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Cited by 0Information and Cyber SecurityRisk and Safety AnalysisDigital Transformation in Industry

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 6 of the 12 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

An FMEA-Based Framework for Operational Technology Security Risk Prioritization in Manufacturing

Open access
Nugraha, Arya Adhi·2026·Jurnal Rekayasa Industri (JRI)
DOI 10.37631/jri.v8i2.2497
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Abstract

The increasing convergence of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) in manufacturing has introduced cybersecurity risks that threaten production reliability, operational continuity, and safety. However, conventional cybersecurity assessments often emphasize technical vulnerabilities without adequately considering their operational consequences. This study developed a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)-based framework integrating OT asset identification, cyber threat scenarios, failure modes, and operational impacts. Seven representative OT asset categories were evaluated using Severity (S), Occurrence (O), and Detection (D) criteria to calculate Risk Priority Numbers (RPNs) and establish risk-treatment priorities. The scenario-based assessment identified unauthorized Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) modification as the highest-priority risk (RPN = 420), followed by unauthorized remote access (RPN = 360), engineering workstation compromise (RPN = 324), and industrial network disruption (RPN = 324). A severity-based review mechanism was incorporated to address the limitations of conventional RPN prioritization. The proposed framework demonstrates how cyber-induced failure modes can be systematically translated into manufacturing-oriented risk priorities. By integrating cybersecurity considerations with industrial risk engineering, the framework provides a structured decision-support approach for prioritizing security controls and supporting production reliability, operational resilience, and risk-informed manufacturing management.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper develops an FMEA-based framework for prioritizing Operational Technology (OT) security risks in manufacturing by translating cyber threat scenarios into failure modes and scoring them with Severity, Occurrence, and Detection. Applied to seven representative OT asset categories, it ranks unauthorized PLC logic modification as the highest-priority risk (RPN = 420).

Key findings

  • Unauthorized PLC logic modification had the highest RPN (420), followed by unauthorized remote access (360), engineering workstation compromise (324), industrial network disruption (324), and SCADA server disruption (270).
  • HMI compromise (RPN = 240) and historian data manipulation (RPN = 168) were classified as moderate priority; the five highest scenarios were classified as high priority.
  • The framework adds a severity override: failure modes with Severity scores of 9–10 require explicit management review regardless of overall RPN classification.
  • The paper argues that RPN should be treated as a relative prioritization indicator, not an absolute cybersecurity risk measure, because different S/O/D combinations can produce identical RPN values.

Methods

  • Design: a design-oriented risk assessment approach using conventional FMEA, structured as OT asset → cyber threat → failure mode → operational effect → S/O/D → RPN → priority level → recommended treatment.
  • Sample/data: seven representative OT asset categories were assessed: PLC, HMI, engineering workstation, SCADA server, industrial network, historian server, and remote access infrastructure.
  • Analysis: each cyber-induced failure mode was scored on 10-point ordinal scales for Severity, Occurrence, and Detection; RPN was calculated as S × O × D, with reported priority bands of 1–100 low, 101–250 moderate, and 251–500 high.

Limitations

  • Stated: the numerical assessment is a framework-based application to representative OT scenarios and should not be generalized as universal risk values for all manufacturing environments.
  • Stated: S/O/D scores depend on organizational context, system architecture, threat exposure, existing controls, and expert judgment; conventional RPN can produce identical values for different risk profiles and does not explicitly account for adaptive cyber adversaries.
  • Stated/evident: the scenario-based assessment does not provide empirical evidence of operational performance improvement, and the paper calls for future industrial case studies and structured expert validation.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.37631/jri.v8i2.2497

Cites

13 of 13 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

6 of 12 cited sources checked · 6 supported · 0 flagged

  • Premisecitation

    Contemporary research demonstrates that cyberattack scenarios must be assessed according to their potential effects on industrial operations rather than solely according to traditional information-security criteria.

