Cited by 59AI-based Problem Solving and PlanningReinforcement Learning in RoboticsNeural and Behavioral Psychology Studies

Divide et impera : subgoaling reduces the complexity of probabilistic inference and problem solving

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Maisto, Domenico, Donnarumma, Francesco, Pezzulo, Giovanni·2015·Journal of The Royal Society Interface

Abstract

It has long been recognized that humans (and possibly other animals) usually break problems down into smaller and more manageable problems using subgoals. Despite a general consensus that subgoaling helps problem solving, it is still unclear what the mechanisms guiding online subgoal selection are during the solution of novel problems for which predefined solutions are not available. Under which conditions does subgoaling lead to optimal behaviour? When is subgoaling better than solving a problem from start to finish? Which is the best number and sequence of subgoals to solve a given problem? How are these subgoals selected during online inference? Here, we present a computational account of subgoaling in problem solving. Following Occam's razor, we propose that good subgoals are those that permit planning solutions and controlling behaviour using less information resources, thus yielding parsimony in inference and control. We implement this principle using approximate probabilistic inference: subgoals are selected using a sampling method that considers the descriptive complexity of the resulting sub-problems. We validate the proposed method using a standard reinforcement learning benchmark (four-rooms scenario) and show that the proposed method requires less inferential steps and permits selecting more compact control programs compared to an equivalent procedure without subgoaling. Furthermore, we show that the proposed method offers a mechanistic explanation of the neuronal dynamics found in the prefrontal cortex of monkeys that solve planning problems. Our computational framework provides a novel integrative perspective on subgoaling and its adaptive advantages for planning, control and learning, such as for example lowering cognitive effort and working memory load.

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Crossref · 10.1098/rsif.2014.1335

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  • Expected precision or confidence about preferred outcomes reports on the progress towards the goal, and precision can be updated during goal-directed action rather than just mediating learning by reporting reward prediction errors.

    “The expected precision or confidence about preferred outcomes reports on the progress towards the goal – like spatial proximity or sub-goals (Lepora and Pezzulo, 2015, Maisto et al., 2015) – and in accordance with early cybernetic models of purposive action such as the Test-Operate-Test-Exit (TOTE) model (Miller et al., 1960) precision can be updated (in a Bayes optimal fashion) during goal-direct”

    From Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control (2015) · cites this paper as Maisto et al., 2015

    The Inferential procedure (§2.3; page unavailable) describes monitoring subgoal achievement and selecting the next subgoal, supporting the spatial-subgoal aspect of progress toward a goal. It does not identify this process as expected precision or confidence about preferred outcomes, or say that precision is updated during goal-directed action rather than mediating learning through reward prediction errors. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Authors
Maisto, D., Donnarumma, F., & Pezzulo, G.
Affiliations
  • Institute for High Performance Computing and Networking (IT)
  • National Research Council (IT)
Corresponding author
Pezzulo, Giovanni
Venue
Journal of The Royal Society Interface
Published
2015-03
Volume
12
Issue
104
Pages
20141335
ISSN
  • 1742-5662 (ISSN-L)
  • 1742-5689
OpenAlex
W2101645771
Cited by
59
References
63
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 4
FWCI
5.82
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of The Royal Society Interface (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › AI-based Problem Solving and Planning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Reinforcement Learning in Robotics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
Keywords
subgoal selection, problem solving, probabilistic inference, approximate inference, sampling, Occam's razor, descriptive complexity, planning, prefrontal cortex, reinforcement learning, working memory load, cognitive effort, online inference
MeSH terms
Algorithms, Animals, Haplorhini, Bayes Theorem, Brain, Computer Simulation, Humans, Learning, Markov Chains, Monte Carlo Method, Neurons, Neurosciences, Probability, Problem Solving, Prefrontal Cortex, Internet

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