The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms
Open accessAbstract
A fundamental problem entrepreneurs face in the formative stages of their businesses is how to provide incentives for employees to protect, rather than steal, the source of organizational rents.We study how the entrepreneur's response to this problem will determine the organization's internal structure, growth, and its eventual size.In particular, our model suggests large, steep hierarchies will predominate in physical capital intensive industries, and these will typically have seniority-based promotion policies.By contrast, flat hierarchies will be seen in human capital intensive industries.These will have up-or-out promotion systems, where experienced managers either become owners or are fired.Furthermore, flat hierarchies will have more distinctive technologies or cultures than steep hierarchies.The model points to some essential differences between organized hierarchies and markets.
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Cites
Burt, R. S. (1992) · doi:10.4159/9780674029095 · Cited by 9,093
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
On the Size Distribution of Business Firms
Lucas, R. E. (1978) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003596 · Cited by 3,236
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Self-citationZingales, L. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00262 · Cited by 1,495
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Human Resource Management and Productivity
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rajan, R., & Zingales, L.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2000-02
- OpenAlex
- W2892224068
- Cited by
- 160
- References
- 3
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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