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Macroeconomic Effects from Government Purchases and Taxes

Open access
Barro, Robert, Redlick, Charles·2009·National Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract

For U.S. annual data that include WWII, the estimated multiplier for temporary defense spending is 0.4-0.5 contemporaneously and 0.6-0.7 over two years.If the change in defense spending is "permanent" (gauged by Ramey's defense-news variable), the multipliers are higher by 0.1-0.2.The estimated multipliers are all significantly less than one and apply for given average marginal income-tax rates.We cannot estimate reliable multipliers for non-defense purchases because of the lack of good instruments.Since the defense-spending multipliers are less than one, greater spending crowds out other components of GDP, mainly investment, but also non-defense government purchases and net exports.Consumer expenditure on non-durables and services has only a small response.In a post-1950 sample, increases in average marginal income-tax rates (measured by a newly constructed time series) have significantly negative effects on GDP.When interpreted as a tax multiplier, the magnitude is around 1.1.When we hold constant marginal tax rates, we find no statistically significant effects on GDP from changes in federal tax revenue (using the Romer-Romer exogenous federal tax-revenue change as an instrument).In contrast, with revenue held constant, increases in marginal tax rates still have a statistically significant negative effect on GDP.Therefore, tax changes seem to affect GDP mainly through substitution effects, rather than wealth effects.The combination of the estimated spending and tax multipliers implies that balanced-budget multipliers for defense spending are negative.

Overview

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TL;DR

Using U.S. annual data that include WWII, the paper estimates temporary defense-spending multipliers of 0.4–0.5 contemporaneously and 0.6–0.7 over two years, with permanent-spending multipliers higher by 0.1–0.2, and finds post-1950 increases in average marginal income-tax rates have negative GDP effects with a tax multiplier around 1.1. It concludes defense multipliers are significantly less than one, non-defense multipliers cannot be reliably estimated for lack of instruments, and tax effects operate mainly through substitution rather than wealth effects.

Key findings

  • For samples including WWII, the estimated multiplier for temporary defense spending is 0.4–0.5 contemporaneously and 0.6–0.7 over two years; if the change is “permanent” (gauged by Ramey’s defense-news variable), multipliers are higher by 0.1–0.2. All are significantly less than one and apply for given average marginal income-tax rates.
  • Because defense-spending multipliers are less than one, greater spending crowds out other GDP components, mainly investment, but also non-defense government purchases and net exports; consumer expenditure on non-durables and services has only a small response. Reliable multipliers for non-defense purchases cannot be estimated because of the lack of good instruments.
  • In a post-1950 sample, increases in average marginal income-tax rates have significantly negative effects on GDP; interpreted as a tax multiplier, the magnitude is around 1.1. Holding marginal tax rates constant, changes in federal tax revenue using the Romer-Romer exogenous instrument have no statistically significant effect on GDP, while with revenue held constant, increases in marginal tax rates still have a statistically significant negative effect.
  • The combination of estimated spending and tax multipliers implies that balanced-budget multipliers for defense spending are negative, in the range of -0.3 to -0.7.

Methods

  • Annual U.S. data ending in 2006 and starting in 1950, 1939, 1930, or 1917; main analysis includes WWII. Data include BEA/Kendrick government purchases, Ramey’s defense-news variable, a newly constructed average marginal income-tax rate series (Barro-Sahasakul updated with NBER TAXSIM and state income taxes), and the Romer-Romer exogenous federal tax-change measure.
  • Estimates equations for the growth rate of per capita real GDP with government purchases, expected future purchases, average marginal income-tax rates, lagged unemployment, and a yield-spread variable; estimation is by two-stage least squares with instruments including defense spending, defense news, lagged variables, and the first lag of the dependent variable.
  • Additional specifications examine components of GDP, total government purchases, and tax variables; component data are available annually since 1929, defense-news data cover 1939–2008 with rough pre-1939 estimates, and the AMTR series covers 1912–2006.

Limitations

  • Stated in the paper: reliable multipliers for non-defense purchases cannot be estimated because of the lack of good instruments; the post-1954 sample has insufficient variation in defense outlays to get an accurate reading on defense-spending multipliers; tax-rate effects are less reliably estimated in long samples; contemporaneous AMTR changes are endogenous; state income-tax data before 1979 raise accuracy concerns; and the WWI defense-news measure is a rough approximation.
  • Stated in the paper: defense-spending multipliers may exceed non-defense multipliers because of wartime command-and-control and patriotism, so the defense estimates may provide upper bounds for the non-defense multiplier, though the comparison is theoretically ambiguous.
  • Evident from the text: annual frequency is forced by data availability; the WWII exogeneity argument neglects a possible linkage between economic conditions and war probability; and identification relies on assumptions that lagged AMTR changes are pre-determined and that tax-smoothing makes future tax-rate changes unpredictable.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.3386/w15369

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Barro, R.J. (1984). Macroeconomics, New York, Wiley.
  2. Redlick, C.J. (2009). Average Marginal Tax Rates in the United States: A New Empirical Study of their Predictability and Macroeconomic Effects, 1913-2006, unpublished undergraduate thesis, Harvard University.

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Metadata

Authors
Barro, R., & Redlick, C.
Affiliations
National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
Venue
National Bureau of Economic Research
Published
2009-09
OpenAlex
W3121702635
Cited by
104
References
29
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 31
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
Locations
National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
Keywords
government spending multiplier, tax multipliers, defense spending, marginal income tax rates, federal tax revenue, investment crowding out, balanced budget multiplier, substitution effect, consumer spending, World War II

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