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Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence
Open accessAbstract
We arguethatstrategicinteractionsbetween firms in an oligopoly can explain the puzzling lack of high-powered incentivesin executive compensationcontractswrittenby shareholderswhose objective is to maximize the value of their shares.We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstratethatthe use of high-powered incentives will be limited by the need to soften product marketcompetition.In particular,when managerscan be compensated based on theirown and theirrivals' performance,we show thattherewill be an inverse relationshipbetween the magnitude of high-powered incentives and the degree of competition in the industry.More competitive industriesarecharacterizedby weakerpay-performanceincentives.Empirically,we find strongevidence of this inverserelationshipin the compensation of executives in the United States.Our econometric resultsare not consistent with alternativetheories of the effect of competition on executive compensation.We conclude thatstrategicconsiderations can preclude the use of highpowered incentives, in contrastto the predictions of the standardprincipal-agentmodel.
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Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Cited by
Chapter 38 Executive compensation
Murphy, K. J. (1999) · Handbook of Labor Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(99)30024-9 · Cited by 1,567
The Other Side of the Trade‐Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation
Aggarwal, R. K., & Samwick, A. A. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250051 · Cited by 1,037
Self-citationMurphy, K. J. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.163914 · Cited by 681
Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting
GERVAIS, S., HEATON, J. B., & ODEAN, T. (2011) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01686.x · Cited by 538
RAJGOPAL, S., SHEVLIN, T., & ZAMORA, V. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00890.x · Cited by 462
Metadata
- Authors
- Aggarwal, R., & Samwick, A.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1996-07
- OpenAlex
- W2132878064
- Cited by
- 250
- References
- 1
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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