Cited by 2,031Memory Processes and InfluencesCognitive Functions and MemoryMemory and Neural Mechanisms

The evolution of foresight: What is mental time travel, and is it unique to humans?

Suddendorf, Thomas, Corballis, Michael C.·2007·Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Abstract

In a dynamic world, mechanisms allowing prediction of future situations can provide a selective advantage. We suggest that memory systems differ in the degree of flexibility they offer for anticipatory behavior and put forward a corresponding taxonomy of prospection. The adaptive advantage of any memory system can only lie in what it contributes for future survival. The most flexible is episodic memory, which we suggest is part of a more general faculty of mental time travel that allows us not only to go back in time, but also to foresee, plan, and shape virtually any specific future event. We review comparative studies and find that, in spite of increased research in the area, there is as yet no convincing evidence for mental time travel in nonhuman animals. We submit that mental time travel is not an encapsulated cognitive system, but instead comprises several subsidiary mechanisms. A theater metaphor serves as an analogy for the kind of mechanisms required for effective mental time travel. We propose that future research should consider these mechanisms in addition to direct evidence of future-directed action. We maintain that the emergence of mental time travel in evolution was a crucial step towards our current success.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Suddendorf and Corballis propose that mental time travel—projecting oneself into past and future—is the most flexible form of future-oriented cognition and argue there is as yet no convincing evidence for it in nonhuman animals. They outline a taxonomy of prospection and a theater metaphor of subsidiary mechanisms to guide comparative and developmental research.

Key findings

Memory systems differ in the flexibility they offer for anticipatory behavior; episodic memory/mental time travel is described as the most flexible and most recently evolved, with its primary adaptive advantage lying in future-directed action.

  • Reviewing comparative studies, the authors find no convincing evidence for mental time travel in nonhuman animals; scrub jays show episodic-like memory for what/where/when/who, but such performance may depend on trace strength, innate predispositions, or specific learning rather than mental reconstruction.
  • Mental time travel is not an encapsulated system but comprises subsidiary mechanisms, metaphorically a theater production with stage, playwright, actors, set, director, executive producer, and broadcaster; in humans, key components emerge around ages 3–4, and children anticipate future needs by around age 4.
  • The Bischof-Köhler hypothesis proposes that nonhuman animals cannot flexibly anticipate future need or drive states different from current ones; in Mulcahy and Call’s ape study, subjects carried a suitable tool into a waiting room in 7 out of 16 trials on average, with one orangutan achieving 15 out of 16, but the authors argue association learning was not ruled out.

Methods

Theoretical review and synthesis: the paper proposes a taxonomy of memory and prospection systems and a theater metaphor for the components of mental time travel.

  • It reviews comparative, developmental, and neurophysiological evidence from published studies, including scrub jays, apes, children, amnesic patients, and brain imaging.
  • The main analysis is conceptual: it evaluates whether behaviors meet criteria for mental time travel by ruling out chance, innate predispositions, procedural prospection, semantic prospection, or combinations of these.

Limitations

The paper states that there is as yet no convincing evidence for mental time travel in nonhuman animals, but also that it cannot firmly conclude other animals lack the capacity; a substantial body of comparative data is required before concluding any trait is uniquely human.

  • It states that phenomenological experience is private, that there is no agreement on criteria for phenomenological awareness even in humans, and that the www criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for mental time travel.
  • Evident from the text: as a theoretical review, its conclusions depend on existing studies and interpretations; several purported positive findings in animals are critiqued as confounded by learning or association, and no new experiments are presented to resolve those disputes.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/s0140525x07001975

Cites

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 340 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingnone given
    § Michael C. Corballis · p. 1

    There is as yet no convincing evidence for mental time travel in nonhuman animals.

    “We review comparative studies and find that, in spite of increased research in the area, there is as yet no convincing evidence for mental time travel in nonhuman animals.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingreasoning
    § 3. Mental time travel in nonhuman animals? · p. 5

    Trained apes have not provided evidence of mental time travel.

    “They have not provided evidence of mental time travel.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingcitation
    § Is mental time travel a frame-of-reference issue? · p. 18

    The correlation between these competences is age-independent.

    “The correlation between these competences is age-independent.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bischof-Köhler 2000

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  • Findingcitation
    § Randy L. Buckner · p. 20

    Amnesia is linked to impairments of prospection and imagination.

    “Characterization of the deficits in patients with brain lesions shows that amnesia is linked to impairments of prospection and imagination (Klein et al. 2002a; Hassabis et al. 2007).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Klein et al. 2002a

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    • cites Hassabis et al. 2007

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  • Findingcitation
    § Randy L. Buckner · p. 20

    Recent brain imaging observations reveal that frontal and medial temporal memory systems participate in envisioning the future in ways that parallel their role in remembering the past.

    “Recent empirical observations using brain imaging reveal that frontal and medial temporal memory systems participate in envisioning the future in ways that parallel their role in remembering the past (Addis et al. 2007; Okuda et al. 2003; Szpunar et al. 2007).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Addis et al. 2007

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    • cites Okuda et al. 2003

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    • cites Szpunar et al. 2007

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  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 279
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    Findingreasoning
    § 3. Mental time travel in nonhuman animals? · p. 5

    There is so far no use of tense, nor any sense that trained apes are telling stories about previous or anticipated episodes.

    “There is so far no use of tense, nor any sense that the animals are telling stories about previous or anticipated episodes.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
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    Findingcitation
    § Martin Bru ¨ne and Ute Bru ¨ne-Cohrs · p. 20

    Patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder suffer from intrusive thoughts and over-ascribe meaning to prevent future negative events, which often precludes effective future action planning.

    “Patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) suffer from intrusive thoughts to which they often over-ascribe meaning in order to prevent future (negative) events, perhaps as a consequence of the tendency to excessively reflect upon their cognitive processes (Janeck et al. 2003). This often precludes effective future action planning in that patients with OCD are caught in repetitive behaviours”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Janeck et al. 2003

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    Findingcitation
    § Is mental time travel a frame-of-reference issue? · p. 18

    At around the fourth birthday, a set of new competences synchronously develop, including theory of mind, time comprehension, delay of gratification, temporal organization of conflicting desires, and anticipation of future needs.

    “We were able to show in a sample of 170 children that at around the fourth birthday a set of new competences synchronously develop. They include: a theory of mind as tested in a false-belief paradigm; time comprehension as demonstrated by predicting and comparing the running times of hourglasses; and the abilities to delay gratification, to temporally organize conflicting desires, and to anticip”
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    • cites Bischof-Köhler 2000

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    Findingcitation
    § Martin Bru ¨ne and Ute Bru ¨ne-Cohrs · p. 19

    In Alzheimer's disease, loss of episodic and prospective memory is profound even in preclinical stages, and this deterioration is associated with a progressive cholinergic deficit.

    “In Alzheimer's disease (AD), for example, the loss of episodic and prospective memory is profound, even in preclinical stages (Jones et al. 2006), and this functional deterioration is associated with a progressive cholinergic deficit commencing in the nucleus basalis of Meynert.”
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    • cites Jones et al. 2006

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    Findingcitation
    § Martin Bru ¨ne and Ute Bru ¨ne-Cohrs · p. 20

    AD patients show a temporally graded memory loss with more remote memories better preserved, whereas semantic dementia patients show the reversed gradient, and fv-FTD patients show no temporal gradient.

    “AD patients typically show a temporally graded memory loss with more remote memories being better preserved than more recent ones, whereas patients with semantic dementia (SD) involving the anterior temporal pole show the reversed gradient. However, patients with a frontal variant of FTD (fv-FTD) do not show any temporal gradient of episodic memory deficits (Piolino et al. 2003).”
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    • cites Piolino et al. 2003

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    Findingown data
    § Is mental time travel a frame-of-reference issue? · p. 18

    Mental time travel and theory of mind develop at the same stage both phylogenetically and ontogenetically.

    “Mental time travel and theory of mind develop, both phyloand ontogenetically, at the same stage.”
    • Also stated in: § Is mental time travel a frame-of-reference issue? · p. 18 · boosted
      “We were able to show in a sample of 170 children that at around the fourth birthday a set of new competences synchronously develop.”
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    • cites Bischof-Köhler 2000

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    Findingcitation
    § Martin Bru ¨ne and Ute Bru ¨ne-Cohrs · p. 19

    In Korsakoff's syndrome, episodic memory deficits may lead to a complete loss of personal history, and patients confabulate.

    “in full-blown Korsakoff's syndrome - which may develop in conditions associated with a severe deficiency of vitamin B1 (in Western societies, most often chronic alcoholism) episodic memory deficits may lead to a complete loss of personal history. Even more pronounced than in AD, patients with Korsakoff's syndrome 'make up' their personal history, referred to as producing confabulations.”
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    • cites Sacks 1985

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    Findingcitation
    § Valerie A. Carr a and Indre V. Viskontas b · p. 21

    The medial temporal lobe, particularly the hippocampus, is implicated in encoding and retrieval of episodic memories and may also play an important role in future event construction.

    “The MTL, and in particular the hippocampus, has been repeatedly implicated in the encoding and retrieval of episodic memories (for review, see Davachi 2006), and recent evidence indicates that this region may also play an important role in future event construction (Addis et al. 2007; Hassabis et al. 2007; Okuda et al. 2003).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Davachi 2006

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    • cites Addis et al. 2007

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    • cites Hassabis et al. 2007

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    Findingcitation
    § Valerie A. Carr a and Indre V. Viskontas b · p. 21

    In an fMRI study, the dentate gyrus and CA3 field were selectively active during episodic memory formation, whereas the subiculum was active during retrieval.

    “Results show that the dentate gyrus and CA3 field were selectively active during episodic memory formation, whereas the subiculum was active during retrieval of the study episode.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Eldridge et al. 2005

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    Findingcitation
    § Mental time travel in the rat: Dissociation of recall and familiarity · p. 24

    Intact rats efficiently 'answer' a question about where an object was in a given context by seeking out that object, and this ability cannot be reduced to a time-dependent process such as trace decay.

    “Intact rats efficiently 'answer' such a question by seeking out object B (Eacott et al. 2005), and it cannot be claimed that such ability can be reduced to a time-dependent process such as trace decay”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Eacott et al. 2005

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    Findingown data
    § First test, then judge future-oriented behaviour in animals · p. 35

    The chimpanzees had not previously succeeded in a planning-like task that required them to bring in a tool, and they never had to bring the tool during training.

    “the animals had not previously succeeded in a planning-like task that required them bring in a tool, and also never had to bring the tool during training”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § Michael C. Corballis · p. 1

    In a dynamic world, mechanisms allowing prediction of future situations can provide a selective advantage.

    “In a dynamic world, mechanisms allowing prediction of future situations can provide a selective advantage.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given
    § 1. Introduction · p. 1

    Past and future mental time travel share phenomenological characteristics and activate similar parts of the brain.

    “Past and future travels share phenomenological characteristics and activate similar parts of the brain.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Michael C. Corballis · p. 1

    Mental time travel allows humans not only to go back in time, but also to foresee, plan, and shape virtually any specific future event.

    “The most flexible is episodic memory, which we suggest is part of a more general faculty of mental time travel that allows us not only to go back in time, but also to foresee, plan, and shape virtually any specific future event.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Michael C. Corballis · p. 1

    The emergence of mental time travel in evolution was a crucial step towards our current success.

    “We maintain that the emergence of mental time travel in evolution was a crucial step towards our current success.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisereasoning
    § 1. Introduction · p. 1

    Organisms that can pick up on significant regularities and act in tune with them have an advantage over those that do not.

    “The world is dynamic, and organisms that can pick up on significant regularities (e.g., fluctuations in food availability) and act in tune with them (e.g., being in the right place at the right time) have an advantage over those that do not.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Premisenone given
    § 1. Introduction · p. 1

    Some species have evolved behavioral predispositions to exploit significant long-term regularities through natural selection.

    “Through natural selection, some species have evolved behavioral predispositions to exploit significant long-term regularities (e.g., seasonal variations).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Premisecitation
    § 1. Introduction · p. 1

    Many organisms actively influence their own futures by creating an environment that suits their needs (niche-construction).

    “Many organisms actively influence their own futures by creating an environment that suits their needs (socalled niche-construction, Odling-Smee et al. 2003), such as when a beaver dams a stream.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Odling-Smee et al. 2003

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.1. Toward a definition of mental time travel · p. 4

    The crux of mental time travel lies in its role in enhancing biological fitness in the future, so mental time travel into the past is subsidiary to our ability to imagine future scenarios.

    “If this argument is correct, then the crux of mental time travel lies in its role in enhancing biological fitness in the future, so that mental time travel into the past is subsidiary to our ability to imagine future scenarios.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisereasoning
    § 1. Introduction · p. 2

    Top-down mediation offers the opportunity for representations decoupled from the immediate input to drive action flexibly and independently.

    “Top-down mediation offers the opportunity for representations decoupled from the immediate input to drive action flexibly and independently.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
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    Premisecitation
    § 2.1. Toward a definition of mental time travel · p. 3

    One can mentally revisit an event without accurate information as to what, where, and when, and conversely one can know what, where, and when something happened without remembering the event itself.

    “Personal experience, as well as research on false memories, show that one can mentally revisit an event without accurate information as to what, where, and when, and conversely one can know what, where, and when something happened (e.g., one's birth) without remembering the event itself (Suddendorf & Busby 2003b).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf & Busby 2003b

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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.1. Toward a definition of mental time travel · p. 3

    The www criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for mental time travel.

    “However, although useful, the www criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for mental time travel.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning
    § 1. Introduction · p. 1

    Future-oriented mechanisms vary in flexibility, and relatively inflexible mechanisms will often suffice.

    “However, futureoriented mechanisms vary in flexibility, and relatively inflexible mechanisms will often suffice.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § 1. Introduction · p. 1

    The ultimate evolutionary advantage of mental time travel lies with the capacity to access the future.

    “Nevertheless, there is growing recognition that mental time travel into the past and future are related, and that the ultimate evolutionary advantage must lie with the capacity to access the future (Dudai & Carruthers 2005a; Suddendorf & Busby 2003b; 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis 1997; Tulving 2005).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Dudai & Carruthers 2005a

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    • cites Suddendorf & Busby 2003b; 2005

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    • cites Suddendorf & Corballis 1997

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    Premisenone given
    § 1. Introduction · p. 1

    Present behavior can increase or decrease an individual's future survival chances.

    “Since present behavior can increase or decrease an individual's future survival chances, one might expect many species to have evolved anticipatory capacities.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 1. Introduction · p. 2

    Mental time travel is the most flexible of memory-based systems, and the most recently evolved.

    “We argue that mental time travel is the most flexible of those memorybased systems, and the most recently evolved.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisereasoning
    § 2.1. Toward a definition of mental time travel · p. 3

    Episodic memory is about reconstructing particularities of specific events that have happened to the individual, not about regularities.

    “Episodic memory is not about regularities , but about reconstructing particularities of specific events that have happened to the individual.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § 2.1. Toward a definition of mental time travel · p. 3

    Episodic memory provides access to the personally experienced event, rather than just the knowledge extracted from the event.

    “Episodic memory, in contrast to semantic memory, provides access to the personally experienced event, rather than just the knowledge extracted from the event.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given
    § 2. A taxonomy of future-oriented cognition · p. 2

    Semantic memory contains general knowledge, allowing learning in one context to be voluntarily transferred to another.

    “Semantic memory contains general knowledge, allowing learning in one context to be voluntarily transferred to another.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning
    § 1. Introduction · p. 2

    Organisms may have sophisticated mechanisms to track temporal information and yet inflexible action systems, and vice versa.

