The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers
Open accessAbstract
We examine the labor market for mutual fund managers. Using data from 1992–1994, we find that termination is more performance-sensitive for younger managers. We identify possible implicit incentives created by the termination-performance relationship. The shape of the termination-performance relationship may give younger managers an incentive to avoid unsystematic risk. Direct effects of portfolio composition may also give younger managers an incentive to herd into popular sectors. Consistent with these incentives, we find that younger managers hold less unsystematic risk and have more conventional portfolios. Promotion incentives and market responses to managerial turnover are also studied.
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Citations
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Cited by
Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased Earnings Forecasts
Hong, H., & Kubik, J. D. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00526 · Cited by 1,469
Does Fund Size Erode Mutual Fund Performance? The Role of Liquidity and Organization
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Herd Behavior in Financial Markets
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Security Analysts' Career Concerns and Herding of Earnings Forecasts
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Chevalier, J., & Ellison, G.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1998-02
- OpenAlex
- W3023287100
- Cited by
- 640
- References
- 33
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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