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Varieties of Epistemic Injustice 1

Pohlhaus, Gaile · 2017 · The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice

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Abstract

The idea of "epistemic injustice" draws together three branches of philosophy - political philosophy, ethics, and epistemology - to consider how epistemic practices and institutions may be deployed and structured in ways that are simultaneously infelicitous toward certain epistemic values (such as truth, aptness, and understanding) and unjust with regard to particular knowers. This chapter seeks to convey knowledge concerning the varieties of epistemic injustice does, by definition, engage in epistemic activity. It provides some initial examples of epistemic injustices so that readers may begin to understand the grammar of the term &s;epistemic injustice&s; for future and new uses. The chapter then presents four lenses with which to think about varieties of epistemic injustice. It also provides readers a sense of some ways epistemic injustices can take shape without foreclosing the possibility of thinking about epistemic injustices along other trajectories, and especially along trajectories that may be more readily noticed by those who are differently located than the author.

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Crossref · 10.4324/9781315212043-2

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Metadata

Authors
Pohlhaus, G.
Corresponding author
Pohlhaus, Gaile
Venue
The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice
Publisher
Routledge
Published
2017-03-31
Pages
13-26
OpenAlex
W4242300518
Cited by
240
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 21 · 2025: 32 · 2024: 60 · 2023: 45 · 2022: 39 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 3
FWCI
34.50
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
Keywords
epistemic injustice, epistemic practices, epistemic institutions, epistemic value, truth, aptness, understanding

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