    “Organisms may have sophisticated mechanisms to track temporal information and yet inflexible action systems, and vice versa.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Premisereasoning
    § 2.1. Toward a definition of mental time travel · p. 3

    There is a distinction between merely knowing that some event will occur and mentally creating an event.

    “Again, though, there is a distinction between merely knowing that some event will occur, such as that the sun will set, and mentally creating an event, such as a sunset actually experienced, with gradual fading of light, and the blue flash on the horizon as the last image of the sun disappears.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.1. Toward a definition of mental time travel · p. 3

    Mental time travel is a generative process, incorporating known elements but arranged in particular ways.

    “This means that mental time travel is a generative process, incorporating known elements but arranged in particular ways to create the experience of events that are actually occurring.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § 1. Introduction · p. 2

    Perceptual systems differ in the robustness of their tracking and storage of information.

    “Perceptual systems differ in the robustness of their tracking (e.g., use of single versus multiple perceptual channels to track significant aspects of the environment) and storage of information (e.g., knowing what is currently where).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Premisecitation
    § 2. A taxonomy of future-oriented cognition · p. 2

    In humans, declarative memories are conscious and at least partly verbalizable.

    “In humans, these memories are conscious and at least partly verbalizable (Tulving 1985; 2005).”
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    • cites Tulving 1985; 2005

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § 2.1. Toward a definition of mental time travel · p. 4

    There is as yet no agreement as to the conditions defining phenomenological awareness, even in humans.

    “It is conceivable that neurophysiological criteria may eventually suffice, but there is as yet no agreement as to the conditions defining phenomenological awareness, even in humans.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 2.1. Toward a definition of mental time travel · p. 3

    Mental reconstruction of past events and construction of future ones may have been responsible for the concept of time itself and the understanding of continuity between past and future.

    “The mental reconstruction of past events and construction of future ones may have been responsible for the concept of time itself, and the understanding of a continuity between past and future.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 1. Introduction · p. 1

    Many species might have evolved anticipatory capacities.

    “Since present behavior can increase or decrease an individual's future survival chances, one might expect many species to have evolved anticipatory capacities.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.1. Toward a definition of mental time travel · p. 3

    Mental time travel cannot be defined in terms of the veracity of the content.

    “This means that mental time travel cannot be defined in terms of the veracity of the content.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 2.1. Toward a definition of mental time travel · p. 3

    False memories have been widely documented and are readily created in the laboratory.

    “False memories have been widely documented (e.g., Loftus & Ketcham 1994) and are readily created in the laboratory (e.g., Roediger & McDermott 1995).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Loftus & Ketcham 1994

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    • cites Roediger & McDermott 1995

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    Premisecitation
    § 1. Introduction · p. 1

    Humans have in general been extraordinarily successful in foreseeing, planning, and shaping the future.

    “Though we may often get it wrong, humans have in general been extraordinarily successful in foreseeing, planning, and shaping the future, and indeed allowing us to influence the earth itself in extraordinary but not always benevolent ways (Dawkins 2000).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Dawkins 2000

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  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisereasoning
    § 2.1. Toward a definition of mental time travel · p. 3

    Based on previous experiences, humans can imagine specific events in the future including particularities that characterized past events.

    “Based on previous experiences, we can imagine specific events in the future, including the sorts of particularities that have characterized events in the past.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisenone given
    § 1. Introduction · p. 2

    The link between perceptual and action systems can be direct (bottom-up) or top-down, mediated by internal representations.

    “Further, the link between the two can be direct, or bottom-up , when perception of a stimulus triggers a response, or they can be top-down , mediated by internal representations (i.e., declarative memory).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 2.1. Toward a definition of mental time travel · p. 4

    The crucial selective advantage mental time travel provides is flexibility in novel situations and the versatility to develop and adopt strategic long-term plans to suit individual selected goals.

    “We postulate that the crucial selective advantage mental time travel provides is flexibility in novel situations and the versatility to develop and adopt strategic longterm plans to suit individual selected goals.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 3.1. Mental time travel into the past · p. 6

    Action with the future in mind provides increased selective advantage and is hence visible to evolution.

    “We argue that it is action with the future in mind that provides increased selective advantage and is hence visible to evolution.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.1. Mental time travel into the past · p. 6

    The information listed in Table 1 may be known rather than remembered.

    “The information listed in Table 1 may be known rather than remembered.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.1. Mental time travel into the past · p. 5

    Scrub jays seem to know what, where, and when food was cached, thus apparently meeting the www criterion.

    “Scrub jays seem to know what has been cached, where it was cached, and when it was cached, thus apparently meeting the www criterion.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § 3.1. Mental time travel into the past · p. 5

    The www criterion need not imply true episodic memory, in part because there need not be implications about autonoetic consciousness.

    “As noted earlier, however, investigators have used the term 'episodic-like memory' in acknowledgment that the www criterion need not imply true episodic memory, in part because there need not be any implications about autonoetic consciousness (Clayton et al. 2003; Emery & Clayton 2004).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Clayton et al. 2003

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    • cites Emery & Clayton 2004

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  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.1. Mental time travel into the past · p. 6

    Performance that depends on time since an event may rely on strengths of memory traces, which fade in time, and may provide a direct cue without implying mental travel through time.

    “For example, performance that depends on time since an event may rely on the strengths of memory traces, which fade in time, and may therefore provide a direct cue without implying mental travel through time.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given
    § 2.2. Evidence for continuity of past and future mental time travel · p. 4

    There is a fundamental causal asymmetry: one cannot know the future as one knows the past.

    “There is a fundamental causal asymmetry, and one simply cannot know the future as one knows the past.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.2. Evidence for continuity of past and future mental time travel · p. 4

    Mental time travel offers the ultimate step in adaptation to the future by allowing us to foresee unique events.

    “In allowing us to foresee unique events, mental time travel offers the ultimate step in adaptation to the future.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.2. Mental time travel into the future · p. 7

    Caching strategy rests on some memory capacities and suggests orientation to future consumption, but need not imply the animal envisages that future or explicitly plans for it.

    “This strategy rests on some memory capacities and suggests orientation to future consumption, but it need not imply that the animal actually envisages that future, or even explicitly plans for it.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 3.2. Mental time travel into the future · p. 7

    Advantageous behavior can lead to evolutionary change and can become instinctive as descendants face selection pressure for reliable, less resource-intensive shortcuts.

    “Advantageous behavior can lead to evolutionary change (Bateson 2004) and can become instinctive as descendants of animals displaying the behavior face selection pressure for reliable, less resource-intensive shortcuts.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bateson 2004

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    The other two control animals performed identically to two animals in Experiment 1.

    “The other two performed identically to two animals in Experiment 1.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 4.1. The stage · p. 9

    To entertain a future event one needs imagination, some kind of representational space in our mind for the imaginary performance.

    “To entertain a future event one needs imagination - some kind of representational space in our mind for the imaginary performance.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 7

    Superficially, the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis cannot be correct, since many species act to secure future needs.

    “Superficially, at least, this hypothesis cannot be correct, since many species act to secure future needs, as illustrated by the caching of food.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    Animals that are not capable of conceiving of future drive and need states would have little reason to concern themselves with a remote future, as all they would care about is satisfaction of current needs.

    “Animals that are not capable of conceiving of future drive and need states would have little reason to concern themselves with a remote future, as all they would care about is satisfaction of current needs.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § 4. Components of human mental time travel · p. 9

    Flexible anticipation of particular events is no easy feat and may involve a suite of cognitive abilities that may not be available to animals or to young children.

    “One reason to question whether mental time travel is possible in nonhuman animals is that flexible anticipation of particular events is no easy feat and may involve a suite of cognitive abilities that may not be available to animals or to young children (Suddendorf & Busby 2003b; Suddendorf & Corballis 1997).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf & Busby 2003b

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Suddendorf & Corballis 1997

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 4. Components of human mental time travel · p. 9

    To evolve a flexible anticipation system, many cognitive components may need to be in place to achieve a level of accuracy that provides a selective advantage sufficient to compensate for the enormous expense of cognitive resources.

    “To evolve a flexible anticipation system, many cognitive components may need to be in place to achieve a level of accuracy that provides a selective advantage sufficient to compensate for the enormous expense of cognitive resources.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationcitation
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    Contrary to what the authors claimed, association cannot be ruled out.

    “Thus, contrary to what the authors claimed, association cannot be ruled out (Suddendorf 2006).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    Living in fission-fusion societies, as modern chimpanzees do, may have selected for an increased capacity to monitor across time and space the comings and goings of other group members.

    “It has been argued that living in fissionfusion societies, as modern chimpanzees do, may have selected for an increased capacity to monitor across time and space the comings and goings of other group members (Barrett et al. 2003).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Barrett et al. 2003

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 3.2. Mental time travel into the future · p. 7

    Prevention of pilfering is a common adaptive problem for species that store food, and various strategies have evolved to deal with it.

    “Prevention of pilfering is a common adaptive problem for species that store food, and various strategies have evolved to deal with it (for a review, see Dally et al. 2006a).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Dally et al. 2006a

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 4.1. The stage · p. 9

    To represent the future, the stage has to allow combination of recently presented material and information stored in long-term memory, and must allow offline processing.

    “To represent the future, the stage has to allow combination not only of recently presented material, but also of information stored in long-term memory. It must allow offline processing.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 7

    Children anticipate future needs by around age 4.

    “One study suggests that children anticipate future needs by around age 4 (Suddendorf & Busby 2005), and the challenge is now to document its development in more detail and to test nonhuman species.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf & Busby 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    There is a range of evidence that great apes can imagine alternative states of the world and may hence offer a link between animal and human minds.

    “There is a range of evidence that great apes can imagine alternative states of the world (see sect. 4.1) and may hence offer a link between animal and human minds (for a review, see Suddendorf & Whiten 2001).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf & Whiten 2001

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § 4.1. The stage · p. 9

    Offline replay during sleep may be involved in consolidation of declarative memories in the hippocampus.

    “Offline replay during sleep may be involved in consolidation of declarative memories in the hippocampus (Kali & Dayan 2004; Wilson & McNaughton 1994).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Kali & Dayan 2004

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Wilson & McNaughton 1994

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 7

    One has to be capable of conceiving having different future needs, such as imagining being thirsty when currently quenched.

    “First, therefore, one has to be capable of conceiving having different future needs, such as imagining being thirsty when currently quenched.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationcitation
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    A substantial body of comparative data is required before it can be concluded that any trait is uniquely human.

    “We admit that a substantial body of comparative data is required before it can be concluded that any trait is uniquely human (Hauser et al. 2002).”
    • Also stated in: § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45 · plain
      “We also stated that 'a substantial body of comparative data is required before it can be concluded that any trait is uniquely human' (target article, sect. 3.3, para. 6).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Hauser et al. 2002

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    It would be a serious challenge to many humans' anthropocentric worldview and would have profound moral implications if other species have mental time travel.

    “It would be a serious challenge to many humans' anthropocentric worldview and would have profound moral implications (Suddendorf & Busby 2003a).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf & Busby 2003a

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductcitation
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    The final control condition was not given to the successful animals of Experiments 1 to 3, but to a new group of four animals.

    “However, this control condition was not given to the successful animals of Experiments 1 to 3, but to a new group of four animals.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductown data
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    Two of the new control animals never brought the tool back and hence could never have experienced the reward that may have facilitated performance in the previous studies.

    “Two of these never brought the tool back and hence could never have experienced the reward that may have facilitated performance in the previous studies.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    If the same animal were to pass variations of such tests across different needs and contexts, the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis would become increasingly untenable.

    “If the same animal were to pass variations of such tests across different needs (e.g., hunger, thirst, temperature) and contexts (locations, time-intervals), the Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis would become increasingly untenable.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § 4.1. The stage · p. 9

    Dreaming or day-dreaming may be regarded as a form of 'scenario building' that social mammals may have evolved to allow practice/play without suffering consequences.

    “In fact, dreaming or day-dreaming may be regarded as a form of 'scenario building' that social mammals may have evolved to allow practice / play without suffering consequences (Alexander 1989).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Alexander 1989

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 4.1. The stage · p. 9

    Although non-lingual species may not have a phonological loop, they may very well have an image-based system (visuospatial sketchpad).

    “Although non-lingual species may not have anything like the inner voice and inner ear (i.e., the phonological loop), they may very well have an image-based system (i.e., the visuospatial sketchpad).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    The same tools were appropriate over trials, so apes could have just learned to always return with these same tools.

    “The same tools were appropriate over trials, so apes could have just learned to always return with these same tools.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    Given the selective importance of future-oriented behavior, species are likely to have evolved a wealth of different mechanisms.

    “Given the selective importance of future-oriented behavior, species are likely to have evolved a wealth of different mechanisms.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 7

    Such future-oriented behaviors may typically be largely instinctive, and experience may only allow changes within specific domain parameters.

    “As noted, though, such behaviors may typically be largely instinctive, and experience may only allow changes within specific domain parameters.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    At present, there is no need to abandon the null hypothesis, but neither are we in a position to firmly conclude that other animals do not possess this capacity.

    “At present, there is no need to abandon the null hypothesis, but neither are we in a position to firmly conclude that other animals do not possess this capacity.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationcitation
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    Species that can ponder what has happened and speculate about what might happen in the future would require fundamentally different welfare considerations.

    “Those species that can be shown to ponder what has happened, and to speculate about what might happen in the future, would require fundamentally different welfare considerations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    Our closest surviving relatives, the great apes, may be expected to have precursors of the human ability, such as foresight limited to serving current needs.

    “Our closest surviving relatives, the great apes, may be expected to have precursors of the human ability (e.g., foresight limited to serving current needs).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.3. The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis · p. 8

    It is possible that antecedents of mental time travel had evolved in the common great ape ancestor.

    “It is possible, then, that antecedents of mental time travel had evolved in the common great ape ancestor.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    One possibility is that extensive foresight evolved first in the context of throwing, as hominins faced different predators and prey in the savannah than they did in the trees.

    “One possibility, then, is that extensive foresight evolved first in the context of throwing, as hominins faced different predators and prey in the savannah than they did in the trees.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    Cultures have evolved complex moral systems that judge actions as right or wrong partly based on what the actor could or could not have reasonably foreseen to be the future consequences of the act.

    “Cultures have evolved complex moral systems that judge actions as right or wrong partly based on what the actor could or could not have reasonably foreseen to be the future consequences of the act.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § 4.2. The playwright · p. 9

    Some nonhuman species appear to have declarative memory that could serve this function.

    “As noted earlier, some nonhuman species appear to have declarative memory that could serve this function.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    Human future-directed behavior can go beyond individual needs and may carry a concern for the planet and its inhabitants.

    “Our futuredirected behavior can even go beyond merely individual needs and may carry a concern for the planet itself, along with its inhabitants.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 13

    The now-standard taxonomy of human memory can be extended to incorporate variations in the degree of flexibility each system provides for the future.

    “The now-standard taxonomy of human memory, we suggest, can be extended to incorporate variations in the degree of flexibility each system provides for the future.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    Great apes do hurl objects, but with little precision.

    “Great apes do hurl objects, but with little precision.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 4.1. The stage · p. 9

    Only great apes have so far provided some evidence for secondary representation in all of these areas and may therefore have the mental stage to imagine past or future events.

    “A review of the literature found that only our closest relatives, the great apes, have so far provided some evidence for secondary representation in all of these areas (Suddendorf & Whiten 2001; 2003; Whiten & Suddendorf, in press) and may therefore have the mental stage to imagine past or future events.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf & Whiten 2001

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Suddendorf & Whiten 2003

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Whiten & Suddendorf, in press

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 5. Some qualifications · p. 13

    Humans appear to be less constrained and can link virtually anything to anything else across time.

    “Humans appear to be less constrained and can (though may not) link virtually anything to anything else across time.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given
    § 5. Some qualifications · p. 13

    Episodes are actively constructed and are prone to error.

