The DOI matches its Crossref record; 84 of the 86 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 2 are not checked yet; 66 of the 87 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits
Open accessAbstract
We significantly reduce the cost of factoring integers and computing discrete logarithms in finite fields on a quantum computer by combining techniques from Shor 1994, Griffiths-Niu 1996, Zalka 2006, Fowler 2012, Ekerå-Håstad 2017, Ekerå 2017, Ekerå 2018, Gidney-Fowler 2019, Gidney 2019. We estimate the approximate cost of our construction using plausible physical assumptions for large-scale superconducting qubit platforms: a planar grid of qubits with nearest-neighbor connectivity, a characteristic physical gate error rate of 10−3, a surface code cycle time of 1 microsecond, and a reaction time of 10 microseconds. We account for factors that are normally ignored such as noise, the need to make repeated attempts, and the spacetime layout of the computation. When factoring 2048 bit RSA integers, our construction's spacetime volume is a hundredfold less than comparable estimates from earlier works (Van Meter et al. 2009, Jones et al. 2010, Fowler et al. 2012, Gheorghiu et al. 2019). In the abstract circuit model (which ignores overheads from distillation, routing, and error correction) our construction uses 3n+0.002nlgn logical qubits, 0.3n3+0.0005n3lgn Toffolis, and 500n2+n2lgn measurement depth to factor n-bit RSA integers. We quantify the cryptographic implications of our work, both for RSA and for schemes based on the DLP in finite fields.
Verified 2026-10-05 · 2 references not checked yet
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
Gidney and Ekerå combine several optimizations to Shor’s algorithm and its Ekerå–Håstad derivatives to sharply reduce the cost of factoring RSA integers and computing finite-field discrete logarithms on a fault-tolerant quantum computer. Their headline estimate is factoring a 2048-bit RSA integer in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits, with spacetime volume about a hundredfold lower than comparable earlier estimates.
Key findings
- The construction reduces the abstract-circuit cost for factoring an \(n\)-bit RSA integer to \(3n + 0.002n\lg n\) logical qubits, \(0.3n^3 + 0.0005n^3\lg n\) Toffolis, and \(500n^2 + n^2\lg n\) measurement depth.
- For \(n=2048\), Table 3 reports 20 megaqubits, 5.1 hours per run, 5.9 expected megaqubitdays, and a 31% retry risk; the title/abstract advertise 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits.
- The paper estimates the spacetime volume is a hundredfold less than comparable earlier works (Van Meter et al. 2009, Jones et al. 2010, Fowler et al. 2012, Gheorghiu et al. 2019), and the Toffoli count is over 10× lower than previous works.
- For \(n=2048\), the implementation needs approximately 3 billion CCZ states, with total distillation error 6.4% using level 1 code distance 17 and level 2 code distance 27; at code distance 27 the topological error probability is approximately 27%, implying roughly 1.4 repeats on average.
Methods
- The construction starts from Shor’s algorithm and Ekerå–Håstad’s short-discrete-logarithm algorithm, then applies windowed arithmetic, Zalka’s coset representation of modular integers, oblivious carry runways, and a reaction-limited spacetime layout for lookup additions.
- Cost estimates are given in the abstract circuit model and under physical assumptions for superconducting qubits: planar nearest-neighbor connectivity, physical gate error rate \(10^{-3}\), surface-code cycle time 1 microsecond, and reaction time 10 microseconds.
- Parameters such as code distances, window sizes, runway spacing, and padding offset are optimized by minimizing a skewed expected spacetime volume \(s^{1.2} \cdot t/(1-\epsilon)\) over enumerated combinations; estimates cover RSA moduli from 1024 to 16384 bits and finite-field discrete logarithms.
Limitations
- The paper states large systemic uncertainties: doubling or halving the physical gate error rate would change the required qubit count by more than 10%, and the estimates are intended as ballpark figures, not exact predictions.
- The paper notes that the runtime estimate ignores that at larger problem sizes lookups become slower because the minimum code distance increases.
- The paper states that code distance 27 at \(n=2048\) is “pushing the limits of feasibility” with about 27% topological error and roughly 1.4 expected repeats; increasing to distance 29 would raise qubit count by 15% but reduce error by about a factor of 10. The text also makes evident that no hardware demonstration is performed and that not all optimizations are directly applicable to elliptic-curve arithmetic.
