Enacting a social ecology: radically embodied intersubjectivity
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Embodied approaches to cognitive science frequently describe the mind as "world-involving," indicating complementary and interdependent relationships between an agent and its environment. The precise nature of the environment is frequently left ill-described, however, and provides a challenge for such approaches, particularly, it is noted here, for the enactive approach which emphasizes this complementarity in quite radical terms. This paper argues that enactivists should work to find common cause with a dynamic form of ecological psychology, a theoretical perspective that provides the most explicit theory of the psychological environment currently extant. In doing so, the intersubjective, cultural nature of the ecology of human psychology is explored, with the challenges this poses for both enactivist and ecological approaches outlined. The theory of behavior settings (Barker, 1968; Schoggen, 1989) is used to present a framework for resolving some of these challenges. Drawing these various strands together an outline of a radical embodied account of intersubjectivity and social activity is presented.
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Citations
Cites
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765
Mind in life: biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-2543 · Cited by 2,696
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (2017) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262529365.001.0001 · Cited by 2,449
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
Chemero, A. P. (2009) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/8367.001.0001 · Cited by 1,899
Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9 · Cited by 1,640
Affordances and Prospective Control: An Outline of the Ontology
Turvey, M. T. (1992) · Ecological Psychology · doi:10.1207/s15326969eco0403_3 · Cited by 933 · cited 4×
“Further, following arguments that all of human psychology in particular is embedded not only in a physical but a social and cultural surround, I outline how a combined approach enables a comprehensive account of the human psychological environment.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialEcological laws of perceiving and acting: In reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981)
Turvey, M. T., Shaw, R. E., Reed, E. S., & Mace, W. M. (1981) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(81)90002-0 · Cited by 679 · cited 4×
“The orthodox Turvey et al. (1981) view on the matter requires a strict one-to-one relationship between the ecological information (e.g., structure in the ambient array of light) and the affordance that it specifies.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialHEFT, H. (1989) · Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.1989.tb00133.x · Cited by 522
Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories
Thompson, E., & Stapleton, M. (2009) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2 · Cited by 501
Defining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-temporality in Action
Barandiaran, X. E., Di Paolo, E., & Rohde, M. (2009) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712309343819 · Cited by 497 · cited 3×
“systems have richer, more complex potential interactions (Di Paolo, 2005; Barandiaran et al., 2009).”
Background
Cited by
Reconceiving representation-hungry cognition: an ecological-enactive proposal
Kiverstein, J. D., & Rietveld, E. (2018) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712318772778 · Cited by 150
“McGann (2014) is an important exception, and more recently Di Paolo, Buhrmann, and Barandiaran (2017).”
BackgroundInfluentialRadical embodiment in two directions
Baggs, E., & Chemero, A. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-02020-9 · Cited by 145
(2016) · Constructivist Foundations · Cited by 33
Metadata
- Authors
- McGann, M.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2014-11-18
- Volume
- 5
- Pages
- 1321-1321
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2094230131
- Cited by
- 50
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 1.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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