The DOI matches its Crossref record; 109 of the 113 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Hypothesis of the Co-evolution of Cooperation and Responses to Inequity
Open accessAbstract
Recent evidence demonstrates that humans are not the only species to respond negatively to inequitable outcomes which are to their disadvantage. Several species respond negatively if they subsequently receive a less good reward than a social partner for completing the same task. While these studies suggest that the negative response to inequity is not a uniquely human behavior, they do not provide a functional explanation for the emergence of these responses due to similar characteristics among these species. However, emerging data support the hypothesis that an aversion to inequity is a mechanism to promote successful long-term cooperative relationships amongst non-kin. In this paper, I discuss several converging lines of evidence which illustrate the need to further evaluate this relationship. First, cooperation can survive modest inequity; in explicitly cooperative interactions, individuals are willing to continue to cooperate despite inequitable outcomes as long as the partner's overall behavior is equitable. Second, the context of inequity affects reactions to it in ways which support the idea that joint efforts lead to an expectation of joint payoffs. Finally, comparative studies indicate a link between the degree and extent of cooperation between unrelated individuals in a species and that species' response to inequitable outcomes. This latter line of evidence indicates that this behavior evolved in conjunction with cooperation and may represent an adaptation to increase the payoffs associated with cooperative interactions. Together these data inform a testable working hypothesis for understanding decision-making in the context of inequity and provide a new, comparative framework for evaluating decision-making behavior.
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“This lack of inequity aversion in callitrichids suggests there is either an inability to recognize and/or respond to resource inequities, or that maintaining biparental cooperation may confer a greater benefit to the family group, (e.g., enhanced offspring survival), than losing a parental partner due to the avoidance of interactions that lead to minor inequities (Brosnan, 2011).”
From Inequity aversion strategies between marmosets are influenced by partner familiarity and sex but not by oxytocin (2016) · cites this paper as Brosnan, 2011
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“The patterns of prosocial preferences among primates vary considerably both across species and within species (Brosnan, 2011; Brosnan and de Waal, 2014; Cronin, 2012; McAuliffe and Thornton, 2015).”
From Inequity aversion strategies between marmosets are influenced by partner familiarity and sex but not by oxytocin (2016) · cites this paper as Brosnan, 2011
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Citations
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Evolution of responses to (un)fairness
Brosnan, S. F., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2014) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1251776 · Cited by 313
Chimpanzees play the ultimatum game
Proctor, D. P., Williamson, R. A., de Waal, F. Β. Μ., & Brosnan, S. F. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1220806110 · Cited by 212
Justice- and fairness-related behaviors in nonhuman primates
Brosnan, S. F. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1301194110 · Cited by 132
Social Influences on Inequity Aversion in Children
McAuliffe, K., Blake, P. R., Kim, G., Wrangham, R. W., & Warneken, F. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080966 · Cited by 117
Selective and contagious prosocial resource donation in capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees and humans
Claidière, N., Whiten, A., Mareno, M. C., Messer, E. J. E., Brosnan, S. F., Hopper, L. M., Lambeth, S. P., Schapiro, S. J., & McGuigan, N. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep07631 · Cited by 105
Metadata
- Authors
- Brosnan, S. F.
- Affiliations
- Georgia State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Brosnan, Sarah F.
- ORCID
- Brosnan, Sarah F.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2011
- Volume
- 5
- Pages
- 43-43
- ISSN
- 1662-453X (ISSN-L)
- 1662-4548
- PMC
- PMC3077916
- OpenAlex
- W1964756643
- Cited by
- 134
- References
- 113
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 10
- FWCI
- 29.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Frontiers in Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Primate Behavior and Ecology
- Keywords
- inequity aversion, cooperation, coevolution, comparative psychology, non-kin cooperation, joint effort, evolutionary psychology, decision-making
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