    “As pointed out earlier, episodes are actively constructed and are prone to error.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 5. Some qualifications · p. 13

    Mental time travel often involves only the smallest snippets of events.

    “Also, mental time travel often involves only the smallest snippets of events.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    Bipedal hominins in the deforested savannah may have relied increasingly on throwing stones at predators, as well as using them to bring down prey and cut up carcasses.

    “Bipedal hominins in the deforested savannah may have relied increasingly on throwing stones at predators (e.g., Calvin 1982), as well as using them to bring down prey and cut up carcasses.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Calvin 1982

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 4.2. The playwright · p. 9

    To generate content, imaginary events need a script or narrative, requiring access to a declarative database.

    “To generate content, imaginary events need a script or narrative. This requires access to a declarative database - that is, stored information that is not stimulus bound, but can be made available top-down.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    Law, education, religion, and many other fundamental aspects of human culture are deeply dependent on our shared ability to reconstruct past and imagine future events.

    “Law, education, religion, and many other fundamental aspects of human culture are deeply dependant on our shared ability to reconstruct past and imagine future events.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 5. Some qualifications · p. 13

    As one matures, one accumulates more semantic facts, and fewer things are surprising.

    “As one matures, one also accumulates more semantic facts, and fewer things are surprising.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    Humans can identify future threats to the world, whether of their own doing or external origin, forecast outcomes, and choose to act now to secure future needs.

    “We can identify future threats to our world, be they of our own doing (e.g., the consequences of human-induced global warming) or of external origin (e.g., an asteroid on collision course with Earth). Humans can forecast the outcomes and choose to act now to secure future needs.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 4.2. The playwright · p. 9

    To generate new content, one needs to be able to combine and recombine existing elements.

    “To generate new content, however, one further needs to be able to combine and recombine existing elements.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 13

    Today humans base much of their actions on anticipation of future events.

    “Even if the initial adaptive advantage may have been small, it is clear that today humans base much of their actions on anticipation of future events, from preparing this weekend's escape to building wealth.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    The fact that stone tools provide an archaeological record that other behaviors do not may skew our evaluation of their significance.

    “The fact that stone tools provide us with an archaeological record that other behaviors do not may skew our evaluation of their significance.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisereasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 13

    Because behavior that increases future survival has a selective advantage, mechanisms for future-directed behavior are ubiquitous.

    “Because behavior that increases future survival has a selective advantage, mechanisms for future-directed behavior are ubiquitous.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Behavior that increases future survival has a selective advantage.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    As perhaps the only species with such foresight, humans alone may be driven to consciously guide the planet into the future and be burdened with the responsibility of getting it right.

    “As perhaps the only species with such foresight, humans alone may be driven to consciously guide the planet into the future (Dawkins 2000) and thus be burdened with the responsibility of getting it right.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Dawkins 2000

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    Carrying rocks for use as missiles at some future point may have been vital, and a capacity to plan for this might have been strongly selected for.

    “Carrying rocks for use as missiles at some future point may have been vital, and a capacity to plan for this might have been strongly selected for.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 5. Some qualifications · p. 13

    Although semantic memory and prospection are phylogenetically older than episodic memory and prospection, mental time travel may vastly increase the nature and capacity of semantic future-oriented cognition.

    “Thus, although we have argued that semantic memory and prospection are phylogenetically older than episodic memory and prospection, mental time travel may vastly increase the nature and capacity of semantic future-oriented cognition.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 4.8. Components of successful mental time travel · p. 12

    Mental time travel requires a constellation of skills and is not simply an isolated capacity.

    “In summary, the theater metaphor implies that mental time travel requires a constellation of skills and is not simply an isolated capacity.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 13

    Foresight requires several sophisticated cognitive abilities, is resource-intensive and error-prone, and introduces new kinds of mental stress, including knowledge of inevitable death.

    “This foresight requires several sophisticated cognitive abilities, is resource-intensive and error-prone, and introduces new kinds of mental stress, not least of which is the knowledge of inevitable death.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 13

    Mental time travel offers the ultimate level of flexibility, allowing voluntary anticipation of any particular event.

    “Mental time travel offers the ultimate level of flexibility, allowing voluntary anticipation of any particular event.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § Martin Bru ¨ne and Ute Bru ¨ne-Cohrs · p. 20

    Brain regions involved in future action planning and episodic/prospective memory retrieval are overactive in OCD, which could be interpreted as a mental time travel overshoot.

    “Notably, those brain regions involved in future action planning, as well as episodic and prospective memory retrieval, including the ACC, the prefrontal cortex, and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, have been found overactive in patients with OCD; and this could arguably be interpreted as an MTT overshoot (Bru ¨ne 2006).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Brüne 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § The continuum of 'looking forward,' and paradoxical requirements from memory · p. 17

    Foresight could be seen as a continual phenomenon of different levels of complexity and thus possibly present in animals, though to a lower degree than in humans.

    “If foresight is indeed derived from associations of varying degree of complexity (which we might not always be aware of), this would support the proposal that foresight could be seen as a continual phenomenon of different levels of complexity and thus possibly present in animals, though to a lower degree than in humans.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Nonhuman animals can use simple predictions based on associations, learning from experience and applying it in the future.
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    Our ancestors may have competed with an array of other bipedal species and perhaps simply outsmarted them, contributing to their demise.

    “Our ancestors may have competed with an array of other bipedal species that once graced this planet, and perhaps simply outsmarted them, contributing to their demise (Suddendorf 2004).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf 2004

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    The use of fire is evident by 400,000 years ago and may well have been used much earlier.

    “Consider, for example, the use of fire, which is also evident by 400,000 years ago (e.g., Boaz et al. 2004) and may well have been used much earlier.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Boaz et al. 2004

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § The continuum of 'looking forward,' and paradoxical requirements from memory · p. 17

    Animals require foresight that is considerably less complex and rich in scenarios than that required by humans.

    “it is easy to see that animals would require foresight that is considerably less complex and rich in scenarios than that required by humans.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    Humans may be the only species capable of mental time travel because the others competing in our niche have become or have been made extinct.

    “We may be the only species capable of mental time travel because the others competing in our niche have become (or have been made) extinct.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § Martin Bru ¨ne and Ute Bru ¨ne-Cohrs · p. 19

    Patients with Korsakoff's syndrome are confined to the present despite apparently intact imagination.

    “although the patients' imagination is apparently left intact, they are confined to the present”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Sacks 1985

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    This may have resulted in a runaway social competition between and within groups towards greater intelligence, and enhanced abilities for both cooperation and deception.

    “This may have resulted in a runaway social competition between (and within) groups towards greater intelligence, and enhanced abilities for both cooperation and deception.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    Social rather than ecological pressures drove the evolution of intelligence, not only in humans, but in primates more generally.

    “It has been suggested that social rather than ecological pressures drove the evolution of intelligence, not only in humans, but in primates more generally (Humphrey 1976).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Humphrey 1976

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    This suggestion that humans played a role in displacing other hominins is in line with recorded human history and other human characteristics.

    “This suggestion that humans played a role in displacing other hominins is in line with recorded human history in that human groups perpetually compete with each other and often violently displace other groups, as well as with various other human characteristics, such as our unique obsessions with inter-group competitive play (e.g., sports).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    These may have included the ability to entertain alternative future scenarios (mental time travel), to read others' minds (theory of mind), and to communicate (language).

    “These may have included the ability to entertain alternative future scenarios (mental time travel), to read others' minds (theory of mind), and to communicate (language).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    Planning capacities could have been selected for as the incidental use of fire gave way to maintenance of fire and, finally, to the making of fire for more controlled and deliberate purposes.

    “Planning capacities could have been selected for as the incidental use of fire gave way to maintenance of fire and, finally, to the making of fire for more controlled and deliberate purposes.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Is mental time travel a frame-of-reference issue? · p. 18

    Humans have access to a higher level of behavioral organization that allows them to conceive of a temporal axis and manage competing desires, overriding instant gratification.

    “Humans may still behave the same way, but they have access to a higher level of behavioral organization. They are able to conceive of a temporal axis analogous to space that provides a buffer on which competing desires, including future ones, may be shifted, postponed, adjourned, delayed, or anticipated, according to their expected consummatory value and success, thus overriding the imperative of”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Animals, when experiencing conflicting needs, cannot but follow the strongest need and suppress the others.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    A potential explanation is that once early hominins obtained a certain level of ecological dominance, they were faced with increased competition from their own species.

    “A potential explanation, suggested by Alexander and colleagues (Alexander 1989; Flinn et al. 2005), is that once early hominins obtained a certain level of 'ecological dominance,' perhaps partly through technological advances as discussed earlier, they were faced with increased competition from their own species - 'humans uniquely became their own principal hostile force of nature' (Alexander 1989”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Alexander 1989

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Flinn et al. 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 15

    An account emphasizing intra-species or intra-genus competition may exaggerate the importance of a single factor.

    “Like the 'just-so stories' about throwing or fire, an account emphasizing intra-species or intra-genus competition may exaggerate the importance of a single factor.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Is mental time travel a frame-of-reference issue? · p. 19

    Theory of mind can be interpreted as frame-of-reference awareness.

    “Obviously, theory of mind can also be interpreted as frame-ofreference awareness.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 15

    Such catastrophic events may well have produced bottlenecks in evolutionary history where social competition was of far less import than ecological factors and cooperation.

    “Such events may well have produced bottlenecks in evolutionary history where social competition was of far less import than ecological factors and cooperation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    Much of what humans recall and foresee has to do with 'who did what to whom, when, where, and why'.

    “As noted earlier, much of what humans recall and foresee has to do with 'who did what to whom, when, where, and why' (Pinker 2003, p. 27).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Pinker 2003

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    One problem for such an account is to explain why the cognitive arms race seems to have persisted longer in humans than in other primates, resulting in apparently unique cognitive skills, including, perhaps, mental time travel.

    “One problem for such an account is to explain why the cognitive arms race seems to have persisted longer in humans than in other primates, resulting in apparently unique cognitive skills, including, perhaps, mental time travel.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Is mental time travel a frame-of-reference issue? · p. 18

    Frame-of-reference awareness is the common mechanism underlying these competences.

    “We consider 'frame-of-reference awareness' to be that mechanism.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The potential for frame-of-reference awareness is beyond the grasp of even the great apes.
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationcitation
    § The continuum of 'looking forward,' and paradoxical requirements from memory · p. 17

    Simple associations, when accumulated, could serve as the basis for phenomena as complex as foresight simulation.

    “while simple associations are merely atomic elements, when accumulated, they could serve the basis for phenomena as complex as foresight simulation”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bar et al. 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

    • Rests on an assumption: Nonhuman animals can use simple predictions based on associations, learning from experience and applying it in the future.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    These victories in gaining control of the natural world may only have been side effects of a quite different evolutionary arms race.

    “Yet, these victories in gaining control of the natural world may only have been side effects of a quite different evolutionary arms race.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 15

    Claiming that the hostile forces of nature turned into 'relative trivialities' probably underestimates the selective pressure of catastrophic environmental changes.

    “Claiming that the hostile forces of nature turned into 'relative trivialities' (Alexander 1989) probably underestimates the selective pressure of catastrophic environmental changes such as ice ages, volcanic eruptions, and meteorite impacts on life in general.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Alexander 1989

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 15

    Plausible accounts exist that can explain why humans may have capacities, such as mental time travel, that other species do not have.

    “Rather than endorsing one or the other scenario, we present them here merely to make the point that plausible accounts exist that can explain why humans may have capacities, such as mental time travel, that other species do not have.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 15

    Darwinian continuity need not demand greater mental powers in nonhuman animals than is currently evident.

    “Darwinian continuity need not demand greater mental powers in nonhuman animals than is currently evident.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Is mental time travel a frame-of-reference issue? · p. 18

    Foresight as such does not yet require frame-of-reference awareness; what matters is foresight of need states.

    “Foresight as such, however, does not yet require frame-of-reference awareness. What really matters is foresight of need states, that is, of motivational frames of reference other than the ones shaping the present world view.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Randy L. Buckner · p. 20

    The capacity for mental exploration of future possibilities is extraordinarily well developed in humans, while forms of these abilities exist in other animal species.

    “While forms of these abilities exist in other animal species, the capacity for mental exploration of future possibilities is extraordinarily well developed in humans.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § Is mental time travel a frame-of-reference issue? · p. 18

    Mental time travel unquestionably requires the ability to reflect upon frames of reference.

    “Mental time travel unquestionably requires the ability to reflect upon frames of reference.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Evolutionary considerations · p. 14

    This intra-genus competition may have ultimately been won by human groups because of continued advances in foresight, language, culture, and coordinated aggression, leaving humans as the sole survivors.

    “This intra-genus competition may have ultimately been won by human groups because of continued advances in foresight, language, culture, and coordinated aggression, leaving us as the sole survivors of an extraordinary evolutionary arms race.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    The function of episodic memory is to accumulate stories that are relevant to recount in conversation.

    “The function of episodic memory, in my view, is to accumulate stories that are relevant to recount in conversation”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Emotional aspects of mental time travel · p. 22

    People who have higher visual imagery capacities generate more detailed representations of their personal past and future, and rate their representations of future events as being more emotional and meaningful.

    “people who have higher visual imagery capacities generate more detailed representations of their personal past and future, and rate their representations of future events as being more emotional and meaningful”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites D'Argembeau & Van der Linden 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § Emotional aspects of mental time travel · p. 23

    Positive biases in representing the past and future probably help maintain a positive view of the self and foster optimism concerning one's personal future, which may promote physical and mental health.

    “Positive biases in representing the past and future probably help maintain a positive view of the self and foster optimism concerning one's personal future, which may promote physical and mental health”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Taylor & Brown 1988

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Emotional aspects of mental time travel · p. 23

    Depressed individuals tend to generate fewer positive future events, while anxious individuals tend to generate more negative future experiences.

    “depressed individuals tend to generate fewer positive future events, while anxious individuals tend to generate more negative future experiences”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites MacLeod & Byrne 1996

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Emotional aspects of mental time travel · p. 23

    Most people hold positive views of themselves and are more willing to consider information that bolsters their self-image than information that contradicts it.

    “Most people hold positive views of themselves and are more willing to consider information that bolsters their selfimage than information that contradicts it”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Baumeister 1998

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    Episodic memory is a unique endowment.

    “Episodic memory is certainly a unique endowment”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Emotional aspects of mental time travel · p. 22

    The resulting representations can be highly selective, and the pieces of information that are encoded, maintained, and retrieved from memory in priority are those that are most relevant to an individual's goals, beliefs, and concerns.

    “The resulting representations can therefore be highly selective, and the pieces of information that are encoded, maintained, and retrieved from memory in priority are those that are most relevant to an individual's goals, beliefs, and concerns”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Conway 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Emotional aspects of mental time travel · p. 22

    Representations of emotional events induce significant modifications of emotional responses and feelings, and may therefore be used to regulate affective states.

    “Representations of emotional events induce significant modifications of emotional responses and feelings (Damasio et al. 2000), and may therefore be used to regulate affective states”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Damasio et al. 2000

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisereasoning
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    In certain applications in which data are scarce and non-homogeneous, storing actual encountered examples, regardless of their representativeness, may be a viable strategy.

    “in certain applications in which data are scarce and non-homogeneous, storing actual encountered examples, regardless of their representativeness, may be a viable strategy”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Emotional aspects of mental time travel · p. 22

    The use of mental simulations to regulate mood states is not always straightforward; people probably use rather complex strategies that may vary across situations.

    “the use of mental simulations to regulate mood states is not always straightforward, however; people probably use rather complex strategies that may vary across situations”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    To delineate categories, it may be useful to remember borderline instances, as with support vectors.

