Equilibria in Health Exchanges: Adverse Selection versus Reclassification Risk
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper studies equilibrium and welfare in a class of regulated health insurance markets known as exchanges. We use detailed health plan choice and utilization data to model individual-level (i) projected health risk and (ii) risk preferences. We combine the estimated distributions of risk and risk preferences with a model of competitive insurance markets to predict allocations and prices
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation
Train, K. E. (2001) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511805271 · Cited by 7,784
Barsky, R. B., Juster, F. T., Kimball, M. S., & Shapiro, M. D. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555280 · Cited by 2,400
Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets
Chiappori, P., & Salanie, B. (2000) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262111 · Cited by 1,013
Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts
Handel, B. R. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.7.2643 · Cited by 707
Self-citationSelection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Ryan, S. P., Schrimpf, P., & Cullen, M. R. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.1.178 · Cited by 417
Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey
Cardon, J. H., & Hendel, I. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696362 · Cited by 411 · cited 5×
“Cardon and Hendel (2001) find no evidence of selection based on private information with coarser data while Carlin and Town (2009) use claims data that are similarly detailed to ours and also argue that significant residual selection is unlikely. where Wj denotes household wealth, Pjkt is the…”
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Cited by
Health Insurance for “Humans”: Information Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare
Handel, B. R., & Kolstad, J. T. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20131126 · Cited by 427
Self-citationChoose to Lose: Health Plan Choices from a Menu with Dominated Option*
Bhargava, S., Loewenstein, G., & Sydnor, J. (2017) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjx011 · Cited by 294
Alternative Payment Models and Performance in Federally Qualified Health Centers
Markowski, J., Wallace, J., Schlesinger, M., & Ndumele, C. D. (2024) · JAMA Internal Medicine · doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2024.2754 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Handel, B., Hendel, I., & Whinston, M. D.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2015
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1261-1313
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2144650466
- Cited by
- 199
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 56.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm, 243 d)
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.