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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 11 of the 60 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

A Zero-Trust Architecture for Remote Access in Industrial IoT Infrastructures

Open access

Abstract

This paper considers the domain of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) infrastructures and the recurring need for collaboration across teams and stakeholders by means of remote access. The paper describes a secure solution beyond the traditional perimeter-based security approach, which consists of an architecture that supports multi-level authorization to achieve fine-grained access control, better scalability, and maintainability. An implementation of the proposed solution, using open-source technologies, is also discussed and covers the protection of both the network and edge domains of a complex IIoT infrastructure. Finally, the paper presents a risk-driven and model-based process that is designed to support the migration of existing infrastructures to the solution architecture. The approach is validated, taking as a reference two relevant scenarios for the aerospace industry.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper proposes a two-layered zero-trust architecture for remote access in Industrial IoT, combining SDN-based network controls with TEE-based edge protection and a risk-driven model-based migration process. It demonstrates feasibility through an open-source prototype deployed on a manufacturing demonstrator and validates an end-to-end remote maintenance workflow.

Key findings

  • The architecture separates network and edge security: SDN Data/Control/Application layers map to PEP/PDP/Trust Algorithm, while edge protection uses TEE and a Gateway Portal model for fine-grained access control down to memory regions and peripherals, including legacy equipment.
  • The prototype was deployed on an existing manufacturing demonstrator with four network segments (public internet, enterprise, manufacturing, shop floor) and around 40 network nodes; validation followed a remote maintenance workflow with four phases: Preliminary Authorizations, Access Grant, Maintenance, and Cleanup.
  • The solution is argued to satisfy SR1–SR4: least knowledge/privilege, resilience to denial-of-service via distributed/layered security, fine-grained access control, and robust logging. No quantitative performance or security results are reported.
  • A migration methodology uses SysML architecture models, STRIDE threat analysis, risk evaluation/ranking, and mitigation patterns to guide ZTA adoption.

Methods

  • Design and prototype implementation covering two application scenarios: Industry 4.0 secure remote maintenance and connected aircraft; threat analysis via STRIDE; security requirements SR1–SR4.
  • Implementation uses OpenFloodlight SDN controller, Open vSwitch, Siemens Simatic IoT2050 gateway with ARM TrustZone, OP-TEE, Node-RED front-end, and a Linux back-end; deployed in the COLLABS EU project demonstrator.
  • Validation is an end-to-end remote maintenance workflow on the manufacturing demonstrator, with qualitative mapping to security requirements; no quantitative metrics are reported.

Limitations

  • Stated: performance evaluation (throughput and energy efficiency) is identified as an area of improvement/future work; the methodology is described as a first step, with future work on industrial-strength implementation, standard interfaces, automated analyses, and code generation.
  • Stated: prototype tools may be replaced in the future for improved features, performance, or robustness.
  • Evident: validation reports no quantitative measurements or comparative benchmarks, and only one of the two application scenarios is implemented in the prototype.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3390/electronics12030566

Cites

31 of 31 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

10 Valid · 3 Not valid · 41 Not checked · 109 Own results and interpretations

27 more claims

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 115
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 54
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1

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Claims other papers make about this one

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Citations

Cites

Show all 28 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. 2015, Smart factory for industry 4.0: A review, Int. J. Mod. Manuf. Technol., 7, 28
  2. Shostack, A. (2014). Threat Modeling: Designing for Security, John Wiley & Sons.
  3. Friedenthal, S., Moore, A., and Steiner, R. (2014). A Practical Guide to SysML: The Systems Modeling Language, Morgan Kaufmann.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Federici, F., Martintoni, D., & Senni, V.
Affiliations
Collins Aerospace (United States) (US)
Corresponding author
Senni, Valerio
Venue
Electronics
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2023-01-22
Volume
12
Issue
3
Pages
566
ISSN
2079-9292 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4317743536
Cited by
74
References
28
Citations by year
2026: 25 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 11
FWCI
31.80
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Electronics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation program (871518)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Keywords
zero-trust architecture, Industrial Internet of Things, remote access, fine-grained access control, perimeter security, edge security, network security, open-source security tools, aerospace industry

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Zero-Trust Architecture for Remote Access in Industrial IoT Infrastructures. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3390/electronics12030566
The paper
Federici, F., Martintoni, D., & Senni, V. (2023). A Zero-Trust Architecture for Remote Access in Industrial IoT Infrastructures. Electronics. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12030566

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.