    “Contemporary research on industrial control systems further demonstrates the growing convergence between cybersecurity and process safety, emphasizing that cyberattack scenarios must be assessed according to their potential effects on industrial operations rather than solely according to traditional information-security criteria (Da Silva et al., 2025).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Da Silva et al., 2025 source
  • Findingown data

    SCADA server disruption had an RPN of 270.

    “Engineering workstation compromise and industrial network disruption shared an RPN of 324, followed by SCADA server disruption (RPN = 270).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The expert judgment used to assign Severity, Occurrence, and Detection scores is reliable.
    • Rests on an assumption: The set of seven OT cyber-induced failure modes analyzed is sufficiently complete to represent the relevant OT cybersecurity risks in manufacturing.
    • Rests on an assumption: The representative OT scenarios and their assigned scores are representative of real manufacturing OT environments.
  • Findingown data

    Engineering workstation compromise had an RPN of 324.

    “Engineering workstation compromise and industrial network disruption shared an RPN of 324, followed by SCADA server disruption (RPN = 270).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The expert judgment used to assign Severity, Occurrence, and Detection scores is reliable.
    • Rests on an assumption: The set of seven OT cyber-induced failure modes analyzed is sufficiently complete to represent the relevant OT cybersecurity risks in manufacturing.
    • Rests on an assumption: The representative OT scenarios and their assigned scores are representative of real manufacturing OT environments.
  • Findingown data

    Engineering workstation compromise and industrial network disruption produced identical RPN values (324).

    “Engineering workstation compromise and industrial network disruption produced identical RPN values (324).”
    • Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
      “The scenario-based assessment identified unauthorized Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) modification as the highest-priority risk (RPN = 420), followed by unauthorized remote access (RPN = 360), engineering workstation compromise (RPN = 324), and industrial network disruption (RPN = 324).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The seven OT asset categories selected are representative of manufacturing OT environments.
  • Findingown data

    Industrial network disruption had an RPN of 324.

    “Engineering workstation compromise and industrial network disruption shared an RPN of 324, followed by SCADA server disruption (RPN = 270).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The expert judgment used to assign Severity, Occurrence, and Detection scores is reliable.
    • Rests on an assumption: The set of seven OT cyber-induced failure modes analyzed is sufficiently complete to represent the relevant OT cybersecurity risks in manufacturing.
    • Rests on an assumption: The representative OT scenarios and their assigned scores are representative of real manufacturing OT environments.
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 53
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 26

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Premisecitation

    Previous research has modified FMEA for cybersecurity risk assessment in manufacturing by incorporating game-theoretic estimation of cyberattack likelihood, demonstrating that failure-oriented methods can be adapted to represent adversarial risks in cyber-physical manufacturing systems.

    “Previous research has modified FMEA for cybersecurity risk assessment in manufacturing by incorporating game-theoretic estimation of cyberattack likelihood, demonstrating that failure-oriented methods can be adapted to represent adversarial risks in cyber-physical manufacturing systems (Zarreh et al., 2019;Rahman et al., 2024;Suorsa & Helo, 2026).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Zarreh et al., 2019 source
    • cites Rahman et al., 2024

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Suorsa & Helo, 2026

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

    Premisecitation

    The proposed risk prioritization approach is consistent with previous industrial engineering research emphasizing systematic assessment of operational failure consequences.

    “The proposed risk prioritization approach is consistent with previous industrial engineering research emphasizing systematic assessment of operational failure consequences.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Asdi et al., 2025 source
    • cites Ayu Febriana et al., 2025 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Premisecitation

    Asdi et al. (2025) applied FMEA to prioritize operational risks and formulate mitigation strategies.

    “Similarly, Asdi et al. (2025) applied FMEA to prioritize operational risks and formulate mitigation strategies.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Asdi et al. (2025) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Premisecitation

    FMEA has been integrated with Bayesian networks for cybersecurity risk assessment in complex operational environments, illustrating its capacity to structure cyber threats as failure scenarios and quantitatively prioritize their associated risks.

