The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers
Open accessAbstract
We examine the labor market for mutual fund managers. Using data from 1992–1994, we find that termination is more performance-sensitive for younger managers. We identify possible implicit incentives created by the termination-performance relationship. The shape of the termination-performance relationship may give younger managers an incentive to avoid unsystematic risk. Direct effects of portfolio composition may also give younger managers an incentive to herd into popular sectors. Consistent with these incentives, we find that younger managers hold less unsystematic risk and have more conventional portfolios. Promotion incentives and market responses to managerial turnover are also studied.
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Cites
On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance
Carhart, M. M. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x · Cited by 17,283
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows
Sirri, E. R., & Tufano, P. (1998) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00066 · Cited by 3,200
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover
Jovanovic, B. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260808 · Cited by 3,092
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1979) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0401 · Cited by 3,033
Scharfstein, D. S., & Stein, J. C. (1988) · American Economic Review · Cited by 2,783
Regression standard errors in clustered samples
Rogers, W. H. (1993) · Stata technical bulletin · Cited by 2,694
Root-N-Consistent Semiparametric Regression
Robinson, P. M. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912705 · Cited by 2,475
Cited by
Does Fund Size Erode Mutual Fund Performance? The Role of Liquidity and Organization
Chen, J., Hong, H., Huang, M., & Kubik, J. D. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828043052277 · Cited by 1,430
Herd Behavior in Financial Markets
Bikhchandani, S., & Sharma, S. (2000) · IMF Staff Papers · doi:10.2307/3867650 · Cited by 1,203
Firm Innovation in Emerging Markets: The Role of Finance, Governance, and Competition
Ayyagari, M., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (2011) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109011000378 · Cited by 911
CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies
Serfling, M. A. (2014) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.12.013 · Cited by 904
Middle‐Status Conformity: Theoretical Restatement and Empirical Demonstration in Two Markets
Phillips, D. J., & Zuckerman, E. W. (2001) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/324072 · Cited by 845
Metadata
- Authors
- Chevalier, J., & Ellison, G.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1998-02
- OpenAlex
- W3023287100
- Cited by
- 640
- References
- 33
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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