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Learning on the IGT follows emergence of knowledge but not differential somatic activity

Fernie, Gordon, Tunney, Richard J.·2013·Frontiers in Psychology
DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00687PMC PMC3790076
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Figure 1 Mean net score across 10-trial blocks. The closed circles represent the Specific question group and the open circles represent the General question group. Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
Figure 1 Mean net score across 10-trial blocks. The closed circles represent the Specific question group and the open circles represent the General question group. Error bars are the standard error of the mean.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 Mean rating for each deck across question period. Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
Figure 2 Mean rating for each deck across question period. Error bars are the standard error of the mean.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3 The number of participants at each question period who selected each deck as the One Deck they would choose if forced to only pick from one.
Figure 3 The number of participants at each question period who selected each deck as the One Deck they would choose if forced to only pick from one.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 4 Calculated vs. actual expected value on each deck after 100 trials for each participant (except for participant 3 for whom figures are following 80 trials). The calculated expected value was calculated from a participant's estimates of the average gain, average loss and frequency of loss over ten selections from that deck. The dashed lines are the mean actual expected values.
Figure 4 Calculated vs. actual expected value on each deck after 100 trials for each participant (except for participant 3 for whom figures are following 80 trials). The calculated expected value was calculated from a participant's estimates of the average gain, average loss and frequency of loss over ten selections from that deck. The dashed lines are the mean actual expected values.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 5 Estimated vs. actual expected value on each deck after 100 trials for each participant (except for participant 3 for whom figures are following 80 trials). The dashed lines are the mean actual expected values.
Figure 5 Estimated vs. actual expected value on each deck after 100 trials for each participant (except for participant 3 for whom figures are following 80 trials). The dashed lines are the mean actual expected values.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 6 Mean proportion of cards selected from each deck in (A) the pre- and post-knowledge periods for participants who displayed knowledge (n = 27), and (B) the comparable periods for participants who did not display knowledge (n = 5). Error bars are the standard error of the mean. The dashed line represents chance selection.
Figure 6 Mean proportion of cards selected from each deck in (A) the pre- and post-knowledge periods for participants who displayed knowledge (n = 27), and (B) the comparable periods for participants who did not display knowledge (n = 5). Error bars are the standard error of the mean. The dashed line represents chance selection.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 7 Mean aSCRs for each deck in each group, (A) across all selections; (B) in selections prior to and following knowledge expression in those participants who displayed knowledge, and (C) the equivalent figure to b for participants who did not demonstrate knowledge—aSCRs before and after the mean trial at which knowledge was expressed in those who expressed knowledge (trial 39 in the Specific Group and trial 43 in the General group). Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
Figure 7 Mean aSCRs for each deck in each group, (A) across all selections; (B) in selections prior to and following knowledge expression in those participants who displayed knowledge, and (C) the equivalent figure to b for participants who did not demonstrate knowledge—aSCRs before and after the mean trial at which knowledge was expressed in those who expressed knowledge (trial 39 in the Specific Group and trial 43 in the General group). Error bars are the standard error of the mean.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 8 Mean rSCRs for each deck in each group, (A) across all selections; (B) in selections prior to and following knowledge expression in those participants who displayed knowledge; and (C) the equivalent figure to b for participants who did not demonstrate knowledge—rSCRs before and after the mean trial at which knowledge was expressed in those who expressed knowledge (trial 39 in the Specific Group and trial 43 in the General group). Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
Figure 8 Mean rSCRs for each deck in each group, (A) across all selections; (B) in selections prior to and following knowledge expression in those participants who displayed knowledge; and (C) the equivalent figure to b for participants who did not demonstrate knowledge—rSCRs before and after the mean trial at which knowledge was expressed in those who expressed knowledge (trial 39 in the Specific Group and trial 43 in the General group). Error bars are the standard error of the mean.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 9 Mean pSCRs for each deck in each group. (A) Across all selections. (B) Mean pSCRs for the advantageous and disadvantageous decks in selections pre- and post-knowledge expression in those participants who displayed knowledge. (C) The equivalent graph to b for the participants who did not demonstrate knowledge (n = 5)—pSCRs in the period before and after the mean trial at which knowledge was expressed in the majority of each group. Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
Figure 9 Mean pSCRs for each deck in each group. (A) Across all selections. (B) Mean pSCRs for the advantageous and disadvantageous decks in selections pre- and post-knowledge expression in those participants who displayed knowledge. (C) The equivalent graph to b for the participants who did not demonstrate knowledge (n = 5)—pSCRs in the period before and after the mean trial at which knowledge was expressed in the majority of each group. Error bars are the standard error of the mean.CC BY · PubMed Central

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Research works printed but not linked: 29

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Metadata

Authors
Fernie, G., & Tunney, R. J.
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Publisher
Frontiers Media SA
Published
2013
Volume
4
ISSN
1664-1078
DOI
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00687
PMC
PMC3790076
Cited by
30
References
4

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Fernie, G., & Tunney, R. J. (2013). Learning on the IGT follows emergence of knowledge but not differential somatic activity. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00687