    “Beyond manufacturing, FMEA has been integrated with Bayesian networks for cybersecurity risk assessment in complex operational environments, illustrating its capacity to structure cyber threats as failure scenarios and quantitatively prioritize their associated risks (Park et al., 2023).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Park et al., 2023 source

  • It may state two separate claims as one.

    Findingown data

    Unauthorized PLC logic modification generated the highest RPN (420), followed by unauthorized remote access (360).

    “Unauthorized PLC logic modification generated the highest RPN (420), followed by unauthorized remote access (360).”
    • Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
      “The scenario-based assessment identified unauthorized Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) modification as the highest-priority risk (RPN = 420), followed by unauthorized remote access (RPN = 360), engineering workstation compromise (RPN = 324), and industrial network disruption (RPN = 324).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The seven OT asset categories selected are representative of manufacturing OT environments.

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Findingnone given

    The proposed framework was applied to seven representative OT asset categories: PLC, HMI, engineering workstation, SCADA server, industrial network, historian server, and remote access infrastructure.

    “The proposed framework was applied to seven representative OT asset categories: Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), Human-Machine Interface (HMI), engineering workstation, SCADA server, industrial network, historian server, and remote access infrastructure.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The seven OT asset categories selected are representative of manufacturing OT environments.

  • It may state two separate claims as one.

    Findingown data

    The assessment identified five high-priority OT cyber-induced failure scenarios with RPN values ranging from 270 to 420, and two moderate-priority scenarios with RPN values of 168 and 240.

    “The assessment identified five high-priority scenarios, with RPN values ranging from 270 to 420, and two moderate-priority scenarios, with RPN values of 168 and 240.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The expert judgment used to assign Severity, Occurrence, and Detection scores is reliable.
    • Rests on an assumption: The set of seven OT cyber-induced failure modes analyzed is sufficiently complete to represent the relevant OT cybersecurity risks in manufacturing.
    • Rests on an assumption: The representative OT scenarios and their assigned scores are representative of real manufacturing OT environments.

  • It may state two separate claims as one.

    Findingreasoning

    Historian data manipulation had an RPN of 168 and was assigned moderate priority.

    “HMI compromise (RPN = 240) and historian data manipulation (RPN = 168) were assigned moderate priority.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The expert judgment used to assign Severity, Occurrence, and Detection scores is reliable.
    • Rests on an assumption: The set of seven OT cyber-induced failure modes analyzed is sufficiently complete to represent the relevant OT cybersecurity risks in manufacturing.
    • Rests on an assumption: The representative OT scenarios and their assigned scores are representative of real manufacturing OT environments.

  • It may state two separate claims as one.

    Findingreasoning

    HMI compromise had an RPN of 240 and was assigned moderate priority.

    “HMI compromise (RPN = 240) and historian data manipulation (RPN = 168) were assigned moderate priority.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The expert judgment used to assign Severity, Occurrence, and Detection scores is reliable.
    • Rests on an assumption: The set of seven OT cyber-induced failure modes analyzed is sufficiently complete to represent the relevant OT cybersecurity risks in manufacturing.
    • Rests on an assumption: The representative OT scenarios and their assigned scores are representative of real manufacturing OT environments.

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

    Premisecitation

    FMEA has been adapted to Industry 4.0 production systems to evaluate the reliability implications of conventional and digitally connected components, demonstrating its applicability to smart manufacturing environments.

    “FMEA has been adapted to Industry 4.0 production systems to evaluate the reliability implications of conventional and digitally connected components, demonstrating its applicability to smart manufacturing environments (Salah et al., 2023).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Salah et al., 2023 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductnone given

    The calculated RPN values were used primarily as a relative prioritization mechanism rather than an absolute measure of cybersecurity risk.

