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Designing Online Marketplaces: Trust and Reputation Mechanisms

Open access
Luca, Michael · 2016 · NBER Working Paper Series

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 1 of the 9 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Online marketplaces have proliferated over the past decade, creating new markets where none existed. By reducing transaction costs, online marketplaces facilitate transactions that otherwise would not have occurred and enable easier entry of small sellers. One central challenge faced by designers of online marketplaces is how to build enough trust to facilitate transactions between strangers. This paper provides an economist's toolkit for designing online marketplaces, focusing on trust and reputation mechanisms.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This paper is a survey of how online marketplaces build trust through reputation systems and other design choices, and how those same choices can also enable discrimination. It argues that marketplace design is a choice variable: platforms can reduce or amplify bias through decisions about information, reviews, screening, and transaction automation.

Key findings

  • Online marketplaces have proliferated over the past decade, and by reducing transaction costs they facilitate transactions that otherwise would not have occurred and enable easier entry of small sellers.
  • The paper identifies four main review-related problems in reputation systems: reciprocal reviewing can create retaliation incentives, voluntary reviews can suffer from selection bias, reviews can include promotional/fake content, and some reviewers are more informative than others.
  • The paper highlights documented discrimination in multiple marketplaces, including Airbnb, eBay, Craigslist, Upwork, and Prosper. Reported examples include African-American Airbnb guests being roughly 15% less likely to be accepted, African-American hosts on Airbnb earning about 12% less, eBay bids being 20% lower for identifiably African-American sellers, and Prosper loan listings for Black borrowers being 25–35% less likely to get funded than comparable White borrowers.
  • It proposes design responses such as simultaneous reveal for reviews, anonymous or aggregated feedback, verification of transactions, optimal information provision, making diversity goals salient, and automating transactions to reduce discretion.

Methods

  • This is a narrative survey / toolkit paper, not an original empirical study.
  • It synthesizes prior research and examples from a range of online marketplaces, including Airbnb, HomeAway, eBay, Craigslist, Upwork, Prosper, Uber, Amazon, and others.
  • The main analysis is conceptual and evidence-summarizing: it reviews documented mechanisms and empirical findings from prior studies, and uses platform design comparisons as illustrative cases.

Limitations

  • Not stated in the paper.
  • Evident from the text: the paper is a survey and does not present a new dataset, experiment, or causal identification strategy of its own.
  • Evident from the text: many claims are drawn from prior studies and examples, so conclusions depend on the scope and quality of the cited evidence rather than new direct analysis here.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3386/w22616

Cites

34 of 34 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Figure 1 Sample guests on Airbnb
Figure 1 Sample guests on AirbnbFrom the PDF
Image 2
From the PDF
Figure 3 Sample guests on HomeAway
Figure 3 Sample guests on HomeAwayFrom the PDF
Figure 4 Sample search result on Airbnb
Figure 4 Sample search result on AirbnbFrom the PDF
Image 5
From the PDF
Figure 5 Sample search result on HomeAway
Figure 5 Sample search result on HomeAwayFrom the PDF
Image 7
From the PDF

Verification

Claims the paper makes

1 Valid · 6 Not valid · 6 Not checked · 7 Own results and interpretations

15 more claims

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Citations

Cites

Show all 34 references

Cited by

See all 36

Metadata

Authors
Luca, M.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Luca, Michael
Venue
NBER Working Paper Series
Published
2016-09
Pages
77-93
OpenAlex
W3123230467
Cited by
36
References
23
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 2
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
Keywords
online marketplaces, trust, reputation mechanism, transaction costs, platform design, online auctions, buyer-seller relationships

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-09-25 (prompt extract-v1).

Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.