The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism
Open accessAbstract
In July 2005 the Boston School Committee voted to replace the existing Boston school choice mechanism with a deferred acceptance mechanism that simplifies the strategic choices facing parents.This paper presents the empirical case against the previous Boston mechanism, a priority matching mechanism, and the case in favor of the change to a strategy-proof mechanism.Using detailed records on student choices and assignments, we present evidence both of sophisticated strategic behavior among some parents, and of unsophisticated strategic behavior by others.We find evidence that some parents pay close attention to the capacity constraints of different schools, while others appear not to.In particular, we show that many unassigned students could have been assigned to one of their stated choices with a different strategy under the current mechanism.This interaction between sophisticated and unsophisticated players identifies a new rationale for strategy-proof mechanisms based on fairness, and was a critical argument in Boston's decision to change the mechanism.We then discuss the considerations that led to the adoption of a deferred acceptance mechanism as opposed to the (also strategy-proof) top trading cycles mechanism.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827 · Cited by 5,985
New physicians: A natural experiment in market organization
Roth, A. E. (1990) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.2274783 · Cited by 141
Self-citation
Cited by
Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters And Pilots
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Angrist, J. D., Dynarski, S. M., Kane, T. J., & Pathak, P. A. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr017 · Cited by 497
Self-citationDeferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
Roth, A. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13225 · Cited by 392
Self-citationDeferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
Roth, A. E. (2008) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-008-0117-6 · Cited by 372
Self-citationIncentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
Kojima, F., & Pathak, P. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.3.608 · Cited by 362
Self-citationPathak, P. A., & Sönmez, T. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.1.80 · Cited by 312
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Abdulkadiroglu, A., Pathak, P., Roth, A., & Sonmez, T.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2006-01
- OpenAlex
- W1512121180
- Cited by
- 219
- References
- 3
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3386/w11965
- The paper
- Abdulkadiroglu, A., Pathak, P., Roth, A., & Sonmez, T. (2006). Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w11965
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.