    “The calculated RPN values were used primarily as a relative prioritization mechanism rather than an absolute measure of cybersecurity risk.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The resulting framework operates at three analytical levels: asset level, failure-mode level, and decision level.

    “The resulting framework therefore operates at three analytical levels: asset level, which determines what manufacturing resources require protection; failure-mode level, which determines how cyber threats may disrupt production; and decision level, which determines which risks should receive treatment priority.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • It may state two separate claims as one.

    Premisereasoning

    The intersection between OT cybersecurity and manufacturing-oriented FMEA remains comparatively underdeveloped: cyber threats to OT assets are not yet consistently conceptualized as potential failure modes whose effects can be evaluated in terms of manufacturing consequences and subsequently translated into operational risk priorities.

    “The intersection between these streams remains comparatively underdeveloped: cyber threats to OT assets are not yet consistently conceptualized as potential failure modes whose effects can be evaluated in terms of manufacturing consequences and subsequently translated into operational risk priorities.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Premisecitation

    Yuda and Al-Faritsy (2026) integrated FMEA with reliability-centered maintenance to identify critical equipment failures and establish maintenance interventions aimed at reducing production downtime.

    “For instance, Yuda and Al-Faritsy (2026) integrated FMEA with reliability-centered maintenance to identify critical equipment failures and establish maintenance interventions aimed at reducing production downtime.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Yuda and Al-Faritsy (2026)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    The proposed approach conceptualizes cyber threat scenarios as potential failure modes within manufacturing OT systems.

    “Rather than treating cybersecurity risk exclusively as an information-security problem, the proposed approach conceptualizes cyber threat scenarios as potential failure modes within manufacturing OT systems.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Interpretationnone given

    Effective OT cybersecurity in manufacturing requires more than identifying technical vulnerabilities; it requires understanding how cyber threats can cause operational failures and which of those failures demand priority attention.

    “In conclusion, effective OT cybersecurity in manufacturing requires more than identifying technical vulnerabilities; it requires understanding how cyber threats can cause operational failures and which of those failures demand priority attention.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Manufacturing organizations need a practical mechanism that translates cyber threats into operationally meaningful risk priorities.

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductnone given

    The OT Security FMEA Register was designed to maintain traceability between manufacturing assets, cybersecurity threats, operational failures, risk scores, and treatment decisions.

    “The register was designed to maintain traceability between manufacturing assets, cybersecurity threats, operational failures, risk scores, and treatment decisions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductnone given

    The RPN thresholds were used as decision-support bands developed for the proposed framework, rather than universal FMEA thresholds.

    “The thresholds were used as decision-support bands developed for the proposed framework, rather than universal FMEA thresholds.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

    Interpretationreasoning

    This establishes a conceptual bridge between cybersecurity risk management, reliability engineering, and operational resilience.

    “This establishes a conceptual bridge between cybersecurity risk management, reliability engineering, and operational resilience.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    The framework connects OT assets, cyber threat scenarios, vulnerabilities or failure causes, operational effects, existing detection mechanisms, and risk-treatment priorities through the conventional FMEA dimensions of severity, occurrence, and detection.

    “The framework connects OT assets, cyber threat scenarios, vulnerabilities or failure causes, operational effects, existing detection mechanisms, and risk-treatment priorities through the conventional FMEA dimensions of severity, occurrence, and detection.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Preventive controls address Occurrence, detective controls improve Detection, and recovery measures support production restoration and operational resilience.

    “Risktreatment decisions are subsequently aligned with the dominant risk factors: preventive controls address Occurrence, detective controls improve Detection, and recovery measures support production restoration and operational resilience.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductnone given

    The present scenario-based assessment does not provide empirical evidence of operational performance improvement.

    “Although the present scenario-based assessment does not provide empirical evidence of operational performance improvement, the proposed evaluation mechanism enables future manufacturing applications to examine whether prioritized cybersecurity controls contribute to measurable reductions in operational disruption.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductnone given

    The study's sequence was designed to maintain traceability from an OT asset and its associated cyber threat to the resulting operational consequence and recommended treatment priority.

