Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 3 of the 25 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
IEC 61850 is one of the most prominent communication standards adopted by the smart grid community due to its high scalability, multi-vendor interoperability, and support for several input/output devices. Generic Object-Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE), which is a widely used communication protocol defined in IEC 61850, provides reliable and fast transmission of events for the electrical substation system. This paper investigates the security vulnerabilities of this protocol and analyzes the potential impact on the smart grid by rigorously analyzing the security of the GOOSE protocol using an automated process and identifying vulnerabilities in the context of smart grid communication. The vulnerabilities are tested using a real-time simulation and industry standard hardware-in-the-loop emulation. An in-depth experimental analysis is performed to demonstrate and verify the security weakness of the GOOSE publish-subscribe protocol towards the substation protection within the smart grid setup. It is observed that an adversary who might have familiarity with the substation network architecture can create falsified attack scenarios that can affect the physical operation of the power system. Extensive experiments using the real-time testbed validate the theoretical analysis, and the obtained experimental results prove that the GOOSE-based IEC 61850 compliant substation system is vulnerable to attacks from malicious intruders.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
This paper shows that the IEC 61850 GOOSE protocol in smart-grid substations is vulnerable to insider falsification attacks, even when IEC 62351 security measures are considered. Using Scyther analysis and a real-time HIL testbed, the authors demonstrate that malicious message injection can trip breakers and disrupt power delivery.
## Key findings
- The Scyther analysis found that the secrecy of user-defined GOOSE parameters — IED settings, flag, and data — is at risk.
- The authors report that the security properties Alive, Weakagree, Nisynch, and Niagree failed to hold in their simulation, due to excessive trace patterns exploitable by insiders.
- Their attack demonstration shows an intruder can alter the 12-bit data frame and cause CB1 to change from closed (1) to open (0); the attack was initiated around 29.2 s after simulation start.
- The paper states that the resulting breaker operation interrupted downstream current flow and could induce frequency excursion and cascading failures.
## Methods
- The study combines formal security analysis with real-time hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) experimentation.
- For formal analysis, the GOOSE protocol was written in SPDL and analyzed with Scyther, using both manual and automated security claim verification, with and without IEC 62351 compliance.
- The experimental testbed used OPAL-RT/OP5600, a microgrid with an emergency Diesel Generator, DFIG wind farm, and two load centers, plus ABB REF615 relays and a LAN-based GOOSE multicast setup.
## Limitations
- The paper states that IEC 61850 Edition 2 requires end-to-end GOOSE transfer within 4 ms, and notes that applying stronger encryption may be infeasible because of IED latency constraints; this is a stated practical limitation of the security setting.
- The analysis focuses on an insider attack scenario and specifically a Layer 2 MAC spoofing attack; broader attacker models are not examined in the provided text.
- Evident from the text: the GOOSE message model is studied in a laboratory/HIL microgrid testbed, so the demonstrated impact is experimental rather than from a live utility deployment.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
3 Valid · 1 Not valid · 10 Not checked · 32 Own results and interpretations
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“There have been few research papers [12,24,25] that have demonstrated LAN-based cyberattacks against the GOOSE protocol.”
§ Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid > 2. Related Work
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [12] Youssef, T.A., El Hariri, M., Bugay, N., and Mohammed, O. (2016, January 7–10). IEC 61850: Technology standards and cyber-threats. Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE 16th International Conference on Environment and Electrical Engineering (EEEIC), Florence, Italy. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [24] Hoyos, J., Dehus, M., and Brown, T.X. (2012, January 20–23). Exploiting the GOOSE protocol: A practical attack on cyber-infrastructure. Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE Globecom Workshops, Auckland, New Zealand. source
- Supportedcites [25] Kush, N.S., Ahmed, E., Branagan, M., and Foo, E. (2014, January 20–23). Poisoned GOOSE: Exploiting the GOOSE protocol. Proceedings of the Twelfth Australasian Information Security Conference (AISC 2014) [Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology, Volume 149], Auckland, New Zealand.
