The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism
Open accessAbstract
We test the empirical validity of a claim that has been playing a central role in debates on corporate governance — the claim that interventions by activist hedge funds have a detrimental effect on the long-term interests of companies and their shareholders. We subject this claim to a comprehensive empirical investigation, examining a long five-year window following activist interventions, and we find that the claim is not supported by the data. We find no evidence that activist interventions, including the investment-limiting and adversarial interventions that are most resisted and criticized, are followed by short-term gains in performance that come at the expense of long-term performance. We also find no evidence that the initial positive stock-price spike accompanying activist interventions tends to be followed by negative abnormal returns in the long term; to the contrary, the evidence is consistent with the initial spike reflecting correctly the intervention’s long-term consequences. Similarly, we find no evidence for pump-and-dump patterns in which the exit of an activist is followed by abnormal long-term negative returns. Our findings have significant implications for ongoing policy debates. Policymakers and institutional investors should not accept the validity of the assertions that activist interventions are costly to firms and their shareholders in the long term; such claims do not provide a valid basis for limiting the rights, powers, and involvement of shareholders.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(93)90023-5 · Cited by 25,754
On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance
Carhart, M. M. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x · Cited by 17,283
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches
Petersen, M. A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn053 · Cited by 10,746
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Corporate Bankruptcy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,306
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,603
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
McConnell, J. J., & Servaes, H. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90069-c · Cited by 4,309
Principles of Corporate Finance.
Stapleton, R. C., Brealey, R., & Myers, S. (1981) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2327568 · Cited by 3,634
Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power and specification of test statistics
Barber, B. M., & Lyon, J. D. (1997) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(96)00890-2 · Cited by 2,689
Tobin's q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance
Stulz, R. M. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261970 · Cited by 2,434
Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance
BRAV, A., JIANG, W., PARTNOY, F., & THOMAS, R. (2008) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01373.x · Cited by 1,507
Self-citationMarket Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral Finance
Fama, E. F. (1997) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.15108 · Cited by 1,274
Common Errors: How to (and Not to) Control for Unobserved Heterogeneity
Gormley, T. A., & Matsa, D. A. (2014) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hht047 · Cited by 1,151
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis
Mørck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) · Cited by 1,108
Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial IncentivesPreprint
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. (1982) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,075
Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1994) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4886 · Cited by 900
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors
KLEIN, A., & ZUR, E. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01432.x · Cited by 832
Does Delaware law improve firm value?
Daines, R. (2001) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00086-1 · Cited by 538
Investor activism and takeovers☆
Greenwood, R., & Schor, M. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.05.005 · Cited by 479
A Simple Feasible Procedure to fit Models with High-dimensional Fixed Effects
Guimarães, P., & Portugal, P. (2010) · The Stata Journal: Promoting communications on statistics and Stata · doi:10.1177/1536867x1101000406 · Cited by 430
Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund
Becht, M., Franks, J., Mayer, C., & Rossi, S. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn054 · Cited by 430
Value creation or destruction? Hedge funds as shareholder activists
Clifford, C. P. (2008) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.04.007 · Cited by 429
Firm and Product Life Cycles and Firm Survival
Agarwal, R., & Gort, M. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802320189221 · Cited by 408
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control
Kahan, M., & Rock, E. B. (2026) · Corporate Governance · doi:10.4324/9781003764250-12 · Cited by 339
Learning and the disappearing association between governance and returns
Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Wang, C. C. Y. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.10.004 · Cited by 311
Self-citationBrav, A. (2009) · Foundations and Trends® in Finance · doi:10.1561/0500000026 · Cited by 287
Self-citationThe Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy
Bebchuk, L. A., Coates, J., & Subramanian, G. (2002) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8974 · Cited by 275
Self-citationEstimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches
Petersen, M. (2005) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w11280 · Cited by 258
Staggered boards and long-term firm value, revisited
Cremers, K. J. M., Litov, L. P., & Sepe, S. M. (2017) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.08.003 · Cited by 223
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8449 · Cited by 184
How do staggered boards affect shareholder value? Evidence from a natural experiment
Cohen, A., & Wang, C. C. Y. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.08.005 · Cited by 144
The product market effects of hedge fund activism
Aslan, H., & Kumar, P. (2016) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.08.016 · Cited by 138
The Case Against Shareholder EmpowermentPreprint
Bratton, W. W., & Wachter, M. L. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1480290 · Cited by 123
The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes
Brav, A., Jiang, W., & Kim, H. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17517 · Cited by 112
Self-citationGovernance under the Gun: Spillover Effects of Hedge Fund ActivismPreprint
Gantchev, N., Gredil, O. R., & Jotikasthira, C. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2356544 · Cited by 76
The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Partnoy, F., & Thomas, R. S. (2008) · Financial Analysts Journal · doi:10.2469/faj.v64.n6.7 · Cited by 73
Self-citationTobin's Q Does Not Measure Performance: Theory, Empirics, and Alternative MeasuresPreprint
Dybvig, P. H., & Warachka, M. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1562444 · Cited by 65
The Law and Economics of Blockholder DisclosurePreprint
Bebchuk, L. A., & Jackson, R. J. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1884226 · Cited by 45
Self-citationLearning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns
Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Wang, C. C. Y. (2010) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w15912 · Cited by 35
Self-citationTop Hedge Funds and Shareholder ActivismPreprint
Krishnan, C. N. V., Partnoy, F., & Thomas, R. S. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2589992 · Cited by 12
Cited by
Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors
McCAHERY, J. A., SAUTNER, Z., & STARKS, L. T. (2016) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12393 · Cited by 1,494
Dimson, E., Karakaş, O., & Li, X. (2015) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhv044 · Cited by 1,242
How does hedge fund activism reshape corporate innovation?
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Ma, S., & Tian, X. (2018) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.06.012 · Cited by 604
Self-citationA capability theory of the firm: an economics and (Strategic) management perspective
Teece, D. J. (2019) · New Zealand Economic Papers · doi:10.1080/00779954.2017.1371208 · Cited by 426
The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors
Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Hirst, S. (2017) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.31.3.89 · Cited by 402
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Bebchuk, L., Brav, A., & Jiang, W.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2015-06
- OpenAlex
- W3123197736
- Cited by
- 395
- References
- 41
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.