    “To delineate categories, it may be useful to remember borderline instances, as with support vectors”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Cornuejols & Miclet 2002

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Valerie A. Carr a and Indre V. Viskontas b · p. 21

    The hippocampus is specialized for rapidly storing episodic memories, whereas the surrounding neocortex stores information about statistical regularities in the world.

    “According to the CLS model, the hippocampus is specialized for rapidly storing episodic memories, whereas the surrounding neocortex stores information about the statistical regularities in the world.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites O'Reilly and Rudy (2001)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Emotional aspects of mental time travel · p. 22

    Negative memories remind people of their past errors and provide cues on how to avoid undesired outcomes or minimize their consequences, whereas positive memories remind people of their past accomplishments and provide cues on how to attain success.

    “Negative memories remind people of their past errors and provide cues on how to avoid undesired outcomes or minimize their consequences, whereas positive memories remind people of their past accomplishments and provide cues on how to attain success”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    The Case-Based Reasoning technique aims at solving new problems by matching them with memorized known examples.

    “The Case-Based Reasoning technique (Kolodner 1993) aims at solving new problems by matching them with memorized known examples”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Kolodner 1993

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    Remembered episodes are exactly those that are worth telling.

    “Remembered episodes are exactly those that are worth telling”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    People spend one fifth of their waking time in spontaneous conversation, and a significant share of this time is devoted to reporting past events.

    “People spend one fifth of their waking time in spontaneous conversation (Dunbar 1998), and a significant share of this time is devoted to reporting past events”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Dunbar 1998

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Tannen 1984

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Eggins & Slade 1997

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    Such details represent a waste of storage and hinder and mislead retrieval matching.

    “not only do such details represent a waste of storage, they also hinder and mislead retrieval matching”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    One crucial requirement is that reported stories must appear unexpected.

    “One crucial requirement is that reported stories must appear unexpected”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Dessalles, in press

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § The meaning of 'time' in episodic memory and mental time travel · p. 25

    Temporal information plays a central role in discussions of the nature of episodic memory and mental time travel.

    “Temporal information plays a central role in discussions of the nature of episodic memory (EM) (e.g., Tulving 1972; 1984; 2002b) and mental time travel (MTT) (target article)”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Tulving 1972

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Tulving 1984

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Tulving 2002b

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    Episodic memory is an outgrowth of the language faculty.

    “An alternative view is that EM is an outgrowth of the language faculty”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Dessalles 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § The meaning of 'time' in episodic memory and mental time travel · p. 25

    Among the different types of temporal information that humans and animals could process are temporal locations, temporal distances, and before-after relations and other relations of the order of events.

    “Among the different types of temporal information that humans and animals could process are: when an event occurred (or is expected to occur) within some time pattern ('temporal locations'), how long ago an event occurred ('temporal distances'), and before-after relations and other relations of the order of events”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Friedman 1993

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Mental time travel in the rat: Dissociation of recall and familiarity · p. 25

    We cannot say with any confidence that this 'recall' in a rat was associated with the phenomenological experience that accompanies recall in humans.

    “Of course, we cannot say with any confidence that this 'recall' in a rat was associated with the phenomenological experience that accompanies recall in humans”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    Eliciting interest through conversational stories is a high-stakes game; boring participants are rapidly ignored and may lose their friends.

    “Eliciting interest through conversational stories is a high-stakes game. Boring participants are rapidly ignored and may lose their friends”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    If the primary purpose of storing episodes is to offer material for future recounting, then systematically remembering details such as time and space location makes perfect sense.

    “If, as we claim, the primary purpose of storing episodes is to offer material for future recounting, then systematically remembering details such as time and space location makes perfect sense”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Mental time travel in the rat: Dissociation of recall and familiarity · p. 24

    Human episodic memory rarely codes when an event occurred, and humans are extremely poor at remembering when.

    “human episodic memory rarely codes when, and even with all the advantages of verbal labels to help code such information (e.g., 'last Wednesday,' '19th March'), we are extremely poor at such memory”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Friedman 1993

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § The meaning of 'time' in episodic memory and mental time travel · p. 25

    Memory for time is often inaccurate, systematically distorted, and even inconsistent with remembering time in an integral way.

    “memory for time is often inaccurate, systematically distorted, and even inconsistent with remembering time in an integral way”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Friedman 1993

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Mental time travel in the rat: Dissociation of recall and familiarity · p. 24

    In humans, the subjective feelings of knowing and remembering are associated with different neural systems and different patterns of performance when analysing ROC curves.

    “in humans the subjective feelings of knowing and remembering are associated with different neural systems and different patterns of performance when analysing receiver operating curve (ROC) curves”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Yonelinas 1994

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Yonelinas et al. 1998

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    The interest of coincidentally encountering someone increases with the remoteness of the place and with the simplicity of that person, if she happens to be a celebrity or a close acquaintance.

    “the interest of coincidentally encountering someone increases with the remoteness (and thus complexity) of the place and with the simplicity of that person, if she happens to be a celebrity or a close acquaintance”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    Interlocutors draw from their memory relevant episodes that they can relate to the current conversational topic and systematically try to recount them.

    “Interlocutors draw from their memory relevant episodes that they can relate to the current conversational topic and they systematically try to recount them”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § Mental time travel in the rat: Dissociation of recall and familiarity · p. 24

    The essential difference between remembering and knowing about a past, personally experienced event lies in the subjective feeling associated with a memory, and this cannot be investigated in nonverbal animals.

    “The essential difference between remembering and knowing about a past, personally experienced event lies in the subjective feeling associated with a memory, and clearly this cannot be investigated in nonverbal animals”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Storing events to retell them · p. 23

    In our species, those who know first or who can draw highly relevant events from their past experiences make potentially good allies.

    “In our species, those who know first or who can draw highly relevant events from their past experiences make potentially good allies”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Mental time travel in the rat: Dissociation of recall and familiarity · p. 24

    Because the object was hidden, this ability must rely on recall, and not recognition memory.

    “Because the object was hidden, this ability must rely on recall, and not recognition memory”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    The authors focus on a surprisingly narrow and problematic mechanism for foresight, namely, mental time travel.

    “the authors focus on a surprisingly narrow and problematic mechanism for it, namely, mental time travel”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § Past and future, human and nonhuman, semantic / procedural and episodic · p. 27

    Procedural memory encodes instructions on what action to take whenever certain circumstances arise.

    “procedural memory encodes instructions on what action to take whenever certain circumstances arise.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    If the authors' formulation were strictly true, one would be able to foresee only those events that one has episodic memory of.

    “if it were strictly true, it would mean that one would be able to foresee only those events that one has episodic memory of”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    The Bayesian framework represents at a minimum a substantive counterexample to the framework suggested by the authors.

    “But it represents, at a minimum, a substantive counterexample to the framework suggested by the authors.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § The meaning of 'time' in episodic memory and mental time travel · p. 25

    Humans remember and anticipate times separately on multiple time scales.

    “humans remember and anticipate times separately on multiple time scales”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    In the Bayesian framework, prediction is a fairly straightforward extension of parameter estimation.

    “in this framework, prediction is a fairly straightforward extension of parameter estimation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § The meaning of 'time' in episodic memory and mental time travel · p. 25

    It is not clear that autonoetic consciousness of particular autobiographical episodes is necessary to flexibly plan specific future events.

    “it is not clear that the remaining criterion - autonoetic consciousness of particular autobiographical episodes - is necessary to flexibly plan specific future events”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    To the extent that one can only foresee those future events that one has experienced in the past, and events never repeat themselves exactly, one can never apply the memory of any past event to a future situation.

    “To the extent that one can only foresee those future events that one has experienced in the past, and to the extent that events never repeat themselves exactly, one can never apply the memory of any past event to a future situation”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Events never repeat themselves exactly.
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    Mental time travel is a principled, but narrow and computationally limiting, implementation of foresight.

    “Mental time travel is a principled, but a narrow and computationally limiting, implementation of foresight”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § The meaning of 'time' in episodic memory and mental time travel · p. 25

    Research on humans' memory for times and on thinking about the times of future events shows that there are some common processes and some differences.

    “Research on humans' memory for times and on thinking about the times of future events shows that there are some common processes (e.g., the use of representations of time patterns) and some differences (using impressions of the ages of memories)”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Past and future, human and nonhuman, semantic / procedural and episodic · p. 27

    Procedural and semantic memories are laid down by experience, which is necessarily temporally prior to their formation, but they are not memories about particular events in the past, still less about events in the future.

    “Both procedural and semantic memories are laid down by experience, which is necessarily temporally prior to their formation, but they are not memories about particular events in the past, still less about events in the future.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    The Bayesian framework subsumes and greatly extends the authors' framework for foresight.

    “In this sense, the Bayesian framework subsumes, and greatly extends, the authors' framework for foresight.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Past and future, human and nonhuman, semantic / procedural and episodic · p. 27

    Procedural and semantic memory are timeless forms of memory, evolutionarily preceding the emergence of episodic memory, in both its retrospective and prospective forms.

    “We would bracket procedural and semantic memory together as timeless forms of memory, evolutionarily preceding the emergence of episodic memory, in both its retrospective and prospective forms.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § The meaning of 'time' in episodic memory and mental time travel · p. 25

    From about 4 years of age onward, many children are able to recall unique happenings when asked about events such as 'your last birthday' or 'last Christmas,' but this ability appears years before children are aware of when these events had occurred relative to one another.

    “From about 4 years of age onward, many children are able to recall unique happenings when asked about events such as 'your last birthday' or 'last Christmas,' but this ability appears years before children are aware of when these events had occurred relative to one another”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Friedman 1992

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § The meaning of 'time' in episodic memory and mental time travel · p. 25

    Developmental changes can co-occur but be rooted in different processes, and the deficits that hippocampal patients show in episodic memory and anticipation could be due in part to problems other than the capacity to engage in mental time travel.

    “developmental changes can co-occur but be rooted in different processes, and the deficits that hippocampal patients show in EM and anticipation could be due in part to problems other than the capacity to engage in MTT”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Hassabis et al. 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § Past and future, human and nonhuman, semantic / procedural and episodic · p. 27

    Semantic memory encodes tenseless facts.

    “Semantic memory encodes tenseless facts like 'sugar be sweet.'”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    Different forms of memory might interact with each other and with other mental faculties to help foresee the future.

    “different forms of memory might interact with each other and with other mental faculties to help foresee the future”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    The authors' formulation of foresight places patently untenable limitations on one's very ability to imagine.

    “the authors' formulation of foresight ultimately amounts to placing patently untenable limitations on one's very ability to imagine”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    The Bayesian framework is biologically plausible.

    “First, this framework is clearly biologically plausible.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    One can mentally create events that are sufficiently different from any that one has experienced before.

    “one can obviously mentally create events that are sufficiently different from any that one has experienced before”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § The meaning of 'time' in episodic memory and mental time travel · p. 25

    Throughout development, planning may rely to a greater extent on information abstracted from repeated episodes and from semantic memory.

    “Throughout development, planning may rely to a greater extent on information abstracted from repeated episodes (the commonalities of which are more relevant to the future than the particularities) and from semantic memory”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § The meaning of 'time' in episodic memory and mental time travel · p. 25

    The relevant quality of episodic memory might best be thought of as experiences that are remembered as occurring on a particular occasion.

    “It might be best to think of the relevant quality of EM as experiences that are remembered as occurring on a particular occasion”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Past and future, human and nonhuman, semantic / procedural and episodic · p. 26

    The overlap of representations of past and future is not a completely new idea.

    “The overlap of representations of past and future is not a completely new idea.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Meacham & Singer 1977

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Past and future, human and nonhuman, semantic / procedural and episodic · p. 27

    Tulving identifies episodic memory closely with both past and future (planned) events.

    “Tulving (2005) identifies episodic memory closely with both past and future (i.e., planned) events.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Tulving 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisecitation
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    The ability to foresee future situations is likely to depend on many different mental faculties, including memory of the past.

    “the ability to foresee future 'situations' is likely to depend on many different mental faculties, including memory of the past”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    The Bayesian framework can utilize episodic memory but is not dependent on it.

    “Thus, the Bayesian framework can utilize episodic memory, but is not dependent on it.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    One can easily generalize and extrapolate, with arbitrary specificity and detail, from past experience.

    “one can easily generalize and extrapolate, with arbitrary specificity and detail, from past experience”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § The meaning of 'time' in episodic memory and mental time travel · p. 25

    There is no evidence that events are automatically coded by the times of their occurrence or that memory is temporally organized.

    “There is no evidence that events are automatically coded by the times of their occurrence or that memory is temporally organized”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Friedman 1993

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Friedman 2004

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    One can vividly imagine events that one is certain never to have experienced in the past, such as a boulder rolling up a hill on its own.

    “one can also vividly imagine events that one is certain never to have experienced in the past, such as a boulder rolling up a hill on its own”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    Some degree of generalization and extrapolation is a prerequisite for predicting future events.

    “Some degree of generalization and extrapolation is a prerequisite for predicting future events”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Mental time travel sickness and a Bayesian remedy · p. 26

    Information about the particularities of specific past events, such as that provided by episodic memory, is not needed for specific predictions about future events.

    “Information about the particularities of specific past events, such as that provided by episodic memory, is not needed”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    Foresight can be served by either direct semantic prospection or more roundabout mental time travel directed to the future.

    “foresight can be served by either direct semantic prospection or more round about mental time travel directed to the future.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Past and future, human and nonhuman, semantic / procedural and episodic · p. 27

    Gibson's (1979) idea of affordances depends crucially on perception-action coupling.

    “Gibson's (1979) idea of affordances depends crucially on perception-action coupling.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Gibson 1979

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § Developing past and future selves for time travel narratives · p. 29

    Mental time travel requires the sense of a past and future self, which is lacking in the early years of life.

    “Mental time travel requires the sense of a past and future self, which is lacking in the early years of life.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Past and future, human and nonhuman, semantic / procedural and episodic · p. 27

    Hommel et al. (2001) concluded that perceived events and to-be-produced events are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes.

    “Hommel et al. (2001) give an overview pointing to the conclusion that 'Perceived events (perceptions) and to-be-produced events (actions) are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes - cognitive structures we call event codes'”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Hommel et al. 2001

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Developing past and future selves for time travel narratives · p. 30

    Self-memory is late in developing, and is followed by developing ideas of a self-future.

    “Self-memory is late in developing, and is followed by developing ideas of a self-future.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Prospection or projection: Neurobiological basis of stimulus-independent mental traveling · p. 31

    The deficit in amnesic patients was not restricted to personally relevant possible future events but was common to a wide variety of commonplace scenarios, with severe impairment in placing fragmented images into one coherent spatial context.

    “the deficit was not restricted to personally relevant possible future events (e.g., a possible Christmas event) but was common to wide variety of commonplace scenarios (situation of standing in the main hall of a museum, etc.), with severe impairment in placing fragmented images into one coherent spatial context.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Hassabis et al. (2007)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Has mental time travel really affected human culture? · p. 29

    Even if it was established that mental time travel has significantly affected cultural change, this does not automatically invalidate Darwinian approaches to culture.

    “Second, even if it was established that mental time travel has significantly affected cultural change, this does not automatically invalidate Darwinian approaches to culture.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    The past has actually happened, which means that it once was the present, and thus subject to memory storage by suitably equipped organisms.

    “The past has actually happened, which means that it once was the present, and thus subject to memory storage by suitably equipped organisms”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    In the macroscopic world the effect follows the cause in time, but never the reverse.

    “In the macroscopic world the effect follows the cause in time, but never the reverse.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    There is no such destination for prospective mental time travel, because the future has not happened and all we can know is that all possible futures, except one, will in fact not materialize, but not which one.

