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Political Economics and Public Finance
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Persson, T., & Tabellini, G.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1999-04
- Volume
- 3
- Pages
- 1549-1659
- OpenAlex
- W1639085805
- Cited by
- 279
- References
- 126
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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