The DOI matches its Crossref record; 104 of the 106 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Phenomenological Mind
Abstract
The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: • what is phenomenology? • naturalizing phenomenology and the cognitive sciences • phenomenology and consciousness • consciousness and self-consciousness • time and consciousness • intentionality • the embodied mind • action • knowledge of other minds • situated and extended minds • phenomenology and personal identity. This second edition includes a new preface, and revised and improved chapters. Also included are helpful features such as chapter summaries, guides to further reading, and a glossary, making The Phenomenological Mind an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind.
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In the citing paper
“Axiom four of IIT 3.0, the axiom of integration, confounds integration with what phenomenologists call the unity of conscious experience [11–13].”
From The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory (2015) · cites this paper as [13]
In the citing paper
“the second part of the definition (an experience is what it is by differing from an immense number of other possible experiences) is clearly Tononi’s addition of information exclusion to this axiom and is not a part of phenomenology [11–13].”
From The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory (2015) · cites this paper as [13]
In the citing paper
“The subjective experiencing body (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007), whether engaging with the world's affordances (Gibson, 1979) through the tactile sense, movement or in stillness, is the fundamental basis for all feelings, sensations, perceptions or object manipulation which in turn actively underlies cognition and meaning-making (Merleau-Ponty, 1962& 1965;Dewey, 1991).”
From Clinical outcomes from The BodyMind Approach™ in the treatment of patients with medically unexplained symptoms in primary health care in England: Practice-based evidence (2016) · cites this paper as Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007
Citations
Cites
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00076512 · Cited by 8,743
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8 · Cited by 8,599
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Ryle, G. (2006) · Rowman & Littlefield Publishers eBooks · doi:10.5040/9798216413257.ch-2 · Cited by 6,804
Johnson, M. (1987) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226177847.001.0001 · Cited by 6,450
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E. H., & Thompson, E. T. (2017) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 5,910
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364
Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again.
van Gelder, T., & Clark, A. (1998) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2998391 · Cited by 3,134
Making it explicit : reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment
Brandom, R. B. (1994) · Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association · Cited by 2,620
Ricœur, P., McLaughlin, K., & Pellauer, D. (1986) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 2,472
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Translanguaging as a Practical Theory of Language
Wei, L. (2018) · Applied Linguistics · doi:10.1093/applin/amx039 · Cited by 2,907
Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy
Nodelman, U., Allen, C., & Zalta, E. N. (2002) · ACM/IEEE Joint Conference on Digital Libraries · doi:10.1145/544220.544327 · Cited by 1,999
Toward a second-person neuroscience
Schilbach, L., Timmermans, B., Reddy, V., Costall, A., Bente, G., Schlicht, T., & Vogeley, K. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000660 · Cited by 1,510
What is so special about embodied simulation?
Gallese, V., & Sinigaglia, C. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.09.003 · Cited by 728
The Interview: Data Collection in Descriptive Phenomenological Human Scientific Research
Englander, M. (2012) · Journal of Phenomenological Psychology · doi:10.1163/156916212x632943 · Cited by 684
Metadata
- Authors
- Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Copenhagen (DK)
- Venue
- Routledge eBooks
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2007-11-12
- OpenAlex
- W571383449
- Cited by
- 1,512
- References
- 106
- Citations by year
- 2026: 66 · 2025: 128 · 2024: 129 · 2023: 129 · 2022: 127 · 2021: 114 · 2020: 113 · 2019: 120 · 2018: 98 · 2017: 92 · 2016: 75 · 2015: 69 · 2014: 73 · 2013: 53 · 2012: 40
- FWCI
- 13.91
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
- University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) (submittedVersion)
- Research at the University of Copenhagen (University of Copenhagen) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- phenomenology, philosophy of mind, consciousness, self-consciousness, perception, intentionality, embodied mind, extended mind, situated cognition, personal identity, cognitive science, William James, time and consciousness, phantom limb, blindsight, schizophrenia
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