    “There is no such destination for prospective mental time travel, because unlike the past, the future has not happened and all we can know is that all possible futures, except one , will in fact not materialize, but not which one.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    The present (cause) becomes a memory (effect) by the next present along future-directed causal pathways.

    “That is how the present (cause) becomes a memory (effect) by the next present along future-directed causal pathways.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Past and future, human and nonhuman, semantic / procedural and episodic · p. 27

    Enactive Perception emphasizes the involvement of action in perception.

    “In philosophy, a school of thought known as 'Enactive Perception' also emphasizes the involvement of action in perception”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Noë 2004

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    In principle, the possibility of veridical memory exists.

    “That means that in principle, at least, the possibility of veridical memory exists.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    Occasionally, we are able to recover such detail by going back and 'reliving' the situation, though that utility is in all likelihood a rather marginal one.

    “Occasionally, we are in fact able to recover such detail by going back and 'reliving,' as it were, the situation in question, though that utility is in all likelihood a rather marginal one.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    Rehearsal for questions that may be posed in a forthcoming job interview is readily accomplished through semantic prospection.

    “rehearsal for questions that may be posed in a forthcoming job interview (sect. 2.1) is readily accomplished through semantic prospection”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Prospection or projection: Neurobiological basis of stimulus-independent mental traveling · p. 30

    The series of processes involved with reward-based decision making is best described as 'procedural future cognition' that might be less flexible and stimulus-bound.

    “This series of processes involved with reward-based decision making is obviously one form of prospection, but, as was defined in the target article, it is best described as 'procedural future cognition' that might be less flexible and stimulus-bound.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Past and future, human and nonhuman, semantic / procedural and episodic · p. 27

    The ability to conjure up scripts is a kind of general mental space integration capacity.

    “The ability to conjure up such scripts is a kind of general mental space integration capacity.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    The veridical memory is the 'destination' towards which we steer in retrospective mental time travel.

    “The veridical memory is the 'destination' towards which we steer in retrospective mental time travel.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § Past and future, human and nonhuman, semantic / procedural and episodic · p. 27

    Scripts form a framework for our retrospective and prospective representations of events.

    “Such scripts form a framework for our retrospective and prospective representations of events.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Schank & Abelson 1977

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Prospection or projection: Neurobiological basis of stimulus-independent mental traveling · p. 31

    Addis et al. (2007) controlled more strictly for phenomenological quality of remembered/imagined events so that they were truly episodic and details were constant across future and past conditions.

    “Addis et al. (2007) controlled more strictly for phenomenological quality of remembered / imagined events so that they were truly 'episodic' and that details, emotionality, personal significance, and field / observer perspective were constant across the future and past conditions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Addis et al. (2007)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Prospection or projection: Neurobiological basis of stimulus-independent mental traveling · p. 30

    Mental time travel may be extended more generally to 'mental traveling,' accomplished by stimulus-independent mental processes typical of human thought.

    “Mental time travel may be extended more generally to 'mental traveling,' accomplished by stimulus-independent mental processes typical of human thought.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Prospection or projection: Neurobiological basis of stimulus-independent mental traveling · p. 31

    Hassabis et al. (2007) demonstrated that amnesic patients with bilateral medial temporal damage cannot imagine new experiences in addition to impairment in remembering past episodes.

    “Hassabis et al. (2007) have demonstrated striking evidence that amnesic patients with bilateral medial temporal damage cannot imagine new experiences in addition to their impairment in remembering past episodes.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Hassabis et al. (2007)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § Past and future, human and nonhuman, semantic / procedural and episodic · p. 27

    The discovery of mirror neurons shows overlaps between sensory and motor representations of actions.

    “The discovery of mirror neurons also shows overlaps between sensory and motor representations of actions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    Time itself, along with the causality of the macroscopic world, is profoundly and fundamentally asymmetric with respect to past and future.

    “time itself, along with the causality of the macroscopic world, is profoundly and fundamentally asymmetric with respect to past and future.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    Information whose efficacy for success in planning for the future exceeds that provided by semantic prospection may be unavailable in principle.

    “Such information may in fact be unavailable in principle, for reasons connected with the nature of time and its relation to memory and imagination.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Past and future, human and nonhuman, semantic / procedural and episodic · p. 27

    Martin et al. (1996) found that naming tools selectively activated a left premotor area also activated by imagined hand movements.

    “Martin et al. (1996), who found that 'naming tools selectively activated a left premotor area also activated by imagined hand movements.'”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Martin et al. 1996

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    Which of the possible futures is the 'true future' cannot be known until it has 'travelled to us,' and become the present.

    “Which of these is the ' true future' cannot be known until it has 'travelled to us,' and become the present.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Developing past and future selves for time travel narratives · p. 30

    Episodic memory is the only form of memory that is about the past; it is also the only form that is about the self (autonoetic).

    “EM is the only form of memory that is about the past; it is also the only form that is about the self (autonoetic) (Tulving 1993).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Tulving 1993

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Has mental time travel really affected human culture? · p. 29

    Critics of cultural evolution commonly conflate imperfect human foresight with the perfect supernatural foresight of an omniscient being.

    “Critics of cultural evolution commonly conflate this imperfect 'human foresight' with the perfect 'supernatural foresight' of an omniscient being.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    There is no corresponding possibility with regard to the future, because the future has by definition not happened, being a mixture of coexisting latent possibilities as yet unresolved.

    “There is no corresponding possibility with regard to the future, because the future has by definition not happened, being a mixture of coexisting latent possibilities as yet unresolved.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § Has mental time travel really affected human culture? · p. 29

    Biologically evolved biases in learning can 'predict' the future based on past regularities, but biological evolution cannot actively simulate novel future events.

    “Biologically evolved biases in learning can 'predict' the future based on past regularities (Lorenz 1969; Mayr 1982), but biological evolution cannot actively simulate novel future events.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Lorenz 1969

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Mayr 1982

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Past and future, human and nonhuman, semantic / procedural and episodic · p. 27

    Mecklinger et al. (2002) concluded that visual working memory for manipulable objects is based on motor programmes associated with their use.

    “Mecklinger et al. (2002) concluded that 'visual working memory for manipulable objects is based on motor programmes associated with their use'”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Mecklinger et al. 2002

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    Those examples illustrate only the utility of foresight, not the specific utility of mental time travel for that purpose.

    “those examples illustrate only the utility of foresight - which no one doubts - but not the specific utility of mental time travel for that purpose”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Developing past and future selves for time travel narratives · p. 29

    Future talk is less frequent than talk about the past and occurs more with older preschoolers.

    “there is evidence that future talk is less frequent than talk about the past and occurs more with older preschoolers (Eisenberg 2006)”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Eisenberg 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Has mental time travel really affected human culture? · p. 28

    The existence of mental time travel, specifically regarding future events (foresight), has direct relevance to an ongoing debate concerning the validity of the theory of Darwinian cultural evolution.

    “The existence of mental time travel, specifically regarding future events (i.e., foresight), has direct relevance to an ongoing debate concerning the validity of the theory of Darwinian cultural evolution.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Memory, imagination, and the asymmetry between past and future · p. 28

    Every single example illustrating foresight by means of mental time travel provided in the target article can be implemented by direct semantic prospection instead.

    “every single example illustrating foresight by means of mental time travel provided in the target article can be implemented by direct semantic prospection instead.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § Has mental time travel really affected human culture? · p. 29

    Existing studies suggest that foresight plays little role in directing technological change.

    “Existing studies (e.g., Basalla 1988) suggest that foresight plays little role in directing technological change”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Basalla 1988

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Prospection or projection: Neurobiological basis of stimulus-independent mental traveling · p. 31

    There is probably a corresponding neurobiological distinction between declarative and non-declarative future prospection: stimulus-oriented non-declarative prospection may depend on cortico-basal ganglia loop, while stimulus-independent declarative prospection may recruit medial prefrontal-parietal-temporal network.

    “Probably there is a corresponding neurobiological distinction between the two in the brain: The stimulus-oriented, non-declarative prospection may depend largely on cortico-basal ganglia loop, whereas the stimulus-independent, declarative prospection may recruit the medial prefrontal-parietal-temporal network.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Empirical evaluation of mental time travel · p. 33

    Additional behavioural criteria for 'episodic-like' memory are that memory must have www content, integrated structure, and flexible deployment.

    “We subsequently proposed additional behavioural criteria for 'episodic-like' memory; namely, that the memory must not only be shown to have www content but also to have an integrated structure and that the information can be deployed flexibly (Clayton et al. 2003).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Clayton et al. 2003

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § What are the evolutionary causes of mental time travel? · p. 32

    MTT might to some extent already have been in place from earlier social selection pressures, but changes in hominin ecology chiseled out the more advanced ability humans depend on now.

    “MTT might to some extent already have been in place as a result of earlier selection pressures in the social life, but changes in hominin ecology chiseled out the more advanced ability that we seem totally dependent upon nowadays.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § On the constructive episodic simulation of past and future events · p. 34

    The hippocampus shows increased activity when people construct and elaborate on both future and past events; right hippocampus shows greater activity during construction of future than past events.

    “the hippocampus shows increased activity when people construct and elaborate on both future and past events; indeed, the right hippocampus shows greater activity during construction of future than past events (Addis et al. 2007).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Addis et al. 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § What are the evolutionary causes of mental time travel? · p. 32

    These morphological adaptations must have been related to behavioral adaptations, which could be a result of evolving MTT.

    “These morphological adaptations must have been related to behavioral adaptations, which could be a result of an evolving mental time travel.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § What are the evolutionary causes of mental time travel? · p. 32

    Once Acheulean tools were reached (beginning ~1.5 mya), MTT was in an advanced stage.

    “Once the period of Acheulean tools was reached, beginning about 1.5 million years ago, mental time travel was in an advanced stage.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § On the constructive episodic simulation of past and future events · p. 33

    The constructive episodic simulation hypothesis holds that episodic simulation of future events requires a memory system that allows flexible recombination of details from past events into novel scenarios.

    “the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, which holds that episodic simulation of future events requires a memory system that allows the flexible recombination of details from past events into novel scenarios.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Schacter & Addis 2007a

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Schacter & Addis 2007b

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § What are the evolutionary causes of mental time travel? · p. 32

    De Waal (1982) noted that advanced social cognition in great apes probably was a stepping-stone to complex artifactual cognition in humans.

    “De Waal (1982) noted that the advanced social cognition apparent in great apes probably was a stepping-stone to the complex artifactual cognition in humans.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites De Waal (1982)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § Empirical evaluation of mental time travel · p. 33

    The semantic memory system allows individuals to acquire information about themselves and their world through different sensory modalities and flexibly retrieve and use this information, including personal information and autobiographical facts.

    “The semantic memory system allows individuals to acquire information about themselves and their world through different sensory modalities and flexibly retrieve and use this information. This includes personal information and autobiographical facts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § What are the evolutionary causes of mental time travel? · p. 32

    Humans are probably the species most dependent on MTT, because the world we survive in is manipulated and constructed by complex artifacts, so our mind must be highly tuned to these aspects.

    “And, we are probably also the species most dependent on MTT - the world in which we can survive is a world manipulated and constructed by complex artifacts, so our mind must be highly tuned to these aspects.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § On the constructive episodic simulation of past and future events · p. 33

    Remembering past events and imagining future events draw on similar kinds of information in episodic memory and involve many shared processes.

    “According to this hypothesis, remembering past events and imagining or simulating future events draw on similar kinds of information in episodic memory and involve many shared processes.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Schacter & Addis 2007a

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Schacter & Addis 2007b

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Empirical evaluation of mental time travel · p. 33

    In the absence of such criteria, the comparative aspect of MTT is not a matter of scientific enquiry but of intellectual preference.

    “In the absence of such criteria, the comparative aspect of MTT is not a matter of scientific enquiry but of intellectual preference.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § On the constructive episodic simulation of past and future events · p. 33

    Episodic memory possesses characteristics that make it highly adaptive for simulating novel future scenarios based on past experiences, but also make it prone to errors and distortions from miscombining stored elements.

    “Episodic memory possesses exactly these characteristics, which makes the system highly adaptive for simulating novel future scenarios based on past experiences, but also makes the system, when used for remembering, prone to errors and distortions that arise from miscombining stored elements - a common form of memory distortion.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § Prospection or projection: Neurobiological basis of stimulus-independent mental traveling · p. 31

    Buckner and Carroll (2006) proposed that prospection, episodic memory, theory of mind, and spatial navigation reflect the workings of the same core brain network (medial prefrontal-parietal-temporal network).

    “Buckner and Carroll (2006) to propose that envisioning the future (prospection), remembering the past (episodic memory), conceiving the viewpoint of others (theory of mind), as well as shifting one's topographical perspective (some forms of spatial navigation) reflect the workings of the same core brain network, that is, the medial prefrontal-parietal-temporal network.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Buckner and Carroll (2006)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § What are the evolutionary causes of mental time travel? · p. 32

    If sociality is the crucial factor behind evolution of MTT, it should be expected in some other primates.

    “So, if sociality is the crucial factor behind the evolution of mental time travel, it should be expected in some other primates.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § What are the evolutionary causes of mental time travel? · p. 32

    Humans and apes seem almost equally developed in social cognition, though differing widely in technical understanding.

    “He observes that humans and apes seem almost equally developed in social cognition, though differing widely in technical understanding.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites De Waal (1982)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Empirical evaluation of mental time travel · p. 33

    Most behaviours in any animal are likely to be species typical and a result of some form of predisposition and learning.

    “Most behaviours in any animal, cognitive or otherwise, are likely to be species typical and a result of some form of predisposition and learning.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § What are the evolutionary causes of mental time travel? · p. 32

    It would be very hard to isolate behaviors connected to MTT when observing social life of nonverbal creatures; such behaviors could be explained in a leaner way than assuming MTT.

    “It would be very hard to isolate behaviors connected to MTT when observing the social life of nonverbal creatures; such behaviors could be explained in a leaner way than assuming MTT.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Empirical evaluation of mental time travel · p. 33

    It is not testable empirically whether this type of future planning depends upon episodic personal projection or semantic knowledge.

    “What we do not know, and think is not testable empirically, is whether this type of future planning depends upon episodic personal projection or semantic knowledge.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Empirical evaluation of mental time travel · p. 33

    The what, where, and when must be bound together in order for an animal to discriminate one event from another.

    “the important point here is that the what, where and when must be bound together in order that the animal can discriminate one event from another.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § What are the evolutionary causes of mental time travel? · p. 32

    The main components of Oldowan culture are manufacturing/use of stone tools, transport of artifacts, transport of carcasses, and use of accumulation spots.

    “The main components of the Oldowan culture are recognized as: (1) the manufacturing and use of stone tools; (2) the transport of artifacts (at least stone tools); (3) the transport of pieces of carcasses; and (4) the use of accumulation spots (Plummer 2004).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Plummer 2004

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § What are the evolutionary causes of mental time travel? · p. 32

    A significant advantage of Oldowan culture is that it enabled a much wider exploitation of meat resources.

    “A significant advantage of this culture is that it enabled a much wider exploitation of meat resources.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Empirical evaluation of mental time travel · p. 33

    Humans may always combine episodic and semantic future thinking in assessing alternatives, but this does not prove that the episodic element is essential for future thinking.

    “Humans may always combine episodic and semantic future thinking in assessing alternatives, but this does not prove that the episodic element is essential for future thinking.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Prospection or projection: Neurobiological basis of stimulus-independent mental traveling · p. 31

    Other brain imaging studies indicate roles of anterior prefrontal cortex in prospective memory or remembering action plans, and involvement of medial prefrontal and parietal cortices in stimulus-independent thought.

