Toward a Unified Sub-symbolic Computational Theory of Cognition
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper proposes how various disciplinary theories of cognition may be combined into a unifying, sub-symbolic, computational theory of cognition. The following theories are considered for integration: psychological theories, including the theory of event coding, event segmentation theory, the theory of anticipatory behavioral control, and concept development; artificial intelligence and machine learning theories, including reinforcement learning and generative artificial neural networks; and theories from theoretical and computational neuroscience, including predictive coding and free energy-based inference. In the light of such a potential unification, it is discussed how abstract cognitive, conceptualized knowledge and understanding may be learned from actively gathered sensorimotor experiences. The unification rests on the free energy-based inference principle, which essentially implies that the brain builds a predictive, generative model of its environment. Neural activity-oriented inference causes the continuous adaptation of the currently active predictive encodings. Neural structure-oriented inference causes the longer term adaptation of the developing generative model as a whole. Finally, active inference strives for maintaining internal homeostasis, causing goal-directed motor behavior. To learn abstract, hierarchical encodings, however, it is proposed that free energy-based inference needs to be enhanced with structural priors, which bias cognitive development toward the formation of particular, behaviorally suitable encoding structures. As a result, it is hypothesized how abstract concepts can develop from, and thus how they are structured by and grounded in, sensorimotor experiences. Moreover, it is sketched-out how symbol-like thought can be generated by a temporarily active set of predictive encodings, which constitute a distributed neural attractor in the form of an interactive free-energy minimum. The activated, interactive network attractor essentially characterizes the semantics of a concept or a concept composition, such as an actual or imagined situation in our environment. Temporal successions of attractors then encode unfolding semantics, which may be generated by a behavioral or mental interaction with an actual or imagined situation in our environment. Implications, further predictions, possible verification, and falsifications, as well as potential enhancements into a fully spelled-out unified theory of cognition are discussed at the end of the paper.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Mariani, M. M., Perez‐Vega, R., & Wirtz, J. (2022) · Psychology & Marketing · doi:10.1002/mar.21619 · Cited by 631
Intuitive physics learning in a deep-learning model inspired by developmental psychology
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Self-citationMental space maps into the future
Belardinelli, A., Lohmann, J., Farnè, A., & Butz, M. V. (2018) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2018.03.007 · Cited by 19
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Metadata
- Authors
- Butz, M. V.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2016-06-21
- Volume
- 7
- Pages
- 925-925
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2470855507
- Cited by
- 51
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 4.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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