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Claims the paper makes
42 Valid · 16 Not valid · 10 Not checked · 76 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“It is also reduced by using Eker˚ a and H˚ astad's derivatives [21, 23-25] of Shor's algorithms, that require fewer multiplications to be performed compared to Shor's original algorithms.”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [21] [21] M. Eker˚ a. Modifying Shor's algorithm to compute short discrete logarithms. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/1128 , 2016. URL https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1128 . - sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2.1 says tradeoffs in Ekerå–Håstad’s algorithm reduce the quantum group operations needed per run, supporting a qualified version of the claim. But §1.2.5 says Ekerå’s general discrete-logarithm algorithm without tradeoffs requires approximately 3m operations versus 2m for Shor’s; the blanket claim that the derivatives require fewer multiplications is therefore too broad. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Partly supportedcites [23] [23] M. Eker˚ a. On post-processing in the quantum algorithm for computing short discrete logarithms. Designs, Codes and Cryptography , 88(11):2313-2335, 2020. DOI: 10.1007/s10623-02000783-2. iacr:2017/1122. - sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 1.2 says the Ekerå–Håstad derivatives reduce the number of controlled group operations in each run compared with Shor’s algorithms, supporting the claim’s comparison of quantum computation costs. But the claim does not limit the comparison to each run: Appendix A.2 (RSA) says that, for some tradeoffs, the total number of operations across runs is greater than for a single run of Shor’s algorithm. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Partly supportedcites [24] [24] M. Eker˚ a. Quantum algorithms for computing general discrete logarithms and orders with tradeoffs. Journal of Mathematical Cryptology , 15(1):359-407, 2021. DOI: 10.1515/jmc-20200006. (To appear.) iacr:2018/797. - sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2 says the tradeoff algorithm can use fewer group operations than Shor’s algorithm per run, by up to a factor of two, but requires multiple runs. It also says that without tradeoffs it uses 3m operations versus Shor’s 2m, so the unqualified claim that the derivatives require fewer multiplications is too broad. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)
- Could not verifycites [25] [25] M. Eker˚ a and J. H˚ astad. Quantum Algorithms for Computing Short Discrete Logarithms and Factoring RSA Integers. In Post-Quantum Cryptography , volume 10346 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) , pages 347-363. Springer, 2017. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-598796˙20. - sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In Time-optimal quantum computation (p. 3), Fowler discusses the time required for a factoring computation, while the references (p. 4) list Shor's original work. Our copy does not discuss Ekerå and Håstad's derivatives or compare their multiplication counts with Shor's; searches for those names and for modular-multiplication comparisons found no supporting passage. (LLM, conf=0.75)
states a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“When factoring 2048 bit RSA integers, our construction's spacetime volume is a hundredfold less than comparable estimates from earlier works (Van Meter et al. 2009, Jones et al. 2010, Fowler et al. 2012, Gheorghiu et al. 2019).”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Van Meter et al. 2009 source
Section 5.2 (pp. 20–22) estimates both the qubits required and the execution time for factoring a 2,048-bit number, so this paper supplies an earlier space-and-time estimate of the kind cited. The hundredfold comparison is the citing authors’ conclusion about their own construction, not a result attributed to Van Meter et al. (LLM, conf=0.89)
- Not matchedcites Jones et al. 2010
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Supportedcites Fowler et al. 2012 source
The citation identifies Fowler et al. as an earlier resource estimate, not as the source of the citing authors’ hundredfold comparison. In I. Background (p. 2), Fowler et al. estimate about a billion physical qubits operating for about one day to factor a 2,000-bit number, a closely comparable factoring task. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“In terms of space, we are using 3 n + O (lg n ) logical qubits. The qubits are distributed as follows: n + O (lg n ) for the accumulation register storing the product, n + O (lg n ) for a workspace register during the multiplication, n + O (lg n ) for the lookup output register, and O (lg n ) qubits to hold the part of the exponent needed for the current stage of the semi-classical Fourier trans”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [40] [40] R. B. Griffiths and C.-S. Niu. Semiclassical Fourier Transform for Quantum Computation. Physical Review Letters , 76(17):3228-3231, April 1996. DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.76.3228. arXiv:quant-ph/9511007. - sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The discussion of Fig. 2 (p. 4) describes a semiclassical Fourier transform using measurements and classically controlled one-bit gates. Our copy does not address the claimed 3n + O(lg n) logical-qubit total or its allocation among accumulation, workspace, lookup-output, and exponent registers; searches for those terms found no supporting passage. (LLM, conf=0.76)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“We improve on their estimates by over 100x (see Table 2) when accounting for slight remaining differences in the cost model.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [46] [46] N. C. Jones, R. Van Meter, A. G. Fowler, P. L. McMahon, J. Kim, T. D. Ladd, and Y. Yamamoto. Layered Architecture for Quantum Computing. Physical Review X , 2(3):031007, 2012. DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevX.2.031007. arXiv:1010.5022. - source
