A Survey on Cybersecurity Challenges, Detection, and Mitigation Techniques for the Smart Grid
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 80 of the 80 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The world is transitioning from the conventional grid to the smart grid at a rapid pace. Innovation always comes with some flaws; such is the case with a smart grid. One of the major challenges in the smart grid is to protect it from potential cyberattacks. There are millions of sensors continuously sending and receiving data packets over the network, so managing such a gigantic network is the biggest challenge. Any cyberattack can damage the key elements, confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the smart grid. The overall smart grid network is comprised of customers accessing the network, communication network of the smart devices and sensors, and the people managing the network (decision makers); all three of these levels are vulnerable to cyberattacks. In this survey, we explore various threats and vulnerabilities that can affect the key elements of cybersecurity in the smart grid network and then present the security measures to avert those threats and vulnerabilities at three different levels. In addition to that, we suggest techniques to minimize the chances of cyberattack at all three levels.
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“A detailed survey on various cyberattacks and their defense mechanism has been discussed in [130,131].”
Self-citationA Survey on IoT-Enabled Smart Grids: Emerging, Applications, Challenges, and Outlook
Goudarzi, A., Ghayoor, F., Waseem, M., Fahad, S., & Traore, I. (2022) · Energies · doi:10.3390/en15196984 · Cited by 222
“To better comprehend the risks posed by cyberattacks on the critical infrastructure of electrical grids, in this section, we will discuss a number of significant instances of cyberattacks around the globe [67].”
InfluentialAhsan, F., Dana, N. H., Sarker, S. K., Li, L., Muyeen, S. M., Ali, M. F., Tasneem, Z., Hasan, M. M., Abhi, S. H., Islam, M. R., et al. (2023) · Protection and Control of Modern Power Systems · doi:10.1186/s41601-023-00319-5 · Cited by 191
Cyber Threats to Smart Grids: Review, Taxonomy, Potential Solutions, and Future Directions
Ding, J., Qammar, A., Zhang, Z., Karim, A., & Ning, H. (2022) · Energies · doi:10.3390/en15186799 · Cited by 185
“The vulnerability is demonstrated by the inadequate CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) for data and the protection of services [5,8] and the lack of specific protection technology for smart grid domain data, such as generated data from the field device data, SCADA, grid operational data, and tran…”
Method
Metadata
- Authors
- Tufail, S., Parvez, I., Batool, S., & Sarwat, A.
- Affiliations
- Florida International University (US)
- Vellore Institute of Technology University (IN)
- Corresponding author
- Sarwat, Arif
- Venue
- Energies
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2021-09-17
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 18
- Pages
- 5894
- ISSN
- 1996-1073 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3199302188
- Cited by
- 143
- References
- 80
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 36 · 2024: 36 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 20
- FWCI
- 9.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Energies (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- OSTI OAI (U.S. Department of Energy Office of Scientific and Technical Information) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- U.S. Department of Energy (OE0000779)
- National Science Foundation (1745829)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Smart Grid and Power Systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- smart grid cybersecurity, cyberattacks, attack detection, attack mitigation, confidentiality, integrity and availability, smart grid communication networks
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.