    “other brain imaging studies indicating roles of the anterior part of the prefrontal cortex in prospective memory or remembering mentally represented action plans during ongoing cognitive activities (e.g., Okuda et al. 2007), as well as involvement of medial prefrontal and parietal cortices in stimulus-independent thought or mind-wondering (Mason et al. 2007a, but see also Gilbert et al. 2007 and”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Okuda et al. 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Mason et al. 2007a

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § What are the evolutionary causes of mental time travel? · p. 32

    MTT might not be unique to humans, but humans have the highest physical-technical accuracy and focus in their travels.

    “MTT might not be unique to us, but we have the highest physical-technical accuracy and focus in our travels.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition · p. 34

    This path leads to a quest for an existence proof followed by endless disputes over whether 'it' really was demonstrated.

    “This path leads to a quest for an existence proof (just one animal with 'it' is enough), followed by endless disputes over whether 'it' really was demonstrated.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § First test, then judge future-oriented behaviour in animals · p. 35

    Chimpanzees have some appreciation of the duration of the delay, and a flexible capacity of weighing different options based on time to and size of what is to come relative to what is currently available.

    “This suggests some appreciation of the duration of the delay, and a flexible capacity of weighing different options based on time to and size of what is to come relative to what is currently available.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § First test, then judge future-oriented behaviour in animals · p. 35

    Scrub jays can store their breakfast in the evening at a location where they occasionally are forced to spend the night, but are never provided with breakfast, suggesting future-oriented behaviour not driven by current need.

    “scrub jays can store their breakfast in the evening at a location where they occasionally are forced to spend the night, but are never provided with breakfast, suggesting future-oriented behaviour not driven by current need (Raby et al. 2007).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Raby et al. 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition · p. 35

    The tests for animals are closely analogous to those used with people, and data from people and monkeys have sometimes been reported in the same article.

    “The tests for animals are also closely analogous to those used with people, and indeed data from people and monkeys have sometimes been reported in the same article (see Smith et al. 2003).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Smith et al. 2003

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning
    § First test, then judge future-oriented behaviour in animals · p. 35

    Future-oriented behaviour and episodic-like memory in other animals suggest that not all animals are limited to the present.

    “future-oriented behaviour and episodic-like memory in other animals suggest that not all animals are limited to the present.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition · p. 35

    The comparative study of numerical cognition has made real progress since researchers moved beyond asking 'Do animals count?' to comparative analysis of components.

    “the comparative study of numerical cognition has made real progress since researchers moved beyond asking, 'Do animals count?' (see Shettleworth 1998) to the comparative analysis of components of numerical competence”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Shettleworth 1998

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    • cites Feigenson et al. 2004

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § On the constructive episodic simulation of past and future events · p. 34

    Componential approaches have been usefully applied to memory and should be similarly helpful when applied to future event simulation.

    “Such componential approaches have been usefully applied to memory by numerous investigators, and should be similarly helpful when applied to future event simulation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition · p. 35

    Exact perception of small numerosities and Weber's law-based discrimination among larger ones may be widely shared among vertebrates, whereas exact appreciation of quantities larger than about 5 is normally confined to numerate humans.

    “These may be widely shared among vertebrates, whereas exact appreciation of quantities larger than about 5 is normally confined to numerate humans (Pica et al. 2004).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Pica et al. 2004

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition · p. 34

    Researchers can productively seek no more than functional similarities between human and animal behaviors in analogous situations.

    “Researchers can productively seek no more than functional similarities between human and animal behaviors in analogous situations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition · p. 34

    Monkeys' reports of metacognitive certainty transfer across tasks, and they behave as if using it to control information seeking in naturalistic and operant tasks.

    “Monkeys' reports of metacognitive certainty transfer across tasks (Kornell et al. 2007), and they behave as if they are using it to control information seeking in naturalistic (Hampton et al. 2004) and operant tasks (Kornell et al. 2007).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Kornell et al. 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Hampton et al. 2004

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition · p. 34

    Because we can only observe behavior, we can never know if animals are mentally time traveling anywhere.

    “Because we can only observe behavior, we can never know if animals are mentally time traveling anywhere.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition · p. 34

    We can never know what other species' mental experiences are like.

    “Not only can we never know what other species' mental experiences are like”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition · p. 34

    Monkeys show this functional relationship immediately when memory is taxed, indicating their behavior does not reflect learning to use cues like length of retention interval.

    “Monkeys show this functional relationship immediately when memory is taxed, further indicating that their behavior does not reflect learning to use cues like length of the retention interval.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition · p. 35

    Even so, it still cannot reveal the monkeys' subjective states.

    “Even so, it still cannot reveal the monkeys' subjective states.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § First test, then judge future-oriented behaviour in animals · p. 35

    Our results on chimpanzees counter the interpretation that the apes only needed to learn to always return with the same tool and that the set-up allowed for tool collection based on a current need.

    “Our results on chimpanzees, however, counter this interpretation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § First test, then judge future-oriented behaviour in animals · p. 35

    New results on chimpanzees suggest that they plan for the future and possess some MTT components.

    “new results on chimpanzees suggest that they plan for the future and possess some MTT components.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Dufour & Sterck, submitted

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Dufour et al. 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Mulcahy & Call 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition · p. 34

    The title of the target article implies that we can learn directly about animals' mental states, and its focus on human uniqueness impels a search for an existence proof rather than understanding shared components.

    “It implies that we can learn directly about animals' mental states, and its focus on human uniqueness impels a search for an existence proof rather than for understanding what components of given cognitive processes are shared among species and why.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § First test, then judge future-oriented behaviour in animals · p. 35

    The conditions for MTT in animals are laid out, so the capacity of MTT itself can be investigated.

    “the conditions for MTT in animals are laid out, so the capacity of MTT itself can be investigated.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition · p. 35

    There is reasonable theoretical agreement on relevant procedures and predicted patterns of data in monkey metacognition research.

    “One reason this body of work is so compelling is that there is reasonable theoretical agreement on relevant procedures and predicted patterns of data.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § On the constructive episodic simulation of past and future events · p. 34

    In the updated model, central executive is associated with strategic control, whereas episodic buffer is a limited capacity system that provides temporary storage of information in a multimodal code, capable of binding information into a unitary episodic representation.

    “In the updated model, the central executive is associated with strategic control of processing, whereas the episodic buffer is 'a limited capacity system that provides temporary storage of information held in a multimodal code, which is capable of binding information from the subsidiary systems, and from long-term memory, into a unitary episodic representation' (Baddeley 2000, p. 417).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Baddeley 2000

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § On the constructive episodic simulation of past and future events · p. 34

    Several brain regions show greater activity during future versus past event construction; one is right hippocampus, another is medial part of right anterior prefrontal cortex (BA 10).

    “several brain regions show greater activity during future versus past event construction (Addis et al. 2007). As noted earlier, one of those regions is the right hippocampus. Another such region is a medial part of right anterior prefrontal cortex (BA 10).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Addis et al. 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § On the constructive episodic simulation of past and future events · p. 34

    Baddeley (2000) updated working memory model to include a fourth component, the episodic buffer.

    “Baddeley (2000) updated the model to include a fourth component, the episodic buffer.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Baddeley 2000

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § First test, then judge future-oriented behaviour in animals · p. 35

    The 'broadcaster' is probably not required for mental time travel, although it may enhance joint action.

    “From the capacities mentioned, the 'broadcaster' is probably not required for MTT, although it may enhance joint action.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition · p. 34

    Searching for a yes or no answer about human uniqueness is not a productive way to proceed with research in comparative cognition.

    “searching for a yes or no answer to a question about human uniqueness is not a productive way to proceed with research in comparative cognition.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition · p. 35

    Interpreting what animals do as revealing mental time travel is one example of a widespread return of anthropomorphism, which appeals to the public without necessarily advancing understanding.

    “Interpreting what they do as revealing mental time travel is one example of a rather widespread return of anthropomorphism, which appeals to the public without necessarily advancing understanding (Wynne 2007).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Wynne 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § R4. Mental time travel and developmental psychology · p. 42

    Autobiographical memory is generally taken to include not just episodic memory, but also semantic knowledge that one may have about one's history.

    “Autobiographical memory is generally taken to include not just episodic memory, but also semantic knowledge that one may have about one's history.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § R2.5. Combinations and recombinations · p. 41

    Humans can imagine whatever, wherever, and whenever.

    “We recognize that humans can imagine whatever, wherever , and whenever (Suddendorf & Busby 2003b),”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf & Busby 2003b

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 42

    Time travel almost always takes us to different places.

    “it is also worth noting that time travel almost always takes us to different places.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 42

    Laterality may hold the key, with evidence that the right hippocampus shows greater activity during construction of future events compared to past ones.

    “Another possibility, suggested by Schacter & Addis , is that laterality may hold the key, with evidence that the right hippocampus shows greater activity during construction of future events compared to past ones (Addis et al. 2007).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Addis et al. 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § R2.4. Beyond past and future · p. 41

    Both mental time travel and theory of mind may draw on basic component abilities such as metarepresentation and executive functions, or 'frame-of-reference awareness'.

    “On the one hand, both may draw on basic component abilities such as metarepresentation and executive functions (e.g., Suddendorf 1999), or 'frame-of-reference awareness';”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf 1999

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 42

    If the Uniqueness hypothesis is correct, then some aspects of these disorders may be uniquely human, too.

    “If the Uniqueness hypothesis is correct, then some aspects of these disorders may be uniquely human, too.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 42

    Putative disturbances of the capacity to travel mentally in time can only be informed by such models to the extent that there are animal parallels.

    “Putative disturbances of the capacity to travel mentally in time can only be informed by such models to the extent that there are animal parallels.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R2.4. Beyond past and future · p. 41

    Understanding others' minds often depends on understanding what happened to them, and what their plans and goals might be.

    “and understanding others' minds often depends on understanding what happened to them, and what their plans and goals might be.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 42

    Clues may come from various other syndromes (e.g., autism) and disorders (e.g., delusions).

    “Clues may come from various other syndromes (e.g., autism; Suddendorf & Corballis 1997; Williams et al. 2001) and disorders (e.g., delusions; Gerrans 2007).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf & Corballis 1997

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Williams et al. 2001

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    • cites Gerrans 2007

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R2.4. Beyond past and future · p. 41

    The relation between mental time travel and theory of mind may be quite complex.

    “The relation between mental time travel and theory of mind may be quite complex.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § R2.5. Combinations and recombinations · p. 41

    Even memories that reveal themselves as images require a story grammar if remembrance is to be distinguished from random hallucinations.

    “have acknowledged previously (Suddendorf & Corballis 1997) Freud's observation that even memories that reveal themselves as images require a story grammar if remembrance is to be distinguished from random hallucinations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf & Corballis 1997

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 41

    The evidence overwhelmingly confirms the strong overlap between brain areas involved in imagining the future and in recollecting the past, and hence the Janus hypothesis.

    “This evidence overwhelmingly confirms the strong overlap between brain areas involved in imagining the future and in recollecting the past, and hence the Janus hypothesis.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § R2.5. Combinations and recombinations · p. 41

    Given a basic vocabulary of actors, objects, and events, we can construct unique episodes in the past and create scenarios to deal with unique contingencies in the future.

    “That is, given a basic vocabulary of actors, objects, and events, we can construct unique episodes in the past and create scenarios to deal with unique contingencies in the future.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf & Corballis 1997

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Premisecitation
    § R2.5. Combinations and recombinations · p. 41

    The veracity of episodic memory cannot be used to define it.

    “Several commentators (e.g., Ainslie; Schacter & Addis ) agree with us that the veracity of episodic memory cannot be used to define it.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Ainslie

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    • cites Schacter & Addis

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 42

    The brain areas involved in mental time travel may also be involved in mental traveling in space, and into the minds of others, as well as in time.

    “He and Buckner also suggest that the brain areas involved in mental time travel may also be involved in mental traveling in space, and into the minds of others, as well as in time”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 42

    Double dissociations are particularly informative.

    “Double dissociations are particularly informative, and we agree that further interdisciplinary exchange is highly desirable.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Lorenz

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 42

    The discussion of animal capacities is important to developing potential 'animal models' for certain conditions.

    “For example, the discussion of animal capacities is important to developing potential 'animal models' for certain conditions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § R2.4. Beyond past and future · p. 41

    Mental time travels are mental states.

    “Conversely, mental time travels are mental states,”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 42

    Our considerations may inform different lines of research in psychopathology.

    “Our considerations, in turn, may inform different lines of research in psychopathology”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § First test, then judge future-oriented behaviour in animals · p. 36

    Our results on future-oriented behaviour in chimpanzees indicate that they possibly show future planning and have some of the mental capacities required for mental time travel.

    “In conclusion, our results on future-oriented behaviour in chimpanzees indicate that they possibly show future planning and have some of the mental capacities required for MTT.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R2.5. Combinations and recombinations · p. 41

    Errors of memory hold clues to understanding the memory system.

    “Just as visual illusions hold vital clues to studying normal vision, so errors of memory also hold clues to understanding the system”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § First test, then judge future-oriented behaviour in animals · p. 36

    Theory of mind has also been proposed to require a number of components, among them the capacity to appreciate the future.

    “ToM has also been proposed to require a number of components, among them the capacity to appreciate the future (Barrett et al. 2003, p. 496).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Barrett et al. 2003

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 42

    The same evidence also implicates a medial part of the right anterior prefrontal cortex (BA10), which may be the seat of an 'episodic buffer' that binds multimodal information.

    “But again, this same evidence also implicates a medial part of the right anterior prefrontal cortex (BA10), which they suggest may be the seat of an 'episodic buffer' (Baddeley 2000) that binds multimodal information.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Baddeley 2000

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 42

    The once-common belief that cerebral asymmetry is uniquely human has now been thoroughly refuted.

    “although the once-common belief that cerebral asymmetry is uniquely human has now been thoroughly refuted (Vallortigara & Rogers 2005).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Vallortigara & Rogers 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § R4. Mental time travel and developmental psychology · p. 42

    Few studies have attempted to directly investigate the development of mental time travel into the past and future, but there is a relatively large literature on the development of related concepts such as autobiographical memory.

    “Few studies have attempted to directly investigate the development of mental time travel into the past and future (e.g. Busby & Suddendorf 2005), but there is a relatively large literature on the development of related concepts such as autobiographical memory.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Busby & Suddendorf 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 42

    Failure in any one of the components may lead to no mental time travel, or to disturbances that may be more informative about the physiology than studying the intact system.

    “Failure in any one of the components may lead to no mental time travel, or to disturbances that may indeed be, as Lorenz suggested, more informative about the physiology than studying the intact system.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R2.5. Combinations and recombinations · p. 41

    This generativity may be an asset for flexible foresight, but it may serve less well for accurately recording events of the past.

    “This generativity may be an asset for flexible foresight, but it may serve less well for accurately recording events of the past,”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § First test, then judge future-oriented behaviour in animals · p. 36

    One is not part of the other, since they are two different capacities, but both mental time travel and theory of mind depend partly on the same components.

    “This suggests that one is not part of the other, since they are two different capacities, but that both MTT and ToM depend partly on the same components.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Mental time travel requires self-awareness.
    • Rests on an assumption: Theory of mind is an advanced cognitive capacity often attributed to humans only.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 41

    It is possible that the hippocampus plays a more complex role in humans than in other species.

    “It is possible that the hippocampus plays a more complex role in humans than in other species.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 42

    His own work, and that of others, implicates brain networks involving medial aspects of prefrontal, temporal, and parietal cortices.

    “His own work, and that of others, implicates brain networks involving medial aspects of prefrontal, temporal, and parietal cortices.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 42

    According to the HERA model, the left prefrontal cortex is more involved than the right PFC in episodic memory encoding, whereas the right PFC is more involved than the left PFC in episodic memory retrieval.