The citation is offered for the baseline estimate the citing authors compare against, and our copy of Jones et al. does report exactly that kind of resource estimate under an explicit cost model: Table IX (VII. Timing Considerations, p. 20) gives 4.54 × 10^8 quantum dots (4.54 cm²) for 1024-bit Shor's algorithm, built from 10^5 logical qubits, code distance 31, and two-level |A⟩ distillation factories (Appendix B 1, pp. 21-22; Table IV, p. 14). The '>100x improvement' itself is the citing paper's own conclusion and is not stated by, nor checkable in, this source; what this source supplies is the prior estimate and cost model being improved upon. (LLM, conf=0.82)
- Supportedcites [28] [28] A. G. Fowler, M. Mariantoni, J. M. Martinis, and A. N. Cleland. Surface codes: Towards practical large-scale quantum computation. Physical Review A , 86(3):032324, 2012. DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.86.032324. arXiv:1208.0928. - source
Appendix M (pp. 52–53) estimates the time and physical-qubit resources for a factoring circuit, so this paper is an estimate of the kind the citing authors compare against. The “over 100x” improvement is presented in the citing sentence as the citing authors’ own result, not as a finding attributed to Fowler et al. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Could not verifycites [30] [30] V. Gheorghiu and M. Mosca. Benchmarking the quantum cryptanalysis of symmetric, publickey and hash-based cryptographic schemes. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.02332 , 2019. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.02332 . - sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Overview and Improvements section (p. 12) discusses Gidney’s own gate costs and says their constant factors are worse than previous work. It does not assess the citing authors’ construction against estimates by Jones, Fowler, or Gheorghiu, or report an improvement of over 100x after cost-model adjustments. Searches for those names, the 100x figure, and cost-model differences found no supporting passage. (LLM, conf=0.76)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“In [21, 23, 25], Eker˚ a and H˚ astad explain how to factor RSA integers N = pq in a different way; namely by computing a short discrete logarithm.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [21] [21] M. Eker˚ a. Modifying Shor's algorithm to compute short discrete logarithms. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/1128 , 2016. URL https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1128 . - source
Section 1.2.3, “Breaking RSA,” explicitly says that Ekerå and Håstad describe factoring RSA integers by computing a short discrete logarithm. The citing sentence makes that attribution; it does not state the additional formula d ≡ p+q (mod r). (LLM, conf=0.93)
- Partly supportedcites [23] [23] M. Eker˚ a. On post-processing in the quantum algorithm for computing short discrete logarithms. Designs, Codes and Cryptography , 88(11):2313-2335, 2020. DOI: 10.1007/s10623-02000783-2. iacr:2017/1122. - sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 1.1 (Earlier works) confirms the citing sentence’s main point: Ekerå and Håstad express RSA factoring as a short discrete-logarithm problem. But the more specific equation in the supplied claim is not the one given in Appendix A.2 (RSA): the paper defines the short logarithm using a shifted sum of (p−1)/2 and (q−1)/2, not d ≡ p+q (mod r). (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Could not verifycites [25] [25] M. Eker˚ a and J. H˚ astad. Quantum Algorithms for Computing Short Discrete Logarithms and Factoring RSA Integers. In Post-Quantum Cryptography , volume 10346 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) , pages 347-363. Springer, 2017. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-598796˙20. - sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The discussion of factoring in “Time-optimal quantum computation” (p. 3) estimates hardware requirements for factoring a 2000-bit integer; it does not describe a short-discrete-logarithm algorithm. Searches for Ekerå and Håstad, RSA integers, and d = log_g y found no passage in our copy addressing the attributed method. (LLM, conf=0.77)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
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In the citing paper
“However, executing large-scale, useful algorithms on quantum processors requires very low gate error rates (generally below about 10−10)23, far below those that will probably ever be achievable with any physical device2.”
