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Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid

Open access

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 3 of the 25 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

IEC 61850 is one of the most prominent communication standards adopted by the smart grid community due to its high scalability, multi-vendor interoperability, and support for several input/output devices. Generic Object-Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE), which is a widely used communication protocol defined in IEC 61850, provides reliable and fast transmission of events for the electrical substation system. This paper investigates the security vulnerabilities of this protocol and analyzes the potential impact on the smart grid by rigorously analyzing the security of the GOOSE protocol using an automated process and identifying vulnerabilities in the context of smart grid communication. The vulnerabilities are tested using a real-time simulation and industry standard hardware-in-the-loop emulation. An in-depth experimental analysis is performed to demonstrate and verify the security weakness of the GOOSE publish-subscribe protocol towards the substation protection within the smart grid setup. It is observed that an adversary who might have familiarity with the substation network architecture can create falsified attack scenarios that can affect the physical operation of the power system. Extensive experiments using the real-time testbed validate the theoretical analysis, and the obtained experimental results prove that the GOOSE-based IEC 61850 compliant substation system is vulnerable to attacks from malicious intruders.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

This paper shows that the IEC 61850 GOOSE protocol in smart-grid substations is vulnerable to insider falsification attacks, even when IEC 62351 security measures are considered. Using Scyther analysis and a real-time HIL testbed, the authors demonstrate that malicious message injection can trip breakers and disrupt power delivery.

## Key findings

  • The Scyther analysis found that the secrecy of user-defined GOOSE parameters — IED settings, flag, and data — is at risk.
  • The authors report that the security properties Alive, Weakagree, Nisynch, and Niagree failed to hold in their simulation, due to excessive trace patterns exploitable by insiders.
  • Their attack demonstration shows an intruder can alter the 12-bit data frame and cause CB1 to change from closed (1) to open (0); the attack was initiated around 29.2 s after simulation start.
  • The paper states that the resulting breaker operation interrupted downstream current flow and could induce frequency excursion and cascading failures.

## Methods

  • The study combines formal security analysis with real-time hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) experimentation.
  • For formal analysis, the GOOSE protocol was written in SPDL and analyzed with Scyther, using both manual and automated security claim verification, with and without IEC 62351 compliance.
  • The experimental testbed used OPAL-RT/OP5600, a microgrid with an emergency Diesel Generator, DFIG wind farm, and two load centers, plus ABB REF615 relays and a LAN-based GOOSE multicast setup.

## Limitations

  • The paper states that IEC 61850 Edition 2 requires end-to-end GOOSE transfer within 4 ms, and notes that applying stronger encryption may be infeasible because of IED latency constraints; this is a stated practical limitation of the security setting.
  • The analysis focuses on an insider attack scenario and specifically a Layer 2 MAC spoofing attack; broader attacker models are not examined in the provided text.
  • Evident from the text: the GOOSE message model is studied in a laboratory/HIL microgrid testbed, so the demonstrated impact is experimental rather than from a live utility deployment.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3390/s21041554

Cites

35 of 35 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Figure 1 Different communication standards for the substation and SCADA systems.
Figure 1 Different communication standards for the substation and SCADA systems.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 Architecture of the proposed test system.
Figure 2 Architecture of the proposed test system.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3 Practical setup of the proposed test system.
Figure 3 Practical setup of the proposed test system.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 4 GOOSE frame structure.
Figure 4 GOOSE frame structure.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 5 Data flow of the GOOSE protocol without IEC 62351.
Figure 5 Data flow of the GOOSE protocol without IEC 62351.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 6 SPDL flow of the GOOSE protocol without IEC 62351.
Figure 6 SPDL flow of the GOOSE protocol without IEC 62351.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 7 SPDL flow of the GOOSE protocol with IEC 62351.
Figure 7 SPDL flow of the GOOSE protocol with IEC 62351.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 8 GOOSE security verification using Scyther.
Figure 8 GOOSE security verification using Scyther.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 9 Attack on subscriber to compromise the Nisynch security property.
Figure 9 Attack on subscriber to compromise the Nisynch security property.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 10 (a) GOOSE message captured before attack, (b) change in CB1 status and (c) GOOSE message captured after attack.
Figure 10 (a) GOOSE message captured before attack, (b) change in CB1 status and (c) GOOSE message captured after attack.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 11 Disruption in the current measurement after injection attack.
Figure 11 Disruption in the current measurement after injection attack.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 12 Frequency excursion after injection attack.
Figure 12 Frequency excursion after injection attack.CC BY · PubMed Central

Verification

Claims the paper makes

3 Valid · 1 Not valid · 10 Not checked · 32 Own results and interpretations

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  • It may state two separate claims as one. 10
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 11

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

1 of 1

Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. IEEE Substation Committee (2017). IEEE Recommended Practice for Implementing an IEC 61850-Based Substation Communications, Protection, Monitoring and Control System, IEEE Substation Committee.

Cited by

See all 80

Metadata

Authors
Reda, H. T., Ray, B., Peidaee, P., Anwar, A., Mahmood, A., Kalam, A., & Islam, N.
Affiliations
  • La Trobe University (AU)
  • Central Queensland University (AU)
  • Victoria University (AU)
  • Deakin University (AU)
Corresponding author
Islam, Nahina
Venue
Sensors
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2021-02-23
Volume
21
Issue
4
Pages
1554
ISSN
1424-8220 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3130854279
Cited by
80
References
37
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 5
FWCI
4.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Sensors (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Victoria University Research Repository (Victoria University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • Own your potential (DEAKIN) (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • La Trobe University (cc-by)
Funders
Central Queensland University (HE3341)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power Systems and Technologies
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Smart Grid and Power Systems
Keywords
IEC 61850, GOOSE protocol, smart grid security, publish/subscribe protocol, substation protection, hardware-in-the-loop emulation, real-time testbed, malicious attacks, power system security

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.