    “This sequence was designed to maintain traceability from an OT asset and its associated cyber threat to the resulting operational consequence and recommended treatment priority.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductnone given

    Explicit operational definitions were established for severity, occurrence, and detection to reduce inconsistent interpretation of FMEA scores.

    “First, explicit operational definitions were established for severity, occurrence, and detection to reduce inconsistent interpretation of FMEA scores.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    The study proposes an FMEA-based framework for Operational Technology security risk prioritization in manufacturing.

    “This study addresses this gap by proposing an FMEA-based framework for Operational Technology security risk prioritization in manufacturing.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The study contributes theoretically by extending conventional FMEA reasoning into OT cybersecurity and positioning cyber-induced events as potential causes of manufacturing system failures.

    “The study contributes theoretically by extending conventional FMEA reasoning into OT cybersecurity and positioning cyber-induced events as potential causes of manufacturing system failures.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Interpretationnone given

    The study contributes theoretically by extending failure-oriented risk analysis into the domain of OT cybersecurity and positioning cyber risk within the broader context of manufacturing reliability and operational resilience.

    “The study contributes theoretically by extending failure-oriented risk analysis into the domain of OT cybersecurity and positioning cyber risk within the broader context of manufacturing reliability and operational resilience.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

    Interpretationnone given

    The proposed framework is expected to provide manufacturing organizations with a structured and interpretable mechanism for integrating cybersecurity considerations into existing risk-management, maintenance, reliability, and operational decision-making processes.

    “From a practical perspective, the proposed framework is expected to provide manufacturing organizations with a structured and interpretable mechanism for integrating cybersecurity considerations into existing risk-management, maintenance, reliability, and operational decision-making processes.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductnone given

    Each assessment maintained traceability between the OT asset, threat scenario, failure mode, and operational effect.

    “Second, each assessment maintained traceability between the OT asset, threat scenario, failure mode, and operational effect.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The framework is positioned as a transparent and practical baseline for OT security prioritization rather than as a replacement for advanced probabilistic or dynamic cyber-risk models.

    “Accordingly, the framework is positioned as a transparent and practical baseline for OT security prioritization rather than as a replacement for advanced probabilistic or dynamic cyber-risk models.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

    Premisenone given

    Cyber threats involve adaptive adversaries whose behavior cannot always be represented through conventional failure-frequency assumptions.

    “Furthermore, cyber threats involve adaptive adversaries whose behavior cannot always be represented through conventional failure-frequency assumptions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Premisenone given

    Conventional RPN-based prioritization has limitations, including subjective scoring, equal mathematical treatment of Severity, Occurrence, and Detection, and the possibility of identical RPN values for different risk profiles.

    “Nevertheless, conventional RPN-based prioritization has several limitations, including subjective scoring, equal mathematical treatment of Severity, Occurrence, and Detection, and the possibility of identical RPN values for different risk profiles.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

    Interpretationreasoning

    This integration enables manufacturing organizations to prioritize cybersecurity interventions according to their potential contribution to production reliability, equipment availability, and operational continuity.

    “This integration enables manufacturing organizations to prioritize cybersecurity interventions according to their potential contribution to production reliability, equipment availability, and operational continuity.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The seven OT asset categories selected are representative of manufacturing OT environments.

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    Severity, occurrence, and detection scores remain dependent on organizational context, system architecture, threat exposure, existing controls, and expert judgment.

    “Severity, occurrence, and detection scores remain dependent on organizational context, system architecture, threat exposure, existing controls, and expert judgment.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The expert judgment used to assign Severity, Occurrence, and Detection scores is reliable.

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

    Study design and conductreasoning

    The numerical assessment presented in this study represents a framework-based application to representative OT scenarios and should not be generalized as universal risk values for all manufacturing environments.

