The Value of Foresight: How Prospection Affects Decision-Making
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Traditional theories of decision-making assume that utilities are based on the intrinsic value of outcomes; in turn, these values depend on associations between expected outcomes and the current motivational state of the decision-maker. This view disregards the fact that humans (and possibly other animals) have prospection abilities, which permit anticipating future mental processes and motivational and emotional states. For instance, we can evaluate future outcomes in light of the motivational state we expect to have when the outcome is collected, not (only) when we make a decision. Consequently, we can plan for the future and choose to store food to be consumed when we expect to be hungry, not immediately. Furthermore, similarly to any expected outcome, we can assign a value to our anticipated mental processes and emotions. It has been reported that (in some circumstances) human subjects prefer to receive an unavoidable punishment immediately, probably because they are anticipating the dread associated with the time spent waiting for the punishment. This article offers a formal framework to guide neuroeconomic research on how prospection affects decision-making. The model has two characteristics. First, it uses model-based Bayesian inference to describe anticipation of cognitive and motivational processes. Second, the utility-maximization process considers these anticipations in two ways: to evaluate outcomes (e.g., the pleasure of eating a pie is evaluated differently at the beginning of a dinner, when one is hungry, and at the end of the dinner, when one is satiated), and as outcomes having a value themselves (e.g., the case of dread as a cost of waiting for punishment). By explicitly accounting for the relationship between prospection and value, our model provides a framework to reconcile the utility-maximization approach with psychological phenomena such as planning for the future and dread.
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Citations
Cites
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Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2007) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2213 · Cited by 2,394 · cited 2×
“In other words, on the one hand the ability of anticipating motivations permits evaluating future outcomes in relation to future internal contexts.”
BackgroundA framework for studying the neurobiology of value-based decision making
Rangel, A., Camerer, C., & Montague, P. R. (2008) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2357 · Cited by 2,184 · cited 2×
“or replaced by Pavlovian processes, which drive innate responses that can produce undesired effects (Daw et al., 2005; Niv et al., 2006; Rangel et al., 2008; Dayan, 2009).”
BackgroundThe evolution of foresight: What is mental time travel, and is it unique to humans?
Suddendorf, T., & Corballis, M. C. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07001975 · Cited by 2,031 · cited 1×
“Suddendorf and Corballis (1997, 2007) proposed the “mental time travel hypothesis” to interpret the human ability to anticipate motivations.”
The neural correlates of subjective value during intertemporal choice
Kable, J. W., & Glimcher, P. W. (2007) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn2007 · Cited by 1,916
Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex encode economic value
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“It has been reported that the brain (e.g., the orbitofrontal cortex) represents subjective reward values during goal-directed decision-making (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008; Kable and Glimcher, 2007).”
BackgroundNeural Mechanisms for Interacting with a World Full of Action Choices
Cisek, P., & Kalaska, J. F. (2010) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.051508.135409 · Cited by 1,543
Goal-directed instrumental action: contingency and incentive learning and their cortical substrates
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“” The baseline model successfully replicates data from many animal experiments, including devaluation (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998), labyrinth navigation, latent learning, and detour behavior (Tolman, 1948), all of which are hallmarks of goal-directed behavior.”
Method
Cited by
Pezzulo, G., Rigoli, F., & Chersi, F. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00092 · Cited by 163
“…reinforcement learning literature (Sutton and Barto, 1981, 1998) and are nowadaysincreasinglystudiedinneuroscienceandneuroeconom-icsinrelationtoperceptual,value-based,andeconomicchoices (Pezzuloetal.,2007;Glimcheretal.,2009;Daw,2012;Pezzulo andRigoli,2011;O’Doherty,2012;SolwayandBotvinick,2012).”
Self-citationBulley, A., Henry, J., & Suddendorf, T. (2016) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/gpr0000061 · Cited by 158
“However, a consideration of the roles of “anticipatory” emotions, and mood has been largely sidelined in theoretical and empirical accounts of the interaction between episodic foresight and intertemporal decision-making (though see Pezzulo & Rigoli, 2011).”
BackgroundAction perception as hypothesis testing
Donnarumma, F., Costantini, M., Ambrosini, E., Friston, K., & Pezzulo, G. (2017) · Cortex · doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2017.01.016 · Cited by 90
Self-citationDivide et impera : subgoaling reduces the complexity of probabilistic inference and problem solving
Maisto, D., Donnarumma, F., & Pezzulo, G. (2015) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2014.1335 · Cited by 59
Self-citationTracing the Roots of Cognition in Predictive Processing
Pezzulo, G. (2017) · Theoretical Philosophy/MIND Group – JGU Mainz · doi:10.15502/9783958573215 · Cited by 33
“…control) as well as other domains including interoception, awareness and consciousness (Clark 2015; Clark 2016; Donnarumma et al. 2017; Hohwy 2013; Friston et al. 2013; Friston and Frith 2015a; Friston and Frith 2015b; Friston et al. 2016a; Pezzulo and Rigoli 2011, Seth 2013; Stoianov et al. 2016).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Pezzulo, G., & Rigoli, F.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2011
- Volume
- 5
- Pages
- 79-79
- ISSN
- 1662-453X (ISSN-L)
- 1662-4548
- OpenAlex
- W2032635052
- Cited by
- 64
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 3.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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