    “According to the HERA (hemispheric encoding retrieval asymmetry) model (Habib et al. 2003), the left prefrontal cortex (PFC) is more involved than the right PFC in episodic memory encoding, whereas the right PFC is more involved than the left PFC in episodic memory retrieval”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Habib et al. 2003

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § R2.4. Beyond past and future · p. 41

    To understand what oneself and others might do in the future typically requires some appreciation of different mental states.

    “For example, to understand what oneself and others might do in the future typically requires some appreciation of different mental states.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 41

    Hippocampal 'place' cells in rodents might code 'when' as well as 'where,' perhaps providing a substrate for episodic-like memory, or the 'stage' component of the Theater hypothesis.

    “de Hoz and Wood (2006) have reviewed evidence that hippocampal 'place' cells in rodents might code 'when' as well as 'where,' perhaps providing a substrate for episodic-like memory, or the 'stage' component of the Theater hypothesis.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites de Hoz and Wood 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § R3. Mental time travel and neuroscience · p. 41

    Aggleton and Brown (1999) have proposed a model in which the hippocampus and other diencephalic structures are activated differently by semantic and episodic memory, at least in humans, although in both cases the prefrontal cortex is implicated as well.

    “Aggleton and Brown (1999) have proposed a model in which the hippocampus and other diencephalic structures are activated differently by semantic and episodic memory, at least in humans, although in both cases the prefrontal cortex is implicated as well”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Aggleton and Brown 1999

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § R5.1. Are behavioral tests possible? · p. 44

    These are behavioral criteria that lend themselves to comparative inquiry.

    “Yet, these are behavioral criteria that lend themselves to comparative inquiry.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § R4. Mental time travel and developmental psychology · p. 42

    Developmental studies of mental time travel are important and may offer vital clues to other relevant disciplines.

    “we do believe that developmental studies of mental time travel are important and that they may offer vital clues to the other relevant disciplines, too”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § ( Atance & Meltzoff ; Shettleworth ). · p. 43

    Most developmental theorists subscribe to something like the Components hypothesis and argue that a range of emerging capacities such as language, self-concept, and theory of mind are related to the development of autobiographic memory.

    “most developmental theorists subscribe to something like the Components hypothesis and argue that a range of emerging capacities such as language, self-concept, and theory of mind are related to the development of autobiographic memory (e.g., Howe & Courage 1997; Levine 2004; Nelson & Fivush 2004; Perner 2000; Reese 2002; Suddendorf & Corballis 1997; Welch-Ross 1995).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Howe & Courage 1997

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Levine 2004

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    • cites Nelson & Fivush 2004

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § ( Atance & Meltzoff ; Shettleworth ). · p. 43

    Little is yet known about the development of children's thinking about the future.

    “Little is yet known about the development of children's thinking about the future (for reviews, see Haith et al. 1994; Moore & Lemon 2001), offering fertile ground for future research”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Haith et al. 1994

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Moore & Lemon 2001

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § ( Atance & Meltzoff ; Shettleworth ). · p. 43

    Some data, such as differential effects of the timing of adult-child conversations on memory, cannot be explained by genetic transmission and suggest that the conversations themselves do influence children's memory.

    “However, some data, such as differential effects of the timing of adult-child conversations on memory (e.g., McGuigan & Salmon 2004), cannot be explained in that way and suggest that the conversations themselves do influence children's memory.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites McGuigan & Salmon 2004

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductcitation
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 44

    Because of counterbalancing, half the jays had received breakfast the morning of the test and the other half had not; thus, four of the birds had reason to expect no breakfast the next day, whereas the other four should have expected to receive breakfast; yet, the results for these two groups were combined, revealing only that, overall, the jays were caching more in the cage that was associated با

    “Because of counterbalancing, half the jays had received breakfast the morning of the test and the other half had not. Thus, four of the birds had reason to expect no breakfast the next day, whereas the other four should have expected to receive breakfast. Yet, the results for these two groups were combined, revealing only that, overall, the jays were caching more in the cage that was associated”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Raby et al. 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § ( Atance & Meltzoff ; Shettleworth ). · p. 43

    Very little is yet known about how children come to develop foresight, and developments may continue well into adolescence.

    “Very little is yet known about how children come to develop foresight, and we suspect that developments continue well into adolescence.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.1. Are behavioral tests possible? · p. 43

    Future-directed action is the key towards mapping animals' competence and understanding the evolution of mental time travel.

    “We suggest that future-directed action is the key towards mapping animals' competence and understanding the evolution of mental time travel.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § ( Atance & Meltzoff ; Shettleworth ). · p. 43

    Key developments in foresight appear to also emerge over the preschool years, and when asked to tell something they did do yesterday and something they will do tomorrow, 3- to 5-year-old children perform similarly on both sets of questions.

    “However, key developments in foresight appear to also emerge over the preschool years (e.g., Atance & O'Neill 2005; Suddendorf & Busby 2005), and when asked to tell something they did do yesterday and something they will do tomorrow, 3- to 5-year-old children perform similarly on both sets of questions (Busby & Suddendorf 2005).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Atance & O'Neill 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Suddendorf & Busby 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Busby & Suddendorf 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.1. Are behavioral tests possible? · p. 44

    Comparative research should focus on non-species-typical behavior because it provides evidence for flexibility and rules out any role of non-cognitive behavioral predispositions governing future-directed behavior.

    “We thus argued that comparative research should focus on non-species-typical behavior because it (a) provides evidence for such flexibility and (b) rules out any role of non-cognitive behavioral predispositions governing future-directed behavior”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.1. Are behavioral tests possible? · p. 43

    Natural selection needs something to get its teeth into, and an internal feel alone is inadequate for that.

    “we pointed out that natural selection needs something to get its teeth into, and an internal feel alone is inadequate for that.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § ( Atance & Meltzoff ; Shettleworth ). · p. 43

    The author found associations between mental time travel tasks and standard measures of theory of mind, substantiating the Theory-of-mind hypothesis.

    “However, the author found associations between these tasks and standard measures of theory of mind, substantiating the Theory-of-mind hypothesis.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bischof-Kohler 2000

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § ( Atance & Meltzoff ; Shettleworth ). · p. 43

    Experimental designs have been proposed to assess future need anticipation, as future-directed action could demonstrate nonverbal capacities.

    “Experimental designs have been proposed to assess future need anticipation, as future-directed action could demonstrate nonverbal capacities (Suddendorf 1994; Suddendorf & Busby 2005; Tulving 2005).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf 1994

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Suddendorf & Busby 2005

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    • cites Tulving 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 44

    These behaviors are largely instinctive, and the Bischof-Kohler hypothesis may still hold for 'individual, flexible situations involving noninstinctive behaviors'.

    “These behaviors, though, are largely instinctive, and the hypothesis may still hold for 'individual, flexible situations involving noninstinctive behaviors' (sect. 3.3 of the target article).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § ( Atance & Meltzoff ; Shettleworth ). · p. 43

    High-elaborating mothers may have passed on the genes that are responsible for high elaboration to their offspring.

    “For example, high-elaborating mothers may have passed on the genes that are responsible for high elaboration to their offspring.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § ( Atance & Meltzoff ; Shettleworth ). · p. 43

    Learning how to broadcast and understanding others' broadcasts are important, but that does not mean that it induces the other abilities involved in mental time travel.

    “Learning how to broadcast and understanding others' broadcasts are no doubt important. But that does not mean that it induces the other abilities we propose are involved in mental time travel.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § ( Atance & Meltzoff ; Shettleworth ). · p. 42

    Young children first begin to refer to small parts of past events and, gradually, with the help of their caregivers, turn them into full narratives.

    “This literature has documented how young children first begin to refer to small parts of past events and, gradually, with the help of their caregivers, turn them into full narratives.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 44

    An alternative explanation for the caching is that the birds based the caching, not on anticipated hunger, but on a general heuristic to balance food sources, based on previous experience of imbalance.

    “An alternative, perhaps, is that the birds based the caching, not on anticipated hunger, but on a general heuristic to balance food sources, based on previous experience of imbalance.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 44

    Many species secure future needs, whether in food caching, nest building, or migration.

    “Many species secure future needs, whether in food caching, nest building, or migration.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 44

    In Raby et al. (2007), eight scrub jays received breakfast in one cage and no breakfast in another cage, on alternating days; when later given the opportunity to store food while currently satiated, they cached more in the place where no breakfast was to be expected.

    “In this study, eight scrub jays received breakfast in one cage and no breakfast in another cage, on alternating days. When later given the opportunity to store food while currently satiated, they cached more in the place where no breakfast was to be expected.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Raby et al. 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § ( Atance & Meltzoff ; Shettleworth ). · p. 43

    Children's mental time travel may be initially more influenced by talk about the past than the future, and the Future-first hypothesis may hold only for evolution rather than for development.

    “Perhaps children's mental time travel is initially more influenced by talk about the past than the future, as Nelson claims, and the Futurefirst hypothesis may hold only for evolution rather than for development.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § ( Atance & Meltzoff ; Shettleworth ). · p. 43

    The self in the present may be a prerequisite of mental time travel, whereas a temporally extended sense of self may be its consequence.

    “In Suddendorf & Corballis (1997), we note, for example, that the self in the present may be a prerequisite of mental time travel, whereas a temporally extended sense of self may be its consequence.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf & Corballis 1997

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § ( Atance & Meltzoff ; Shettleworth ). · p. 43

    The relation between these abilities may be multidimensional and involve other factors.

    “The relation between these abilities may be multidimensional and involve other factors (e.g. such as in the Theory-of-mind hypothesis).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § ( Atance & Meltzoff ; Shettleworth ). · p. 43

    Nonhuman animals cannot anticipate future need states they do not directly experience (the Bischof-Kohler hypothesis).

    “they maintain the hypothesis that we named after them ( Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis ): that nonhuman animals cannot anticipate future need states they do not directly experience (Suddendorf & Corballis 1997).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf & Corballis 1997

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § R5.1. Are behavioral tests possible? · p. 44

    It has been argued that the development of mental time travel is not uniform, but that there are individual and cultural differences in the way children first acquire mental time travel.

    “It has certainly been argued that this development is not uniform, but that there are individual and cultural differences in the way children first acquire mental time travel (see Nelson ).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Nelson

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § R5.1. Are behavioral tests possible? · p. 44

    It is not yet clear whether human children develop mental time travel in a predictable fashion.

    “However, it is not yet clear whether or not this is so.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 44

    The Bischof-Kohler hypothesis cannot be true in the superficial sense that food caching is directed toward future gratification.

    “As we acknowledged in the target article, the BischofKo ¨ hler hypothesis cannot be true in the superficial sense that food caching is directed toward future gratification.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    Various deficits in the components we discuss could limit mental time travel (Multiple limits hypothesis).

    “we put forward the theater metaphor and suggest that various deficits in the components we discuss could limit mental time travel ( Multiple limits hypothesis ).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 46

    We might be missing out on instructive information about the systematic failures of nonhuman animals.

    “but we might be missing out on instructive information about the systematic failures of nonhuman animals.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductcitation
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 45

    The repeated exposure to the conditions means that associative learning could possibly explain the results.

    “As Shettleworth (2007) noted, however, the repeated exposure to the conditions means that associative learning could possibly explain the results.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Shettleworth 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    Such models have to explain why there are dissociations between different kinds of prospection and how they come about.

    “But such models have to explain why there are dissociations between different kinds of prospection and how they come about.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 46

    Negative findings are seldom published, and hence Osvath & Gardenfors' observation that most studies have reported positive results for animal foresight may not be surprising.

    “Note that negative findings are seldom published, and hence Osvath & Ga ¨ rdenfors' observation that most studies have reported positive results for animal foresight may not be surprising.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning
    § R5.4. The future of animal studies of mental time travel · p. 46

    Premack and Woodruff's 1978 Behavioral and Brain Sciences article on theory of mind sparked comparative research that led to real progress and productive research areas in developmental psychology and other disciplines.

    “The article sparked a flurry of comparative research that has led to real progress.”
    • Also stated in: § R5.4. The future of animal studies of mental time travel · p. 46 · hedged
      “In the process, it kick-started perhaps one of the most productive research areas in developmental psychology and galvanized research in neuroscience, philosophy, and other disciplines.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Premack and Woodruff's (1978) source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 44

    There remains a nagging suspicion that the flexible behavior associated with caching in scrub jays is restricted to the particular speciality of food storage.

    “In all this, however, there remains also the nagging suspicion that the flexible behavior associated with caching in scrub jays is restricted to the particular speciality of food storage.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Study design and conductreasoning
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 44

    To conclude that the jays were planning for the next morning rather than having acquired a more general rule, these two conditions would need to be compared rather than amalgamated.

    “To conclude that the jays were planning for the next morning rather than having acquired a more general rule, these two conditions would need to be compared rather than amalgamated.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    These data do not challenge the Bischof-Kohler hypothesis, and it remains unclear how such relatively brief delay of gratification relates to the flexible capacity of humans to travel mentally to any future scenarios.

    “But these data do not challenge the Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis, and it remains unclear how such relatively brief delay of gratification relates to the flexible capacity of humans to travel mentally to any future scenarios, be they a year or only a few minutes away.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 46

    Foresight has played a major role in human survival, providing unparalleled flexibility in adaptive and proactive behavior.

    “We certainly think that foresight has played a major role in human survival, providing us with unparalleled flexibility in adaptive and proactive behavior (the Flexibility hypothesis).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Humans can travel mentally in time.
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 45

    Although the task may tap an important difference between procedural and declarative memory, no mental time travel may be involved.

    “Thus, although the task may tap an important difference between procedural and declarative memory, no mental time travel may be involved.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    A case for quantitative differences in mental time travel could still be made.

    “Nonetheless, a case for quantitative differences in mental time travel could still be made (e.g., Carr & Viskontas ; Hurford et al. ).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Carr & Viskontas

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Hurford et al.

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    Some of the proposals we discuss could be regarded as setting quantitative limits.

    “In fact, some of the proposals we discuss could be regarded as setting quantitative limits.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    The idea that foresight is based on a continuum runs counter to the case we made for the Prospection systems hypothesis.

    “Second, the idea that foresight is based on a continuum runs counter to the case we made for the Prospection systems hypothesis.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    The difference between being and not being limited in such a way could amount to a qualitative shift - without future need anticipation, there is little point in considering any genuinely remote future events.

    “The difference between being and not being limited in such a way could of course amount to a qualitative shift - without future need anticipation, there is little point in considering any genuinely remote future events.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 44

    If the same animals pass different versions of such tasks (involving different contexts and needs), then this evidence for flexibility would make the Bischof-Kohler hypothesis increasingly untenable.

    “As we noted previously, if the same animals pass different versions of such tasks (involving different contexts and needs), then this evidence for flexibility would make the Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis increasingly untenable (Suddendorf & Busby 2005).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf & Busby 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 45

    Over repeated trials two squirrel monkeys (but not rats) gradually reversed their natural preference for four pieces of dates over one piece, when choosing four pieces resulted in provision of water after a long delay (3 hours), and choosing one piece was followed by water supply after a short delay (1/2 hour).

    “They found that over repeated trials two squirrel monkeys (but not rats) gradually reversed their natural preference for four pieces of dates over one piece, when choosing four pieces resulted in provision of water after a long delay (3 hours), and choosing one piece was followed by water supply after a short delay (1 / 2 hour).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Naqshbandi and Roberts 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    Children can delay gratification for longer when the salience of the reward is decreased, suggesting that the extent of the delay reflects inhibition or executive control, rather than the capacity to travel mentally to the future event per se.