    “The numerical assessment presented in this study represents a framework-based application to representative OT scenarios and should therefore not be generalized as universal risk values for all manufacturing environments.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The expert judgment used to assign Severity, Occurrence, and Detection scores is reliable.
    • Rests on an assumption: The set of seven OT cyber-induced failure modes analyzed is sufficiently complete to represent the relevant OT cybersecurity risks in manufacturing.
    • Rests on an assumption: The representative OT scenarios and their assigned scores are representative of real manufacturing OT environments.

  • Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The novelty of this study lies in reframing OT cybersecurity risk prioritization as a manufacturing risk-engineering problem.

    “The novelty of this study therefore lies not merely in applying FMEA to cybersecurity, but in reframing OT cybersecurity risk prioritization as a manufacturing risk-engineering problem.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    The analytical procedure enables the assessment to be replicated for different manufacturing systems by modifying the asset inventory, threat scenarios, operational context, and organizational risk criteria while retaining the underlying analytical structure.

    “This procedure enables the assessment to be replicated for different manufacturing systems by modifying the asset inventory, threat scenarios, operational context, and organizational risk criteria while retaining the underlying analytical structure.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Study design and conductreasoning

    The interpretation of RPN was not performed mechanically; failure modes receiving very high severity scores were separately flagged for management review even when their overall RPN did not fall within the highest category.

    “In addition, the interpretation of RPN was not performed mechanically.Failure modes receiving very high severity scores were separately flagged for management review even when their overall RPN did not fall within the highest category.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Scenarios with RPN values of 101-250 were classified as moderate priority and subjected to planned control improvements and periodic monitoring.

    “Based on the predefined risk classification criteria, scenarios with RPN values of 251-500 were categorized as high priority, requiring prioritized risk-treatment actions, while those with values of 101-250 were classified as moderate priority and subjected to planned control improvements and periodic monitoring.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Scenarios with RPN values of 251-500 were categorized as high priority, requiring prioritized risk-treatment actions.

    “Based on the predefined risk classification criteria, scenarios with RPN values of 251-500 were categorized as high priority, requiring prioritized risk-treatment actions, while those with values of 101-250 were classified as moderate priority and subjected to planned control improvements and periodic monitoring.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Study design and conductreasoning

    The study did not involve intervention on human participants, collection of personally identifiable information, or experimentation affecting individuals, so formal human-subject ethical approval was not applicable.

    “As the study focused on the development and analytical application of a risk-prioritization framework and did not involve intervention on human participants, collection of personally identifiable information, or experimentation affecting individuals, formal human-subject ethical approval was not applicable.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Study design and conductnone given

    RPN values were interpreted as relative decision-support indicators, acknowledging that conventional FMEA scoring does not constitute a probabilistic estimate of cyber risk.

    “Third, RPN values were interpreted as relative decision-support indicators, acknowledging that conventional FMEA scoring does not constitute a probabilistic estimate of cyber risk.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

    Interpretationnone given

    The proposed FMEA-based framework provides a systematic and interpretable foundation for aligning OT cybersecurity decisions with production reliability, operational continuity, and manufacturing resilience.

    “The proposed FMEA-based framework provides a systematic and interpretable foundation for this purpose, enabling OT cybersecurity decisions to be aligned with the broader objectives of production reliability, operational continuity, and manufacturing resilience.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductreasoning

    RPN should be interpreted as a relative prioritization indicator rather than an absolute measurement of cybersecurity risk.

    “However, RPN should be interpreted as a relative prioritization indicator rather than an absolute measurement of cybersecurity risk.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Premisenone given

    An important research gap remains: existing OT cybersecurity studies predominantly emphasize threat identification, vulnerability analysis, attack modeling, or cybersecurity controls, while manufacturing-oriented FMEA studies primarily address equipment failures, process disruptions, quality problems, and conventional operational risks.

