
- Barro, R., & Gordon, D.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1983-02
- OpenAlex
- W3123716766
- Cited by
- 397
- References
- 15
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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