    “Research with children (e.g., Mischel & Mischel 1983) suggests that they can delay gratification for longer when the salience of the reward is decreased (e.g., when looking at a photo of the reward rather than at the actual reward), suggesting that the extent of the delay reflects inhibition or executive control, rather than the capacity to travel mentally to the future event per se.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Mischel & Mischel 1983

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § R5.4. The future of animal studies of mental time travel · p. 46

    Research on mental time travel in animals, including the questions raised by the authors, has been very productive.

    “recent work on mental time travel in animals has been very productive indeed (in addition to our review, see also Dere et al. 2006; Roberts 2006; Zentall 2006).”
    • Also stated in: § R5.4. The future of animal studies of mental time travel · p. 46 · boosted
      “there can be little argument that the questions we have raised have sparked very productive research programs.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Dere et al. 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Roberts 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Zentall 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 45

    Fornix-dissected rats fail on the 'recall' task, yet still succeed on a 'recognition' task.

    “Fornixdissected rats fail on the 'recall' task, yet still succeed on a 'recognition' task.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Eacott & Easton

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    The Multiple limits hypothesis suggests that species might be limited by a variety of other deficits that may have both quantitative and qualitative effects.

    “The Multiple limits hypothesis suggests that species might be limited by a variety of other deficits that may have both quantitative and qualitative effects.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    Bar's suggestion that even human mental time travel may reduce to associations neglects the inventive component of human imagination, just as animal communication fails to display the generativity of human language.

    “Bar suggests that even human mental time travel may reduce to associations, but this again neglects the inventive component of human imagination, just as animal communication fails to display the generativity of human language.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    It remains to be established what exactly the nature and extent of modern apes' foresight (and that of other animals) is.

    “we acknowledged that 'it remains to be established what exactly the nature and extent of modern apes' foresight (and that of other animals) is' (target article, sect. 3.3, para. 7).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites target article

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 45

    One explanation for the gradual reversal of choice from four pieces of dates to one piece would be that the monkeys took their future thirst into account.

    “Thus, one explanation for the gradual reversal of choice from four pieces of dates to one piece would be that the monkeys took their future thirst into account (i.e., evidence against the BischofKo ¨ hler hypothesis).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    The causality may well be the other way around: Mental time travel makes human lives more complex than those of animals.

    “In response, we note first that the causality may well be the other way around: Mental time travel makes human lives more complex than those of animals.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    We cannot prove the Stuck-in-time hypothesis.

    “We are of course also not convinced and acknowledge that we cannot prove the Stuck-in-time hypothesis.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductreasoning
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 44

    The issue of need in this context is not about seeing the apparatus, but about the internal motivational state, and these were neither controlled nor manipulated.

    “The issue of need in this context is not about seeing the apparatus, but about the internal motivational state (see also Bischof-Ko ¨hler & Bischof ), and we merely observed that these were neither controlled nor manipulated”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 45

    Eating dates induces thirst, and subsequently not having access to something to drink for a while causes discomfort.

    “Eating dates induces thirst, and subsequently not having access to something to drink for a while causes discomfort.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 46

    Humans have a long history of carrying diverse sets of tools in preparation for future happenings.

    “Consider, for example, the long history of humans carrying with them diverse sets of tools in preparation for future happenings (e.g., Suddendorf 2006).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Suddendorf 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 44

    It remains to be seen whether this ability is available to jays in other contexts.

    “We agree with Shettleworth (2007) that it remains to be seen whether this ability is available to jays in other contexts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Shettleworth 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    There is something unique about human mental time travel (the Uniqueness hypothesis).

    “We believe that there is something unique about human mental time travel (the Uniqueness hypothesis)”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § R5.4. The future of animal studies of mental time travel · p. 46

    The authors' analyses provided a theoretical framework for Raby et al.'s work.

    “As Raby et al. acknowledge at the beginning of their commentary, our analyses have provided a theoretical framework for their work.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Raby et al. (2007)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    The clever experiments we discussed in the previous section suggest that nonhuman animals may have some competence, and future research may well whittle away at some suggested limits.

    “The clever experiments we discussed in the previous section suggest that nonhuman animals may have some competence, and future research may well whittle away at some suggested limits.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 45

    We can recall that Wellington is the capital of New Zealand, but that is because we know it, not because we can remember being told it.

    “We can recall that Wellington is the capital of New Zealand, but that is because we know it, not because we can remember being told it.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § R5.2. New data on animal foresight · p. 45

    Comparing the neuronal implementation of analog behavior such as that between rats and humans may hold vital information to clarifying the component processes of the Theater hypothesis.

    “Nonetheless, comparing the neuronal implementation of analog behavior such as that between rats and humans, as Buckner submits, may hold vital information to clarifying the component processes of the Theater hypothesis”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R5.4. The future of animal studies of mental time travel · p. 46

    In the context of human mind evolution, convergent evolution of some capacities (as perhaps in jays) may be less relevant than potentially homologous abilities of our closest living primate relatives.

    “In this context, convergent evolution of some capacities (as perhaps in jays) may be less relevant than the potentially homologous abilities of our closest living primate relatives.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisenone given
    § R5.3. Continuity in animal competence · p. 45

    The Bischof-Kohler hypothesis suggests a limit to the extent of foresight (i.e., anticipation of future needs).

    “The Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis, for example, suggests a limit to the extent of foresight (i.e., anticipation of future needs).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 47

    The cognitive arms race seems to have persisted longer in humans than in other primates, resulting in apparently unique cognitive skills, including perhaps mental time travel.

    “One problem for such an account is to explain why the cognitive arms race seems to have persisted longer in humans than in other primates, resulting in apparently unique cognitive skills, including, perhaps, mental time travel”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 47

    Ecological dominance may have led our ancestors down a different path of intergroup competition, resulting in the emergence of language, theory of mind, mental time travel, and so forth.

    “This 'ecological dominance' may have led our ancestors down a different path of intergroup competition, resulting in the emergence of language, theory of mind, mental time travel, and so forth.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 47

    Modern history contains cases of explicit social engineering, such as Marxism, implemented based on plans for future change.

    “In modern history there are certainly cases of explicit social engineering where, say, Marxism was implemented based on plans for future change.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 47

    In one study, Chinese autobiographical memories were more social than those of U.S. participants, who recalled more events oriented towards the self.

    “For example, in one study Chinese autobiographical memories were more social than those of U.S. participants who recalled more events oriented towards the self (Conway et al. 2005).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Conway et al. 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R7. Conclusion · p. 47

    The commentaries signal an increased multidisciplinary interest in mental time travel.

    “In conclusion, the commentaries signal an increased multidisciplinary interest in mental time travel.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 47

    The evidence presented does not imply that Darwinian cultural evolution is a lost cause.

    “Wealso agree that this does not imply that Darwinian cultural evolution is a lost cause.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 47

    There are many parallels between cultural and biological evolution worth considering, even if there are important differences.

    “As Mesoudi et al. (2006) have shown, there are many parallels between cultural and biological evolution that are worth considering, even if there are also important differences.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Mesoudi et al. (2006)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 47

    Culture and language may influence the way people travel mentally in time.

    “In turn, of course, culture and language may also influence the way people travel mentally in time, as Nelson points out.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Nelson

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 47

    Many aspects of human culture are not top-down but bottom-up related to our shared ability to reconstruct past and imagine future events.

    “We suspect that many aspects of human culture are not top-down, but bottom-up related to our shared ability to reconstruct past and imagine future events.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 47

    Cultures may determine what is important to remember or anticipate.

    “For example, cultures may determine what it is that is important to remember or to anticipate.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationown data
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 47

    The evidence presented by the authors makes simple denial that humans have foresight untenable.

    “We agree that the evidence we present makes simple denial that humans have foresight an untenable escape.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 47

    Once early hominins obtained a certain level of ecological dominance, they faced increased competition from their own species.

    “A potential explanation, suggested by Alexander and colleagues (Alexander 1989; Flinn et al. 2005), is that once early hominins obtained a certain level of 'ecological dominance,' . . . they were faced with increased competition from their own species.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Alexander 1989

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Flinn et al. 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 47

    People of all cultures, with the possible but controversial exception of the Piraha, can plan for next week and remember what happened last week.

    “People of all cultures, with the possible but controversial exception of an Amazonian tribe, the Piraha (Everett 2005), can plan for next week and can remember what happened last week.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Everett 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § R6. Mental time travel and evolutionary psychology · p. 46

    The capacity for mental time travel appears necessary for the emergence of civilizations.

    “The capacity for mental time travel would on the face of it appear to be necessary for the emergence of civilizations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Humans can travel mentally in time.
396 of 396
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Phenomenological experience is a private mental capacity that may never be knowable in another organism.

    “Phenomenological experience, though, is a private mental capacity, and one may rightfully wonder if one could ever know of another organism's mental world.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    For mental time travel to have evolved, there must have been some effect on survival or reproduction for natural selection to work on.

    “Nevertheless, for mental time travel to have evolved, there must have been something natural selection could work on, that is, some effect on survival or reproduction (unless it was merely an accidental side effect of some other adaptation).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The adaptive advantage of any memory system can only lie in what it contributes for future survival.

    “The adaptive advantage of any memory system can only lie in what it contributes for future survival.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The human encephalization quotient is about three times that of the chimpanzee.

    “The human EQ is about three times that of the chimpanzee.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The hippocampus is a primary site for episodic memory in humans.

    “a finding that is also consistent with the hippocampus being a primary site for episodic memory in humans.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The apes in the Mulcahy and Call studies had a desire for grape rewards throughout testing.

    “The studies did not control or manipulate the drive or need state of the subjects, and it is not unreasonable to assume that they all had a desire for grape rewards throughout testing (Suddendorf 2006).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Behavior that increases future survival has a selective advantage.

    “Because behavior that increases future survival has a selective advantage”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Animals, when experiencing conflicting needs, cannot but follow the strongest need and suppress the others.

    “Animals, when experiencing contradicting needs, cannot but follow the strongest need and suppress the others.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The potential for frame-of-reference awareness is beyond the grasp of even the great apes.

    “We postulate that the potential for this awareness is beyond the grasp of even the great apes and thus a core constituent of the human condition.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Nonhuman animals can use simple predictions based on associations, learning from experience and applying it in the future.

    “it is clear that they can use simple predictions that are based on associations (i.e., they learn from experience and apply it in the future).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The hippocampus is phylogenetically among the oldest parts of the brain.

    “The hippocampus is phylogenetically among the oldest parts of the brain”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In machine learning, rote learning is an inefficient strategy.

    “In machine learning, rote learning is an inefficient strategy”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The purpose of any learning task is to make generalization possible.

    “The purpose of any learning task is to make generalization possible”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    A good way to perform induction is to aggregate experience into structures such as prototypes or clusters.

    “A good way to perform induction is to aggregate experience into structures such as prototypes or clusters”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Storing particular instances generally makes sense if they are statistically representative.

    “Storing particular instances (e.g., cluster centers) generally makes sense if they are statistically representative”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The intact recognition ability of fornix-transected rats was mediated by intact familiarity processes.

    “As these animals had impaired recall, we can assume that their intact recognition ability was mediated by intact familiarity processes”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Events never repeat themselves exactly.

    “to the extent that events never repeat themselves exactly”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    MTT plays a decisive part in human life and society.

    “Undoubtedly MTT plays a decisive part in human life and society”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Social interaction within many species is very strong.

    “Social interaction within many species is very strong.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The hand-to-mouth lifestyle of great apes does not apply to humans.

    “The hand-to-mouth lifestyle of great apes does not apply to humans.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    It is not possible to know exactly where the next fresh kill will be found.

    “It is not possible to know exactly where the next fresh kill will be found”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Without sharp-edged stone tools in immediate vicinity, a carcass would lose much of its value.

    “Without sharp-edged stone tools in the immediate vicinity, a carcass would lose much of its value.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Mental time travel requires self-awareness.

    “MTT requires self-awareness.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Theory of mind is an advanced cognitive capacity often attributed to humans only.

    “ToM is also considered an advanced cognitive capacity often attributed to humans only.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Larger, more recently evolved systems can perform feats that smaller, more ancestral ones cannot.

    “larger, more recently evolved systems can perform feats that smaller, more ancestral ones cannot.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    It is impossible to know for certain what another human's mental experience is like.

    “We can also never know for certain what even another human's mental experience is like (language or not), but that does not stop us studying the mind (though it did during the behaviorist era).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Humans can travel mentally in time.

    “Since humans can travel mentally in time, the natural question of whether nonhuman animals can do so, too, can inspire the pursuit of more detailed analyses of animal capacities.”
27 of 27

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • In predictive coding frameworks, predictions and prediction errors interact over rapid (synchronic) timescales providing a constitutive basis for the corresponding perceptions, cognitions, and actions.

    “in predictive coding frameworks, predictions and prediction errors interact over rapid (synchronic) timescales providing a constitutive basis for the corresponding perceptions, cognitions, and actions”

    From An Interoceptive Predictive Coding Model of Conscious Presence (2012) · cites this paper as Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007

    The taxonomy of future-oriented cognition (p. 2) discusses stimulus-driven predictions of future events, and the Bayesian commentary (p. 26) discusses estimating future values. Neither addresses predictive coding, interactions between predictions and prediction errors on rapid timescales, or their proposed constitutive role in perception, cognition, and action. Searches for “predictive coding” and “prediction errors” found no passage establishing the claim. (LLM, conf=0.78)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • It is difficult to draw any conclusion from these studies of whether episodic-like memory is restricted to evolved behaviours or whether it is analogous to the generalizability observed in human episodic memory.

    “Therefore, it is difficult to draw any conclusion from these studies of whether episodic-like memory is restricted to evolved behaviours or whether it is analogous to the generalizability observed in human episodic memory [48].”

    From Is episodic-like memory <i>like</i> episodic memory? (2024) · cites this paper as [48]

  • Construction of detached probabilistic scenes has been argued to influence ongoing decision making by estimating outcomes of behavioral choices.

    “Indeed, construction of detached probabilistic scenes has been argued to influence ongoing decision making by estimating outcomes of behavioral choices (Boyer 2008; Suddendorf and Corballis 2007; Schilbach et al. 2008b).”

The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet

References 237 · Cited by 2,031

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. 10.1644/1545-1542(2001)0822.0.CO;2 · DOI
  2. 10.1002/1096-8644(200103)114:33.0.CO;2-I · DOI
  3. Corballis, none, Cognitive Science, none, none
  4. Leaver, none, Animal Cognition, none, none
  5. 10.1002/(SICI)1096-8644(199806)106:23.0.CO;2-L · DOI
  6. Holden, 2005, Science, 308, 1110
  7. Thompson, 1969, Communications in Behavioral Biology, 4, 29
  8. Suddendorf, 1997, Genetic Social and General Psychology Monographs, 123, 133
  9. Osvath, 2005, Lund University Cognitive Studies, 122, 1

Authors
Suddendorf, T., & Corballis, M. C.
Affiliations
  • The University of Queensland (AU)
  • University of Auckland (NZ)
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Published
2007-06
Volume
30
Issue
3
Pages
299-313
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
OpenAlex
W2165108227
Cited by
2,031
References
237
Citations by year
2026: 76 · 2025: 88 · 2024: 106 · 2023: 116 · 2022: 102 · 2021: 108 · 2020: 205 · 2019: 138 · 2018: 110 · 2017: 130 · 2016: 120 · 2015: 118 · 2014: 111 · 2013: 101 · 2012: 101
FWCI
4.98
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • ResearchSpace (University of Auckland) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Cognitive Functions and Memory
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory and Neural Mechanisms
Keywords
mental time travel, prospection, episodic memory, memory systems, anticipatory behavior, planning, cognitive evolution, comparative cognition, non-human animals, theatrical metaphor
MeSH terms
Animals, Brain, Classification, Cognition, Biological Evolution, Forecasting, Humans, Memory, Mental Processes, Mental Recall

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

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