    “Despite these developments, an important research gap remains.Existing OT cybersecurity studies predominantly emphasize threat identification, vulnerability analysis, attack modeling, or cybersecurity controls, while manufacturing-oriented FMEA studies primarily address equipment failures, process disruptions, quality problems, and conventional operational risks.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Study design and conductreasoning

    These limitations were partially addressed by retaining the individual S, O, and D scores alongside the RPN and requiring separate review of high-severity scenarios.

    “These limitations were partially addressed by retaining the individual S, O, and D scores alongside the RPN and requiring separate review of high-severity scenarios.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Scenarios with Severity scores of 9-10 require explicit management evaluation regardless of their overall RPN classification.

    “Scenarios with Severity scores of 9-10 require explicit management evaluation regardless of their overall RPN classification.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

    Premisenone given

    Expert-based scoring can introduce subjectivity into the assessment process.

    “Furthermore, expert-based scoring can introduce subjectivity into the assessment process.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The principal contribution of this study is the development of an interpretable framework that integrates cybersecurity risk assessment with manufacturing-oriented decision-making.

    “The principal contribution of this study is therefore the development of an interpretable framework that integrates cybersecurity risk assessment with manufacturing-oriented decision-making.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

    Study design and conductnone given

    The proposed severity-based review mechanism provides an additional safeguard.

    “Although the proposed severity-based review mechanism provides an additional safeguard, the framework requires further validation using industrial operational data and structured expert assessment.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • It may state two separate claims as one.

    Interpretationnone given

    The proposed framework establishes an explicit analytical linkage between cyber events and their consequences for production operations, enabling cybersecurity decisions to be prioritized according to operational criticality.

    “The proposed framework establishes an explicit analytical linkage between cyber events and their consequences for production operations, enabling cybersecurity decisions to be prioritized according to operational criticality.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The adaptation of the Detection criterion to OT cybersecurity is an important methodological contribution.

    “An important methodological contribution is the adaptation of the Detection criterion to OT cybersecurity.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    The framework addresses the need for a practical mechanism that translates cyber threats into operationally meaningful risk priorities.

    “The framework addresses the need for a practical mechanism that translates cyber threats into operationally meaningful risk priorities.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Manufacturing organizations need a practical mechanism that translates cyber threats into operationally meaningful risk priorities.

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Study design and conductreasoning

    The detailed assessment retained individual scores from 1 to 10, while the ranges shown in Table 1 provide interpretive anchors to improve consistency in risk evaluation.

    “The detailed assessment retained individual scores from 1 to 10, while the ranges shown in Table 1 provide interpretive anchors to improve consistency in risk evaluation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • It may state two separate claims as one.

    Premisecitation

    Conventional RPN-based prioritization has established limitations, including subjectivity in scoring and the possibility that different combinations of severity, occurrence, and detection generate identical RPN values.

    “At the same time, the study recognizes established limitations of conventional RPN-based prioritization-including subjectivity in scoring and the possibility that different combinations of severity, occurrence, and detection generate identical RPN values (Ervural & Ayaz, 2023).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ervural & Ayaz, 2023 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    The framework integrates three interconnected dimensions: risk identification, risk prioritization, and operational improvement.

    “The framework integrates three interconnected dimensions: risk identification, risk prioritization, and operational improvement.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Premisenone given

    Conventional RPN calculations may produce identical values for substantially different combinations of risk factors and do not explicitly account for the adaptive behavior of cyber adversaries.

    “In addition, conventional RPN calculations may produce identical values for substantially different combinations of risk factors and do not explicitly account for the adaptive behavior of cyber adversaries.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Premisenone given

    The criticality of an OT asset cannot be adequately determined from its cybersecurity properties alone; it must also reflect its contribution to production continuity, process control, equipment operation, product quality, and safety.

