Cited by 912

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Monkeys reject unequal pay

Brosnan, Sarah F., de Waal, Frans B. M.·2003·Nature

Abstract

During the evolution of cooperation it may have become critical for individuals to compare their own efforts and pay-offs with those of others. Negative reactions may occur when expectations are violated. One theory proposes that aversion to inequity can explain human cooperation within the bounds of the rational choice model, and may in fact be more inclusive than previous explanations. Although there exists substantial cultural variation in its particulars, this 'sense of fairness' is probably a human universal that has been shown to prevail in a wide variety of circumstances. However, we are not the only cooperative animals, hence inequity aversion may not be uniquely human. Many highly cooperative nonhuman species seem guided by a set of expectations about the outcome of cooperation and the division of resources. Here we demonstrate that a nonhuman primate, the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella), responds negatively to unequal reward distribution in exchanges with a human experimenter. Monkeys refused to participate if they witnessed a conspecific obtain a more attractive reward for equal effort, an effect amplified if the partner received such a reward without any effort at all. These reactions support an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1038/nature01963

Cites

2 of 2 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Brosnan and De Waal found that capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees refused to collaborate if they watched a conspecific obtain a more desirable food reward for equal or even less effort.

    “Their findings illustrate that the animals refused to collaborate if they watched a conspecific obtain a more desirable food reward for equal or even less effort [56,57].”

    From Therapy Dog Welfare Revisited: A Review of the Literature (2021) · cites this paper as [56]

Citations

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 28

  1. Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. M. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quart. J. Econ. 114, 817–868 (1999) · DOI · Paper page
  2. Andreoni, J. Cooperation in public-goods experiments: kindness or confusion? Am. Econ. Rev. 85, 891–904 (1995)
  3. Fehr, E. & Gachter, S. The puzzle of human cooperation: reply. Nature 421, 912 (2003) · DOI
  4. Johnson, D. D. P., Stopka, P. & Knights, S. The puzzle of human cooperation. Nature 421, 911–912 (2003) · DOI
  5. Roberts, G. & Sherratt, T. N. Development of cooperative relationships through increasing investment. Nature 394, 175–179 (1998) · DOI
  6. Wenekind, C. & Milinski, M. Cooperation through image scoring in humans. Science 200, 850–852 (2000) · DOI · Paper page
  7. Henrich, J. et al. In search of Homo economicus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Am. Econ. Rev. 91, 73–78 (2001) · DOI
  8. Henrich, J. Does culture matter in economic behavior? Ultimatum game bargaining among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon. Am. Econ. Rev. 90, 973–979 (2000) · DOI
  9. Fehr, E. & Rockenbach, B. Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism. Nature 422, 137–140 (2003) · DOI
  10. Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L. & Thaler, R. Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: entitlements in the market. Am. Econ. Rev. 76, 728–741 (1986)
  11. Zizzo, D. J. & Oswald, A. Are people willing to pay to reduce other's incomes? Annales d'Econ. Stat. 63–64, 39–62 (2001)
  12. Dugatkin, L. A. Cooperation Among Animals: An Evolutionary Perspective (Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1997) · DOI
  13. de Waal, F. B. M. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996) · DOI
  14. de Waal, F. B. M. & Davis, J. M. Capuchin cognitive ecology: cooperation based on projected returns. Neuropsychologia 1492, 1–8 (2002)
  15. di Bitetti, M. S. Evidence for an important social role of allogrooming in a platyrrhine primate. Anim. Behav. 54, 199–211 (1997) · DOI
  16. de Waal, F. B. M. Food transfers through mesh in brown capuchins. J. Comp. Psychol. 111, 370–378 (1997) · DOI
  17. Tinklepaugh, O. L. An experimental study of representative factors in monkeys. J. Comp. Psychol. 8, 197–236 (1928) · DOI
  18. Andreoni, J., Brown, P. M. & Vesterlund, L. What makes an allocation fair? Some experimental evidence. Games Econ. Behav. 40, 1–24 (2002) · DOI
  19. Falk, A., Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. On the nature of fair behavior. Econ. Inq. 41, 20–26 (2003) · DOI · Paper page
  20. Frank, R. H. in Evolution and the Capacity for Commitment (ed. Nesse, R. M.) 57–76 (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 2001)
  21. Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E. & Cohen, J. D. The neural basis of economic decision-making in the Ultimatum game. Science 300, 1755–1758 (2003) · DOI · Paper page
  22. Frank, R. H. Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (W. W. Norton, New York, 1988)
  23. Hirschleifer, J. in The Latest on the Best: Essays in Evolution and Optimality (ed. Dupre, J.) 307–326 (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987)
  24. Nesse, R. M. in Evolution and the Capacity for Commitment (ed. Nesse, R. M.) 1–44 (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 2001)
  25. Dugatkin, L. A. in Evolution and the Capacity for Commitment (ed. Nesse, R. M.) 120–137 (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 2001)
  26. de Waal, F. B. M. & Berger, M. L. Payment for labour in monkeys. Nature 404, 563 (2000) · DOI
  27. Mendres, K. A. & de Waal, F. B. M. Capuchins do cooperate: the advantage of an intuitive task. Anim. Behav. 60, 523–529 (2000) · DOI
  28. Brosnan, S. F. & de Waal, F. B. M. A proximate perspective on reciprocal altruism. Hum. Nat. 13, 129–152 (2002) · DOI

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Metadata

Authors
Brosnan, S. F., & de Waal, F. B. M.
Venue
Nature
Published
2003-09
Volume
425
Issue
6955
Pages
297-299
ISSN
  • 0028-0836
  • 1476-4687
Cited by
912
References
2
Language
en

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review