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The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform
Open accessAbstract
We propose a new bankruptcy procedure.Initially, a firm's debts are cancelled, and cash and non-cash bids are solicited for the 'new" (all-equity) firm.Former claimants are given shares, or options to buy shares, in the new firm on the basis of absolute priority.Options are exercised once the bids are in.Finally, a shareholder vote is taken to select one of the bids.In essence, our procedure is a variant on the U.S. Chapter 7, in which non-cash bids are possible; this allows for reorganization.We believe our scheme is superior to Chapter 11 since it is simpler, quicker, market-based, avoids conflicts, and places appropriate discipline on management.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Aghion, P., Hart, O., & Moore, J.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1992-06
- Pages
- 215-244
- OpenAlex
- W2149726133
- Cited by
- 569
- References
- 39
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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