    “This characterization was necessary because the criticality of an OT asset cannot be adequately determined from its cybersecurity properties alone; it must also reflect its contribution to production continuity, process control, equipment operation, product quality, and safety.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

    Premisenone given

    The multiplication of three ordinal ratings may produce identical RPN values for failure modes with substantially different risk characteristics, while the equal mathematical weighting of severity, occurrence, and detection may not accurately represent organizational priorities.

    “The multiplication of three ordinal ratings may produce identical RPN values for failure modes with substantially different risk characteristics, while the equal mathematical weighting of severity, occurrence, and detection may not accurately represent organizational priorities.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    High-severity scenarios require explicit management review even when their occurrence or detection scores result in a comparatively moderate RPN.

    “High-severity scenarios require explicit management review even when their occurrence or detection scores result in a comparatively moderate RPN.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
60 of 60

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    OT systems directly interact with physical processes.

    “Unlike conventional IT environments, OT systems directly interact with physical processes.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The seven OT asset categories selected are representative of manufacturing OT environments.

    “The proposed framework was applied to seven representative OT asset categories: Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), Human-Machine Interface (HMI), engineering workstation, SCADA server, industrial network, historian server, and remote access infrastructure.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The considered cyber threat scenarios are common and relevant to industrial environments.

    “Threat scenarios considered common attack mechanisms relevant to industrial environments, including unauthorized access, malware infection, credential compromise, denial-of-service conditions, unauthorized configuration or logic modification, manipulation of process information, network communication disruption, and compromise of engineering or operator interfaces.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The ten-point ordinal scale and operational definitions adequately capture severity, occurrence, and detection for cyber-induced failure modes.

    “A ten-point ordinal scale was adopted for each dimension, where higher values represent greater risk.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The four RPN priority categories are appropriate decision-support bands.

    “For practical interpretation, the resulting RPN values were grouped into four priority categories, as presented in Table 2.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Expert-based scoring is sufficiently reliable despite potential subjectivity.

    “Furthermore, expert-based scoring can introduce subjectivity into the assessment process.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Manufacturing organizations need a practical mechanism that translates cyber threats into operationally meaningful risk priorities.

    “The framework addresses the need for a practical mechanism that translates cyber threats into operationally meaningful risk priorities.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The expert judgment used to assign Severity, Occurrence, and Detection scores is reliable.

    “Severity, occurrence, and detection scores remain dependent on organizational context, system architecture, threat exposure, existing controls, and expert judgment.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The set of seven OT cyber-induced failure modes analyzed is sufficiently complete to represent the relevant OT cybersecurity risks in manufacturing.

    “The assessment identified five high-priority scenarios, with RPN values ranging from 270 to 420, and two moderate-priority scenarios, with RPN values of 168 and 240.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The representative OT scenarios and their assigned scores are representative of real manufacturing OT environments.

    “The numerical assessment presented in this study represents a framework-based application to representative OT scenarios and should therefore not be generalized as universal risk values for all manufacturing environments.”
10 of 10

Citations

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Automotive Industry Action Group, & Verband der Automobilindustrie. (2019). AIAG & VDA FMEA handbook (1st ed.). Automotive Industry Action Group.

Cited by

Still being checked.

Related

Metadata

Authors
Nugraha, A. A.
Affiliations
Swiss German University (ID)
Corresponding author
Nugraha, Arya Adhi
Venue
Jurnal Rekayasa Industri (JRI)
Publisher
Universitas Widya Mataram
Published
2026-10-31
Volume
8
Issue
2
Pages
127-139
ISSN
  • 2714-8874 (ISSN-L)
  • 2714-8882
DOI
10.37631/jri.v8i2.2497
OpenAlex
W7225011115
Cited by
0
References
13
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
JURNAL REKAYASA INDUSTRI (JRI) (publishedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Risk and Safety Analysis
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering › Digital Transformation in Industry
Keywords
operational technology security, manufacturing cybersecurity, risk prioritization, failure mode and effects analysis, risk priority number, IT-OT convergence, operational resilience

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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