New frontiers in the neuroscience of the sense of agency
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The sense that I am the author of my own actions, including the ability to distinguish my own from other people's actions, is a fundamental building block of our sense of self, on the one hand, and successful social interactions, on the other. Using cognitive neuroscience techniques, researchers have attempted to elucidate the functional basis of this intriguing phenomenon, also trying to explain pathological abnormalities of action awareness in certain psychiatric and neurological disturbances. Recent conceptual, technological, and methodological advances suggest several interesting and necessary new leads for future research on the neuroscience of agency. Here I will describe new frontiers for the field such as the need for novel and multifactorial paradigms, anatomically plausible network models for the sense of agency, investigations of the temporal dynamics during agentic processing and ecologically valid virtual reality (VR) applications.
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Citations
Cites
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“…capable of modeling ongoing brain dynamics, such as timefrequency representations of underlying field potentials (i.e., at the source level), while also allowing researchers to measure dynamic interactions between the nodes of a possible agency network (Makeig et al., 2004; Siegel et al., 2012).”
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Cited by
Tapal, A., Oren, E., Dar, R., & Eitam, B. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01552 · Cited by 302
Georgescu, A. L., Kuzmanovic, B., Roth, D., Bente, G., & Vogeley, K. (2014) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00807 · Cited by 123
“David (2012) states that participants are restricted in the movements they can make in order to prevent artifacts in the recording of neural data.”
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The Senses of Agency and Ownership in Patients With Borderline Personality Disorder
Möller, T. J., Braun, N., Thöne, A.-K., Herrmann, C. S., & Philipsen, A. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychiatry · doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2020.00474 · Cited by 19
“On the phenomenological level, SoA informs an agent about their causal influence onto the world, but this information is, of course, a fallible representation of objective reality (7, 50).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- David, N.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 6
- Pages
- 161-161
- ISSN
- 1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2079562183
- Cited by
- 75
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 2.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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