The DOI matches its Crossref record; 126 of the 126 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political Economics and Public Finance
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Citations
Cites
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
La Porta, R. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222 · Cited by 5,699
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261013 · Cited by 5,485
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Distributive Politics and Economic Growth
Alesina, A., & Rodrik, D. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118470 · Cited by 4,406
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Becker, G. S. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886017 · Cited by 4,117
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Rogoff, K. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885679 · Cited by 3,688
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Hibbs, D. A. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400269712 · Cited by 3,368
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_7 · Cited by 3,302
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Cited by
The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives
Lizzeri, A., & Persico, N. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.1.225 · Cited by 821
Comparative Politics and Public Finance
Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (2000) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/317686 · Cited by 765
Self-citationElectoral Systems and Public Spending
Milesi-Ferretti, G. M., Perotti, R., & Rostagno, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753650346 · Cited by 716
Aghion, P., Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., & Shleifer, A. (2009) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w14648 · Cited by 509
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2013) · Handbook of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53759-1.00002-9 · Cited by 480
Self-citationE LECTORAL AND P ARTISAN C YCLES IN E CONOMIC P OLICIES AND O UTCOMES
Franzese, R. J. (2002) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.112801.080924 · Cited by 416
The size and scope of government:
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1999) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00131-7 · Cited by 409
Self-citationHenisz, W. J., & Zelner, B. A. (2005) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2005.16387892 · Cited by 395
The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics
Kaplow, L. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400839223 · Cited by 344
The Aging Population and the Size of the Welfare State
Razin, A., Sadka, E., & Swagel, P. (2002) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/340780 · Cited by 338
Democracy comes to Europe: Franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830–1938
Aidt, T. S., Dutta, J., & Loukoianova, E. (2006) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.07.004 · Cited by 315
Political Institutions and Policy Volatility
Henisz, W. J. (2004) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00129.x · Cited by 275
Goodspeed, T. J. (2002) · International Tax and Public Finance · doi:10.1023/a:1016563902580 · Cited by 258
Metadata
- Authors
- Persson, T., & Tabellini, G.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1999-04
- Volume
- 3
- Pages
- 1549-1659
- OpenAlex
- W1639085805
- Cited by
- 279
- References
- 126
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.