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Cited by 250

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Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence

Open access
Aggarwal, Rajesh, Samwick, Andrew·1996·National Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract

We arguethatstrategicinteractionsbetween firms in an oligopoly can explain the puzzling lack of high-powered incentivesin executive compensationcontractswrittenby shareholderswhose objective is to maximize the value of their shares.We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstratethatthe use of high-powered incentives will be limited by the need to soften product marketcompetition.In particular,when managerscan be compensated based on theirown and theirrivals' performance,we show thattherewill be an inverse relationshipbetween the magnitude of high-powered incentives and the degree of competition in the industry.More competitive industriesarecharacterizedby weakerpay-performanceincentives.Empirically,we find strongevidence of this inverserelationshipin the compensation of executives in the United States.Our econometric resultsare not consistent with alternativetheories of the effect of competition on executive compensation.We conclude thatstrategicconsiderations can preclude the use of highpowered incentives, in contrastto the predictions of the standardprincipal-agentmodel.

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Metadata

Authors
Aggarwal, R., & Samwick, A.
Venue
National Bureau of Economic Research
Published
1996-07
OpenAlex
W2132878064
Cited by
250
References
1
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3386/w5648
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Aggarwal, R., & Samwick, A. (1996). Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w5648

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