Experiments in Artificial Theory of Mind: From Safety to Story-Telling
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Theory of mind is the term given by philosophers and psychologists for the ability to form a predictive model of self and others. In this paper we focus on synthetic models of theory of mind. We contend firstly that such models-especially when tested experimentally-can provide useful insights into cognition, and secondly that artificial theory of mind can provide intelligent robots with powerful new capabilities, in particular social intelligence for human-robot interaction. This paper advances the hypothesis that simulation-based internal models offer a powerful and realisable, theory-driven basis for artificial theory of mind. Proposed as a computational model of the simulation theory of mind, our simulation-based internal model equips a robot with an internal model of itself and its environment, including other dynamic actors, which can test (i.e., simulate) the robot's next possible actions and hence anticipate the likely consequences of those actions both for itself and others. Although it falls far short of a full artificial theory of mind, our model does allow us to test several interesting scenarios: in some of these a robot equipped with the internal model interacts with other robots without an internal model, but acting as proxy humans; in others two robots each with a simulation-based internal model interact with each other. We outline a series of experiments which each demonstrate some aspect of artificial theory of mind.
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Citations
Cites
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Six views of embodied cognition
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Design and use paradigms for gazebo, an open-source multi-robot simulator
Koenig, N., & Howard, A. (2005) · 2004 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS) (IEEE Cat. No.04CH37566) · doi:10.1109/iros.2004.1389727 · Cited by 3,638
Cyberbotics Ltd. Webots ™ : Professional Mobile Robot Simulation
Michel, O. (2004) · International Journal of Advanced Robotic Systems · doi:10.5772/5618 · Cited by 1,261
The grand challenges of Science Robotics
Yang, G.-Z., Bellingham, J., Dupont, P. E., Fischer, P., Floridi, L., Full, R., Jacobstein, N., Kumar, V., McNutt, M., Merrifield, R., et al. (2018) · Science Robotics · doi:10.1126/scirobotics.aar7650 · Cited by 1,177
The Relation between Children's and Mothers’ Mental State Language and Theory-of-Mind Understanding
Ruffman, T., Slade, L., & Crowe, E. (2002) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00435 · Cited by 885 · cited 1×
“This is, after all, one of the key mechanisms by which infant humans learn theory of mind; one only has to think of a child asking “Mummy why are you angry with me?” (Ruffman et al., 2002).”
BackgroundResilient Machines Through Continuous Self-Modeling
Bongard, J., Zykov, V., & Lipson, H. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133687 · Cited by 709 · cited 1×
“Bongardet al. (2006) describe a 4-legged starfish like robot that makes use of explicit internal simulation, both to enable the robot to learn it’s own body morphology and control, and notably allow the robot to recover from physical damage by learning the new morphology following the damage.”
BackgroundHow we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition
Carruthers, P. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09000545 · Cited by 610 · cited 1×
“The role of theory of mind in consciousness (or, indeed of consciousness in theory of mind) is both unclear and controversial (Carruthers, 2009; Sebastian, 2016).”
Background
Cited by
A systematic review of algorithm aversion in augmented decision making
Burton, J. W., Stein, M., & Jensen, T. B. (2020) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.2155 · Cited by 814
Design Principles for Generative AI Applications
Weisz, J. D., He, J., Muller, M., Hoefer, G., Miles, R., & Geyer, W. (2024) · Proceedings of the CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3613904.3642466 · Cited by 232
“We included Teach the AI system about the user in Design for Mental Models as it addresses recent research in Mutual Theory of Mind [33, 177, 187].”
MethodArtificial Intelligence and Data Fusion at the Edge
Munir, A., Blasch, E., Kwon, J., Kong, J., & Aved, A. (2021) · IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine · doi:10.1109/maes.2020.3043072 · Cited by 110
Apply rich psychological terms in AI with care
Shevlin, H., & Halina, M. (2019) · Nature Machine Intelligence · doi:10.1038/s42256-019-0039-y · Cited by 68
Reflective artificial intelligence
Lewis, P. R., & Sarkadi, Ş. (2024) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-024-09664-2 · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- Winfield, A. F. T.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Robotics and AI
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2018-06-26
- Volume
- 5
- Pages
- 75-75
- ISSN
- 2296-9144 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2811094992
- Cited by
- 80
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 8.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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