The cited paper is itself a research paper that demonstrates a LAN-based attack against GOOSE: the Abstract reports that 'a number of GOOSE poisoning attacks are evaluated experimentally on a test bed and demonstrated to be successful', the Attacker Model assumes the adversary 'has access to the data-link layer of the substation local area network (LAN)', and Section 3.3 describes the test bed of publisher, subscriber and attacker on a Cisco substation-bay switch. Its Related Work section credits only Hoyos et al. (2012) as prior work demonstrating a GOOSE-protocol attack, consistent with the citing sentence's framing of few such papers. The 'few research papers' count is the citing authors' own synthesis; what is attributed to this source — that it demonstrates a LAN-based cyberattack against GOOSE — is stated in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It is observed that an adversary who might have familiarity with the substation network architecture can create falsified attack scenarios that can affect the physical operation of the power system.”
§ Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid > Abstract
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It can be seen from Table 7 that most of the automated and manual claims related to user data have one attack scenario at the publisher’s end as the publisher has the authority to repeatedly send the same message to a group of subscribers in plain text.”
§ Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid > 6. Experimental Validation of GOOSE’s Vulnerabilities > 6.2. Results and Discussion
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“One of such attacks, presented in Figure 9, illustrates that an intruder Alice masquerading as a Sub (Subscriber) can use header information ENCAP by taking advantage of the publisher’s re-transmissions and thereby fool legitimate subscribers to accept malicious PDU and GPDU that have been prepared using the attacker’s user-defined values.”
§ Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid > 6. Experimental Validation of GOOSE’s Vulnerabilities > 6.2. Results and Discussion
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on 2 assumptions not shown here.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In Figure 10b, the resultant change in CB1’s status from closed (1) before attack to open (zero) after attack is illustrated.”
§ Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid > 7. Falsified Attack Generation and Impact Analysis
plainstates a causeSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid > 6. Experimental Validation of GOOSE’s Vulnerabilities > 6.1. Experimental Setup
“Table 5 shows the security claims Alive, Weakagree, Nisynch to prove the correctness and to determine the complete characterization of the roles [35] and [20].”
§ Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid > 6. Experimental Validation of GOOSE’s Vulnerabilities > 6.2. Results and Discussion
“based on our simulation result that all three roles, namely Alive, Weakagree, Nisynch, and Niagree, failed to comply with the four characterization security properties.”
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BackgroundA Test bed dedicated to the Study of Vulnerabilities in IEC 61850 Power Utility Automation Networks
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Cited by
Reda, H. T., Anwar, A., & Mahmood, A. (2022) · Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.rser.2022.112423 · Cited by 197
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“[86] IEC 60870-5-104 [87] IEC 61850 [88] IEC 61400-25 [89] IEEE C37.”
Smart Substation Communications and Cybersecurity: A Comprehensive Survey
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Thwe, M. M., Stefanov, A. I., Rajkumar, V. S., & Pálenský, P. (2025) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2025.3580055 · Cited by 73
“Despite its numerous benefits, the GOOSE has limitations like security vulnerabilities since it did not extensively focus on cybersecurity measures [140].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Reda, H. T., Ray, B., Peidaee, P., Anwar, A., Mahmood, A., Kalam, A., & Islam, N.
- Affiliations
- La Trobe University (AU)
- Central Queensland University (AU)
- Victoria University (AU)
- Deakin University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Islam, Nahina
- ORCID
- Venue
- Sensors
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2021-02-23
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1554
- ISSN
- 1424-8220 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC7926645
- OpenAlex
- W3130854279
- Semantic Scholar
- cb345e634907c03f178790440198688e21d03d17
- Cited by
- 80
- References
- 37
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 5
- FWCI
- 4.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Sensors (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Victoria University Research Repository (Victoria University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Own your potential (DEAKIN) (submittedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- La Trobe University (cc-by)
- Funders
- Central Queensland University (HE3341)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power Systems and Technologies
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Smart Grid and Power Systems
- Keywords
- IEC 61850, GOOSE protocol, smart grid security, publish/subscribe protocol, substation protection, hardware-in-the-loop emulation, real-time testbed, malicious attacks, power system security
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