From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: Francisco Varela’s exploration of the biophysics of being.
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 61 of the 61 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper reviews in detail Francisco Varela's work on subjectivity and consciousness in the biological sciences. His original approach to this "hard problem" presents a subjectivity that is radically intertwined with its biological and physical roots. It must be understood within the framework of his theory of a concrete, embodied dynamics, grounded in his general theory of autonomous systems. Through concepts and paradigms such as biological autonomy, embodiment and neurophenomenology, the article explores the multiple levels of circular causality assumed by Varela to play a fundamental role in the emergence of human experience. The concept of biological autonomy provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for characterizing biological life and identity as an emergent and circular self-producing process. Embodiment provides a systemic and dynamical framework for understanding how a cognitive self--a mind--can arise in an organism in the midst of its operational cycles of internal regulation and ongoing sensorimotor coupling. Global subjective properties can emerge at different levels from the interactions of components and can reciprocally constrain local processes through an ongoing, recursive morphodynamics. Neurophenomenology is a supplementary step in the study of consciousness. Through a rigorous method, it advocates the careful examination of experience with first-person methodologies. It attempts to create heuristic mutual constraints between biophysical data and data produced by accounts of subjective experience. The aim is to explicitly ground the active and disciplined insight the subject has about his/her experience in a biophysical emergent process. Finally, we discuss Varela's essential contribution to our understanding of the generation of consciousness in the framework of what we call his "biophysics of being."
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“Such functional boundaries are an essential source of adaptive constraints for biological systems (Rudrauf et al., 2003; Hordijk and Steel, 2015; Lane, 2016), both internally concentrating system-promoting complexity and limiting system-threatening exchanges with external environments.”
From An Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) of Consciousness (2020) · cites this paper as Rudrauf et al., 2003
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“We agree with Varela that the neurophenomenological approach (outlined in the section “Methodology” above), provides, in a certain sense, a “methodological remedy” for the “Hard Problem” of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996; Varela, 1996; Rudrauf et al., 2003).”
From The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood (2018) · cites this paper as Rudrauf et al., 2003
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Cites
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Research works printed but not linked: 17
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Cited by
Phenomenology of future-oriented mind-wandering episodes
Stawarczyk, D., Cassol, H., & D'Argembeau, A. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00425 · Cited by 176
Safron, A. (2020) · Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.3389/frai.2020.00030 · Cited by 133
“Such functional boundaries are an essential source of adaptive constraints for biological systems (Rudrauf et al., 2003; Hordijk and Steel, 2015; Lane, 2016 ), both internally concentrating system-promoting complexity and limiting system-threatening exchanges with external environments.”
BackgroundA mathematical model of embodied consciousness.
Rudrauf, D., Bennequin, D., Granic, I., Landini, G., Friston, K., & Williford, K. (2017) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.05.032 · Cited by 118
Self-citationThe Meaning of Mindfulness: A Second-Order Cybernetics of Stress, Metacognition, and Coping
Garland, E. L. (2007) · Complementary health practice review · doi:10.1177/1533210107301740 · Cited by 118
The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
Williford, K., Bennequin, D., Friston, K., & Rudrauf, D. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02571 · Cited by 78
“The “Hard Problem” and Computational Functionalism We agree with Varela that the neurophenomenological approach (outlined in the section “Methodology” above), provides, in a certain sense, a “methodological remedy” for the “Hard Problem” of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996; Varela, 1996; Rudrauf et al., 2003).”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- RUDRAUF, D., LUTZ, A., COSMELLI, D., LACHAUX, J.-P., & LE VAN QUYEN, M.
- Affiliations
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives (FR)
- Corresponding author
- RUDRAUF, DAVID
- Venue
- Biological Research
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 27-65
- ISSN
- 0716-9760 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2149025351
- Cited by
- 195
- References
- 61
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 0.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Biological Research (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- Americanae (AECID Library) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- Francisco Varela, autopoiesis, neurophenomenology, consciousness, subjectivity, biological autonomy, embodiment, circular causality, emergence, mind-brain relationship, first-person methods, sensorimotor coupling, autonomous systems, self-production
- MeSH terms
- Autonomic Nervous System, Biophysics, Brain, Consciousness, Humans, Mental Processes, Models, Neurological, Self Concept, Biophysical Phenomena
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- RUDRAUF, D., LUTZ, A., COSMELLI, D., LACHAUX, J.-P., & LE VAN QUYEN, M. (2003). From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: Francisco Varela’s exploration of the biophysics of being. Biological Research. https://doi.org/10.4067/s0716-97602003000100005
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