Cited by 69Embodied and Extended CognitionPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceAcademic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology

Ecological Psychology and Enaction Theory: Divergent Groundings

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Heft, Harry·2020·Frontiers in Psychology

Abstract

Both ecological psychology and enaction theory offer an alternative to long-standing theoretical approaches to perception that invoke post-perceptual supplemental processes or structures, e.g. mental representations, to account for perceptual phenomena. They both do so by taking actions by the individual to be essential for an account of perception and cognition. The question that this paper attempts to address is whether ecological psychology and enaction theory can be integrated into a stronger non-representational alternative to perception than either one can offer on its own. Doing so is only possible if most of the basic tenets and concepts of ecological psychology and enaction theory are compatible. Based on an examination of the role that sensations play within each approach; the manner in which each treats the concept of information; and how each conceptualizes an organism’s boundaries, it is concluded that a synthesis of the two approaches is not possible. Particular attention is paid to the concept of sensations, whose limitations were an impetus for the development of ecological psychology.

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Crossref · 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00991

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  • Proponents of the social and the physical approaches have criticized enactivism for very different reasons.

    “Conversely, although proponents of the social and the physical approach have been critical of enactivism, they have done so for very different reasons (cf.Fultot et al., 2016;Heft, 2020).”

    From Productive pluralism: The coming of age of ecological psychology. (2024) · cites this paper as Heft, 2020

    Heft critiques enaction theory from an ecological-psychology perspective, identifying disagreements about sensations, information, and organism boundaries (Concluding Comments; page not indicated). The paper does not discuss proponents of a social approach criticizing enactivism or compare their reasons with those of the ecological approach. (LLM, conf=0.85)

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1 of the 39 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. DiPaolo E. A. Buhrmann T. Barandiaran X. E. (2017). Sensorimotor Life: An Enactive Proposal. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
  2. Lewontin R. (2000). The Triple Helix. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  3. Sedgwick H. (1986). “ Space perception,” in Handbook of Perception and Human Performance, Vol. 1: Sensory Processes and Perception, eds Boff K. R. Kaufman L. Thomas J. P. (New York, NY: Wiley), 21.21– 21.57.
  4. Warren W. H. (2020). “ Perceiving surface layout: ground theory, affordances, and the objects of perception,” in Perception as Information Detection: Reflections on Gibson’s Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, eds Wagman J. Blau J. (New York, NY: Routledge), 151– 173.

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Authors
Heft, H.
Affiliations
Denison University (US)
Corresponding author
Heft, Harry
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Published
2020-05-26
Volume
11
Pages
991-991
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3032624565
Cited by
69
References
39
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 6
FWCI
5.37
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › General Psychology › Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology
Keywords
ecological psychology, enaction theory, perception, mental representation, sensation, concept of information, perception and action, theoretical integration

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