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Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games

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Bergemann, Dirk, Morris, Stephen·2016·Theoretical Economics

Abstract

A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states, the payoff functions, and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the players receive in the game. We characterize the set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibrium if players observe the given information structure but may also observe additional signals. The characterization corresponds to the set of (a version of) incomplete information correlated equilibria, which we dub Bayes correlated equilibria. We identify a partial order on many-player information structures (individual sufficiency) under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. This order captures the role of information in imposing (incentive) constraints on behavior.

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Metadata

Authors
Bergemann, D., & Morris, S.
Venue
Theoretical Economics
Published
2016-05
Volume
11
Issue
2
Pages
487-522
ISSN
  • 1555-7561 (ISSN-L)
  • 1933-6837
OpenAlex
W3122903325
Cited by
379
References
25
FWCI
35.76
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3982/te1808
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Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. (2016). Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games. Theoretical Economics. https://doi.org/10.3982/te1808

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