From Logical quantum processor based on reconfigurable atom arrays (2024) · cites this paper as [23]
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“In [182] it was demonstrated that 2048-bit RSA can be easily cracked in around eight hours by a quantum computer consisting of 20 million qbits.”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [182]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“These results indicate that superconducting processors can remain stable for the hours-long timescales required for large-scale fault-tolerant algorithms21.”
From Quantum error correction below the surface code threshold (2025) · cites this paper as [21]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Although this logical error per cycle might permit certain fault-tolerant applications11, it is still many orders of magnitude higher than expected and precludes larger fault-tolerant circuits12,21.”
From Quantum error correction below the surface code threshold (2025) · cites this paper as [21]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Recent advancements suggest that within the next decade, quantum computing hardware may reach the threshold required to break 2048-bit RSA and comparable ECC implementations [2,3].”
From A Practical Performance Benchmark of Post-Quantum Cryptography Across Heterogeneous Computing Environments (2025) · cites this paper as [2]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
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Citations
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BackgroundMethodInfluentialSuperconducting quantum circuits at the surface code threshold for fault tolerance
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Cited by
Quantum computational chemistry
McArdle, S., Endo, S., Aspuru-Guzik, A., Benjamin, S. C., & Yuan, X. (2020) · Reviews of Modern Physics · doi:10.1103/revmodphys.92.015003 · Cited by 1,621
Logical quantum processor based on reconfigurable atom arrays
Bluvstein, D., Evered, S. J., Geim, A. A., Li, S. H., Zhou, H., Manovitz, T., Ebadi, S., Cain, M., Kalinowski, M., Hangleiter, D., et al. (2024) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-023-06927-3 · Cited by 1,119
“Similar techniques can be used to move logical degrees of freedom to implement nonlocal logical gates 23 .”
BackgroundSuppressing quantum errors by scaling a surface code logical qubit
Google Quantum, A. I., Acharya, R., Aleiner, I., Allen, R., Andersen, T. I., Ansmann, M., Arute, F., Arya, K., Asfaw, A., Atalaya, J., et al. (2023) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-022-05434-1 · Cited by 1,103
Self-citationQuantum error correction below the surface code threshold
Collaborators, G. Q. A. A., Acharya, R., Abanin, D. A., Aghababaie-Beni, L., Aleiner, I., Andersen, T. I., Ansmann, M., Arute, F., Arya, K., Asfaw, A., et al. (2025) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-024-08449-y · Cited by 778
“3b-c, observing good agreement with O ( p ( d +1) / 2 ) error suppression.”
Self-citationExponential suppression of bit or phase errors with cyclic error correction
Google Quantum, A. I., Chen, Z., Satzinger, K. J., Atalaya, J., Korotkov, A. N., Dunsworth, A., Sank, D., Quintana, C., McEwen, M., Barends, R., et al. (2021) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-021-03588-y · Cited by 393
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Gidney, C., & Ekerå, M.
- Affiliations
- Google (United States) (US)
- Swedish Armed Forces (SE)
- ORCID
- Ekerå, Martin
- Venue
- Quantum
- Published
- 2021-04-15
- Volume
- 5
- Pages
- 433
- ISSN
- 2521-327X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2946582523
- Cited by
- 830
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 149 · 2025: 195 · 2024: 151 · 2023: 140 · 2022: 87 · 2021: 63
- FWCI
- 38.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- Quantum (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics › Quantum Information and Cryptography
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
- Keywords
- integer factorization, discrete logarithm problem, quantum algorithms, Shor's algorithm, noisy qubits, superconducting qubits, surface code, Toffoli gate, measurement depth
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